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ABSTRACT
Voice, Arabness, and the Vocal Talent Competition Arab Idol
by
Insia Malik
Advisor: Jonathan H. Shannon
One of the most popular entertainment programs on Arabic television in the 2010s through to its
most recent season in 2017, Arab Idol (Mahbub al-‘Arab) was an offshoot of the Idols television
franchise that launched globally in the early 2000s. This dissertation is a study of how Arabness
was voiced quite literally on Arab Idol, through rhetoric and production—but primarily through
the music. A show in which an Arabness is implicit in the nomenclature, Arab Idol catered to an
Arab audience and thereby featured music that might speak to this audience. What distinguished
the offshoot from its global counterparts at its launch was a unity around a socio-linguistic and
regional Arab—rather than a national—identity, while celebrating the immense diversity across
this region of North Africa and the Arabic-speaking Middle East. Judges and the program’s
emcee made ample references to kull al-‘alam al-‘arabi (the entire Arab world) or al-watan al‘arabi (the Arab homeland). The songs on Arab Idol included popular numbers from the
twentieth century to the present, all performed in various dialects of Arabic. The music usually
featured modal maqam-based melodies, traditional rhythms, and vocal and instrumental
improvisations. Contestants performed songs associated with famous singers from across the
region, invoking both a general Arab pride and one for their respective countries, if they hailed
from the same country as the star who popularized the song. While Arab Idol has been examined
academically through the lens of media studies, and to a lesser extent through that of linguistic
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anthropology, my interest is in arguably the most important aspect of the show: the singing
voice. I argue that the framing of contestants, musical performances, and episodes of Arab Idol
were imbued with markers of Arabness. For Arab Idol, these markers included the Arabic
language, the issue of Palestine, and, most importantly, musical features, singers, and repertoire.
I explore Arab Idol’s links to earlier regional mediated musical programs and televised vocal
competitions that have contributed to the successful establishment of an Arab popular music
consciousness. I also suggest that Arab Idol reflected, redefined, and expanded a canonical Arab
voice formed over the decades by the various media industries in the region.
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GLOSSARY
Ahla Sawt: “the best voice,” alternate Arabic title for the Arab offshoot of The Voice franchise
al-‘alam al-‘arabi: “the Arab world,” a phrase used frequently on Arab Idol
al-‘amiyya: colloquial Arabic
al-watan al-‘arabi: “the Arab homeland or nation,” a phrase used frequently on Arab Idol
ard al-‘uruba: “land of Arabness,” a phrase used to refer to Palestine on Arab Idol
bahhah: vocal quality of hoarseness
balad: country or nation
dabke: Arab folk dance popular in Palestine and surrounding regions
dawr: vocal musical form, featuring a pseudo-operatic “ahat” vocal section
dulab: short introductory instrumental piece before a vocal performance
fa’iz: winner (e.g., of Arab Idol)
fakhr: pride
al-fusha: Literary or classical Arabic; also, Modern Standard Arabic (MSA)
ghunna: timbral technique involving the proper placement of a nasal resonance
hudur: presence; stage presence
ihsas: feeling; moving presence of a sounding person; presence of a spiritually powerful
situation
iqa‘, (pl. iqa‘at): rhythm
jawla: tour
jaww: ambience or atmosphere; also, weather
jumhur: audience, public, crowd
khawf: fear
khaym: character, nature
khibra: experience
hilu: sweet or nice, e.g., nice voice (sawt hilu)
lahzat al-fawz: “moment of winning,” as when the winner of Arab Idol is announced
lajna/lajnat al-tahkim: panel of judges
lawn, (pl. alwan): timbral color of a voice e.g., lawn tarab, lawn sha‘abi)
lazima, (pl. lawazim or lazimat): instrumental responses to a vocal line
layali: vocal improvisatory form
Mahbub al-‘Arab: “the Arabs’ beloved,” the alternate Arabic title of Arab Idol
maqam (pl. maqamat): melodic mode or scale in Arab music
mawwal (pl. mawawil): a vocal improvisation, often drawing on colloquial poetry
min al-muhit ila al-khalij: “from the [Atlantic] Ocean to the Gulf,” a phrase used frequently on
Arab Idol
mubaraza: duel, such as a vocal poetry duel
muhit: ocean; also, region
mujawwad: performative recitational style of the Qur’an reserved for public recitation
munafasa: contest, competition
musabaqa: contest, competition
mutrib: “wielder of tarab,” term for a performing singer
muwashshah: vocal musical and poetic form
Nahda: “renaissance” or “awakening”; the 19th century intellectual project associated with a
revival of Arab unity, including a revival of a standardized literary Arabic language
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Nakba: “catastrophe,” specifically referring to the Palestine catastrophe of displacement in 1948
Naksa: “setback,” specifically referring to the 1967 defeat of Arab armies under Gamal Abdel
Nasser during the Six-Day War with Israel
Qafla (pl. qaflat): “lock”; the ending of an improvisatory phrase
qarar: decision, e.g., decision of the audience (qarar al-jumhur)
qasida (pl. qasa’id): a vocal musical form or poetic classical ode
al-qudud al-halabiyya: literally “equivalencies”; a form of contrafactum composition associated
with the city of Aleppo
al-raqs al-sharqi: “Eastern dancing,” commonly known in English as belly dancing
safir: ambassador, e.g., ambassador of Yemeni culture (safir al-thaqafa al-yamani)
shakal: appearance
sawt, (pl. aswat): 1) voice, e.g., sawt tabi‘i (natural voice) or sawt hilu (nice voice); 2) vote
tabdil: an ornamental technique that involves the replacement of a note by its octave or another
note
tafrid: a performer’s use of a song’s melody as material for an improvisation
tajwid: “to do better”; a set of rules for the correct treatment of the text in Qur’anic recitation
taqsim, (pl. taqasim): “division,” solo instrumental improvisation
taqtuqa: colloquial vocal musical form
tarab: musical state or aesthetic of elation
tarjama: “translation,” an instrumentalist’s musical translation of a vocal line
taswir al-ma‘ana: interpretation of lyrics
taswit: “voting”; stems from the same triliteral root as sawt
thawra: revolution
tikrar: “repetition,” as within a vocal improvisation
ughniyyat al-fawz: “winning song” performed by the newly crowned “Arab Idol”
‘uruba: “Arabness,” Arab identity
‘urba/‘urab: a form of melisma; “lowering of the pitch;” the use of accidental notes to color a
phrase
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Introduction
It is 2013, and after several months of live-episode performances, SMS-text voting, and
social media buzz, Season Two of Arab Idol, one of Arabic television’s most popular programs
to date, has arrived at its much-anticipated finale. Up on stage are the three finalists from Egypt,
Syria, and Palestine as the in-studio audience remains restless and millions of viewers are tuned
in across the Middle East and around the world. Everyone is waiting to learn the outcome of the
audience’s votes, and to see who will be crowned Arab Idol.
The Palestinian finalist, Muhammad ‘Assaf, is one of the main reasons for all the buzz
leading up to this finale. ‘Assaf made headlines throughout the course of the program for his
rags-to-riches backstory, as a Gazan refugee who received the chance to compete despite
difficult circumstances. ‘Assaf has long been favored to win, and when his name is finally
announced as the Arab Idol winner—one of the most famous moments in the show’s history—
total chaos ensues, seemingly much more than the production crew is prepared to handle. The
venue erupts in cheers and audience members begin to flood the stage to embrace and
congratulate ‘Assaf, and to drape him with Palestinian flags. At first, the prerecorded Arab Idol
theme music plays in the background, and live shots of audiences celebrating in three locations
in Palestine—Gaza, Ramallah, and Nazareth—stream on television along with the live feed from
the Beirut studio. The emcee reiterates, “He is the Arab Idol of the second season…star of the
entire Arab world, a son of Palestine, a son of Gaza, the star of Arab Idol.”
A handful of security guards are responsible for barring the audience from ascending
onto the stage, but due to the sheer volume of people attempting to reach ‘Assaf in their elation,
their preventative efforts soon prove ineffectual. For a couple of minutes, the crew seem at a loss
as to how to deal with the situation in order to move ahead to the actual award ceremony. The
1

filler theme music having stopped, the emcees try to urge the audience to go back to their seats
with little success. Finally, the live broadcast resorts to briefly cutting the studio feed, showing
only shots of the jubilation in the Palestinian cities. When footage of the Beirut studio is back
onscreen, the stage has been cleared of everyone but ‘Assaf and the two hosts.
The Lebanese pop star and guest artist for the night’s programming, Assi El Hallani,
awards the Arab Idol trophy to ‘Assaf. After personally congratulating him, he extends his
congratulations to the people of Palestine. Then he adds: “At the same time…I congratulate the
Arab world [al-watan al-‘arabi] because Palestine is the bosom and mother of the Arab world
[hudun wa umm al-watan al-‘arabi]…because Muhammad…is Arab, not just Palestinian.” Next,
diplomatic officials arrive onstage, first the Palestinian United Nations ambassador Nawaya
Hassana, and then a representative relaying the sentiments of the president of the Palestinian
Authority, Mahmud ‘Abbas, praising ‘Assaf for his victory.
‘Assaf dedicates his prize to “the people of Palestine…the martyrs of the Palestinian
revolution…,” which is received with loud applause by the audience. After a pause, ‘Assaf adds:
“and [I dedicate it to] the entire Arab world [al-‘alam al-‘arabi].” It is unclear if the pause is due
to the encouragement he received either through his earpiece or from producers or other
personnel on stage, or if it occurred to him independently to tack on his acknowledgment of the
audience that the show Arab Idol was designed to address. Shortly afterward, ‘Assaf performs a
final song, “Ya Dunya ‘Alay Ishhadi” (World, witness me), which was written especially for his
potential victory moment. The lyrics sing of the unification of the Arab people across the twentyplus Arabic-speaking countries, and renewal through unity. Yet the song, and the impact of his
use of the phrase, al-‘alam al-‘arabi minutes before to acknowledge his audience, seem to be an
afterthought, if not for him, then certainly for the crowd around him. The elation and fervor
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around his win translate more concretely into the audience continuing to bring Palestinian flags
up to the stage as ‘Assaf sings and attempting to join hands with him in order to dance the dabke,
a Levantine line dance.
***
Running on Arabic satellite television in the 2010s through to its most recent season in
2017, Arab Idol (Mahbub al-‘Arab) was an offshoot of the Idols television franchise that
launched globally in the early 2000s.1 This is a study of how Arabness was voiced quite literally
on Arab Idol, through rhetoric and production—but primarily through the music. A show with an
implicit Arabness in its nomenclature, Arab Idol catered to an Arab audience and thereby
featured music chosen to speak to this audience. The songs on Arab Idol included popular
numbers from the twentieth century to the present, and were mostly performed in various
dialects of Arabic.2 The music usually featured modal maqam-based melodies, traditional
rhythms, and vocal and instrumental improvisations. The winner was also dubbed the “Arab
Idol.” In order to examine how Arab Idol imagined Arabness, this dissertation asks the following
questions:
On a show featuring contestants from across a culturally diverse geographical region, what
cultural and commercial considerations did Arab Idol take in its curation of Arabness? How
might the supranational nature of Arab Idol have reflected the region’s historical, political, and
mediated contexts of Arabness? In what ways did Arab Idol become a platform for engaging
with and determining shared issues of political and cultural salience to the Arab region, and to its
large diasporas? And crucially, what was the role of the singing voice and music in all this? How

1

As of summer 2022, it is unlikely that Arab Idol will return for a new season as a multinational competition.
Instead, the same television studios have been working on a new series of national offshoots (e.g., Iraqi Idol; Saudi
Idol).
2
As discussed in Chapter Four, the rare exceptions have been performances in the Kurdish language.
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was the “Arab” voice or sawt—both as a metaphor evoking a myriad of connotations around
Arabness and as a material sonic production—identified, imagined, and cultivated on Arab Idol?
I choose to delve into the topic of Arabness on Arab Idol not only because it is explicit in
the show’s title but also because it took form in the rhetoric that was used throughout the show
by producers, emcees, and judges to describe the contestants and the music they performed. I
also show how such rhetoric around Arabness has political, intellectual, and historical precedents
in the region. I argue that the framing of contestants, musical performances, and episodes of
Arab Idol were imbued with markers of Arabness. For Arab Idol, these markers included the
Arabic language, the issue of Palestine, and, most importantly, musical features, singers, and
repertoire. I explore Arab Idol’s links to earlier regional mediated musical programs and
televised vocal competitions that have contributed to the successful establishment of an Arab
popular music consciousness. I also suggest that Arab Idol reflected, redefined, and expanded a
canonical Arab voice formed over the decades by the various media industries in the region.

The global Idols franchise
The Idols phenomenon began with the creation of Pop Idol in the United Kingdom in
2001 by Simon Cowell and Simon Fuller, a sensational hit that, the following year, led to the
influential American iteration American Idol.3 Subsequent decades would see the company
Fremantle Media license scores of Idols franchise offshoots to television networks around the
world, as well as plenty more unofficial copycat versions of the competition format. In all Idols
iterations, contestants participate in a series of auditions that take place in various cities in the
country or region within which the show is broadcast. For Asian and Arab offshoots, auditions
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also take place in diaspora cities such as Berlin and Paris. The footage of the preliminary
auditions is usually curated and edited in order to create the content of the first few episodes of a
season, often featuring the season’s celebrity judges poking fun at or criticizing the contestants,
as in these early stages the episodes featured many subpar auditionees. Once contestants in the
audition round are whittled down, the successful ones move on to further rounds where they
perform in front of studio audiences, in addition to the same panel of judges. The show’s final
stages, usually broadcast live, have contestants perform their numbers with backing by a house
band. While the contestants perform, information relevant to voting—contestants’ identifying
information and their voting identification number—appears on the screen. In these episodes, the
celebrity judges comment on each performance and while their commentary certainly might
sway the opinion of a viewer who is on the cusp of voting, ultimately their say has little bearing
on the outcome: it is the number of votes from the viewership that determines who is eliminated
and who is crowned Idol. The winners of the Idols offshoots are usually offered a record deal
with a cooperating company in the local regional or national music industry.
In all iterations of Idols, the licensing contractually obligates certain features of the
format to remain constant. In addition to licensing the general formula, the franchise’s logo and
visual formatting must remain uniform, with the show title adjusted depending on the country or
region. Furthermore, the Idols theme song and its various background music versions, composed
by Julian Gingell, Barry Stone, and Cathy Dennis, are used in all the global formats. Some of the
global iterations retain the name of “Idol,” preceded by the region or country’s adjective—e.g.,
American Idol, Indian Idol—while others’ titles vary, such as France’s Nouvelle Star. The
different global offshoots have lasted a varying number of seasons. For instance, despite igniting
the global phenomenon of Idols formats, Pop Idol itself had a very short-lived run of two series
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running between 2001-2003. On the other hand, the popular Indian Idol iteration is gearing up
for its thirteenth season in 2022.4
In 2003, Idols launched its first offshoot for a regional Arab audience called Superstar,
uniquely and explicitly involving contestants from across a range of countries. What
distinguished Superstar (2003-2008) from its global counterparts was a unity around an Arab,
rather than a sub-national, identity.5 Arab Idol was Idols’ second Arab-world iteration, running in
the following decade (2011-2017). On both iterations, judges and the program’s emcee made
ample references to kull al-‘alam al-‘arabi (the entire Arab world) or al-watan al-‘arabi. The
victor of Arab Idol would land a deal with Platinum Records, an arm of the satellite network
corporation that aired the talent competition, Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC). While
headquartered in Dubai and primarily owned by Saudi Arabian investors, MBC’s studios are
based in Lebanon—where Arab Idol’s live episodes were filmed.

Verbal arts competitions in Arab history
The verbal arts have been associated with contests and competitions throughout history
and across the world. In Arabic-speaking regions, the vocal contest or competition has had
precedence for centuries and has long been associated with the regional prestige of verbal and
literary arts, particularly through various forms of poetry. Today, Arabic speakers are taught to
memorize lines of famous Arabic poems in school, whether of classical canonical poetry or
modern formal or colloquial poetry. Poetry is largely consumed orally rather than through
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reading, and therefore the recitation and performance of poetry have often overlapped with
musical performance. Poetry might be just as likely to be chanted en masse as a famous song
might be sung at demonstrations. Poems in both formal Arabic and colloquial dialects have often
been put to music and performed by the most well-known singers in the region. Conversely,
singers have regularly recruited poets to be their lyricists, leading to regular working
relationships between poets and singers. Examples in the twentieth century include the Lebanese
diva Fairouz singing a setting of the poem “‘Atini al-Nay” by the Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani,
Egyptian singer Umm Kulthum singing the poetry of her compatriot Ahmad Shawqi, the regular
collaboration of Egyptian satirical singer Shaykh Imam with kindred revolutionary spirit Ahmad
Fu’ad Najm, and the Lebanese singer Marcel Khalife singing the poetry of Palestinian poet
Mahmud Darwish.
Dating to pre-Islamic times and taking place frequently under the rules of the early
Islamic caliphates—the Umayyad (seventh to eighth centuries CE) and the Abbasid (eighth to
thirteenth centuries CE) dynasties—poetry contests were commonly staged or would materialize
at public places such as markets and trading stations (England 2017, 12). One such location was
Mirbad, a trading site close to Basra, Iraq, where poets at various levels of skill would perform
across a spectrum of dialects, as traders would be passing through from different cities (England
2017, 12).6 This resulted in a diverse regional competition, not unlike the Arab reality
competitions of today, albeit without the twenty-first century social media promotion.7
In courtly life of the same era, poetry and singing contests involving both men and
women—in the forms of verbal duels, controversies, disputes, and improvised singing contests—
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were also popular. As Samuel England describes in Medieval Empires and the Culture of
Competition: Literary Duels at Islamic and Christian Courts, “Monarchs and high administrators
cultivated an environment of charged but orderly literary contest, and also sponsored literature
centred on themes of competition” (2017, 2). Competing performers would usually have their
respective communities of devotees from the elite audience to back them up over the course of a
contest (Imhof 2013). A clear winner did not always emerge, meaning that a contest’s resulting
best singer might have been described in terms of compromises, where one performer might be
described as having the best voice or technique, while another would be described as the best
composer (Imhof 2013). Song choice would additionally be of utmost importance to the
competition. Further “critical to Arabic language arts from their beginnings, the competition
ritual became explicitly tied to empire as the caliphate settled in Damascus during the first
century Hijra, seventh century CE” (England 2017, 11). George Sawa describes how holding
competitions, whether planned or spontaneous, was a way patrons during the Abbasid era
elevated the level of entertainment in their courts by pushing their musicians to perform at their
best (1989a, 182). Competitions in the court were rituals that came to reassure elite citizens of
the authority or superiority of a court or empire, not just the skill of the poet or the authority of
the patron in particular.
Several poetry genres that exemplify the vocal performance competition (munafasa or
musabaqa) or verbal poetic duel (mubaraza) contextualize the phenomenon of Arab Idol in the
region today. Zajal is a catch-all term for literary and vernacular poetry, with the Lebanese zajal
as one contemporary example of verbal duels. Zajjals (poets of the zajal) commonly travel and
perform in different villages throughout Lebanon on the occasions of saints’ days (Haydar 1989,
202). Poets often travel as groups of four with two poets banding together against the other two
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and surrounding crowds joining one of the two respective sides in chanting the refrains. While
certain competitive genres would involve the belittling of the opponent on a certain topic (e.g.,
jafa‘), others would use verbal or poetic techniques and tricks to one-up their opponent (e.g.,
‘ataba) (Haydar 1989).
Throughout the twentieth century, talent competitions have been a part of the media and
music sphere in the Arab world, and mediated competitions on a pan-Arab level have been a
phenomenon for decades. Radio poetry contests were a part of the BBC Arabic Service’s
entertainment programming efforts from 1941 to 1946, and were open to contestants from across
the Arabic-speaking world (Jamjoum 2020; Stanton 2020b). The poems on these programs were
required to adhere to certain themes and lengths, and to be written in Modern Standard Arabic.
Egyptian contestants dominated these competitions, yet the poetry competitions garnered a solid
level of interest beyond Egypt and across the region.
Qur’anic contests have long been popular at schools as a way to encourage children
across the Arab world—and in Muslim communities globally—to properly learn and memorize
the Qur’an. While various debates in Islamic discourse have addressed separating Qur’anic
recitation from popular culture, Qur’anic recitation has a proximity to popular vocal culture in
the region (Nelson 1985; Rasmussen 2005). Many famous singers, such as the Egyptian star
Umm Kulthum, were renowned for their training in Qur’anic recitation, and have succeeded in
singing religious songs as well as popular ones. Local, national, and international competitions
have also been a phenomenon in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, with governments and
private religious institutions providing the sponsorship (Faruqi 1987). With the advent of satellite
television, broadly disseminated televised competitions were not completely novel phenomena.
Regional religious channels such as Iqraa‘ and al-Risala began to carry Qur’anic competition
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programs with reciters either appearing in-studio or phoning in with a recitation. In these cases,
the shows’ commentators and their guests comment on the performances in terms of intonation
and pronunciation (Galal 2008, 172). While not exactly considered a form of vocal performance,
the discussion and deliberation of the sonic and vocal aspects of a recitation by a group of
experts, coupled with the expectation of a winner at the end of such contests, provides a parallel
to other vocal talent competitions.8 The ubiquity of recitation contests in the region set yet
another precedent for competitions such as Arab Idol.9

Arab singers and vocal repertoire
In Arab music, most genres are vocal ones and most “stars” are singers (Racy 2003;
Farraj & Shumays 2019; Shannon 2006; Danielson 1997; Marcus 2015; Thomas 2006). As seen
with the historic vocal competitions, great value is placed on language or poetry in vocal genres.
“‘Voice’…comes to represent a set of cultural and spiritual practices that condition a musical and
moral-ethical state in the would-be artist” as “a prime index of a performer’s authenticity”
(Shannon 2006, 154). Furthermore, commonalities exist among vocalization in different genres
and between religious and “secular” contexts.10 Therefore, Arab genres examined in
ethnomusicological scholarship have understandably been largely vocal ones. These range from
funeral lamentations in Lebanon (Racy 1986b) to the fijri, the Bahraini vocal form associated
with pearl-diving (Touma 1977), the muwashshah (Faruqi 1975; Shannon 2006), the Omani ‘azi
(Garvey 2019), Syriac chant in Aleppo (Jarjour 2018), and oral epic poetry throughout the Arab
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world (Reynolds 1994). In her study of the Maronite church in Lebanon, Guilnard Moufarrej
highlights the importance of oral transmission in musical performances (2010).
Scholars have addressed twentieth-century iconic voices from the region, such as Umm
Kulthum (Danielson 1997; Lohman 2010), Asmahan (Zuhur 1998), Fairouz (Stone 2008; Habib
2005), ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz (Stokes 2009), Sabah Fakhri (Racy 2003; Shannon 2006), and Laure
Daccache (Mansur 2018), many of whose music features prominently on Arab Idol. Studies of
satellite-era Arab popular music have thus far covered Egyptian popular music in the 1990s,
including the singer Amr Diab (Frishkopf 2003). In my work, I draw upon discussions of some
of these singers, whose musical numbers are immediately recognizable by most audience
members and viewers when performed on the show. Singers such as Umm Kulthum, Sabah
Fakhri, and Fairouz are often synonymous with their nation, or can even be said to voice their
nation on Arab Idol, an idea I return to in Chapter Three.

The voice and national unity on global Idols and similar competitions
While much of the literature on the phenomenon of Idols and other vocal talent
competitions has been produced via the lens of media and communications studies, several
(ethno)musicological works analyze vocal and musical aspects as they relate to larger themes on
televised vocal contests. The decades-old Eurovision Song Contest is one of the world’s most
famous vocal talent competitions, involving multiple nations in its imagining of a unified sphere
for an audience. While the Eurovision Song Contest was conceived in 1956 by the European
Broadcast Union as a way to garner cohesion between European nations, now unmoored from its
original political and cultural motivations, it is increasingly seen as a commercial popularity
contest not unlike the various Idols global offshoots (Tay 2011, 329). Ethnomusicological
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essays on the annual Eurovision Song Contest have shed light on the propagation of European
unity and the representation of multiple Europes (Tragaki and Fabbri 2013; Raykoff and Tobin
2007; Fricker and Gluhovic 2013; Raykoff 2021). Many of these essays focus on the
phenomenon of how new songs are constructed or composed for the occasion of the annual
contest, and how different countries’ song submissions fit into or don’t fit into an imagined
Europe; on the other hand, my interest in Arab Idol centers more around the promotion of older
and familiar repertoire explicitly associated with an Arab world. The significance of the
emphasis on new songs in Eurovision relates to how it is a contest for the best song, as opposed
to the Idols franchise, which is a contest for the best singer.
Katherine Meizel’s analysis of the earliest seasons of American Idol (2011) probes how
the show constructs “Americanness” through repertoire and through vocal techniques like the
melisma. She singles out the “melisma” for being indexical of Americanness and thereby
authenticity, in part due to its frequent utilization on the show. Although the melisma has
connotations of Black music, it is adopted by all contestants and praised by judges. While certain
musical aspects such as the melisma are assimilated into the show, others are racialized,
highlighting different strands of the American dream. By probing the melisma, Meizel shows
how American Idol wants to posit itself in some instances as color blind and in others as
celebrating diversity. Her study reveals “the concurrent erosion and articulation of particular
discursive boundaries performed on this program, and explores how they impact the imagining
of American identities” (Meizel 2011, 15). This aspect of Meizel’s study is a thread that I follow
in my work on voice on Arab Idol, particularly regarding how certain vocal techniques and
conventions are stressed to underscore an Arabness on the program.
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Although many offshoots of the Idols global franchise have promoted English and AngloAmerican pop music (Cannova 2020; Ndlela 2011), Matthew Knight (2019) delves into the role
that Georgian vocal polyphony plays in both representing the nation and in showcasing
“authenticity” on Georgian Idol and other Georgian vocal talent competitions that feature groups
of singers rather than soloists. Although the focus of programs on the authentic, real style of
these folkloric groups has masked other issues that these groups face, such as not receiving
sponsorship to further their careers or getting berated for promoting Georgian stereotypes on an
international stage, the preference has shifted from Europop to Georgian folk polyphonic
performances, all the way through the finals of these programs. Similarly on Arab Idol, the focus
was Arab music rather than the Euro-American popular music that appears on other Arab reality
television shows, such as the Arabic version of The Voice.
In an examination of another offshoot of The Voice, The Voice of China, Xinxin Jiang
looks at the performance of the nation through the musical content on the show (2018b). Jiang
considers songs that are specifically about both a love for China and Chinese motivation to show
how the program reasserts Communist Party nationalism by highlighting a unified and supreme
voice.11 Similarly in Zhou’s analysis of another Chinese program, Song of China, being a good
Chinese musician means being a good Chinese citizen, not standing out, and remaining
ordinary—yet still possessing some uniqueness that is promoted by state television (Zhou 2015).
However, Jiang suggests that no single voice can represent all of China, arguing that in fact it is
the diversity of voices that represents the “voice of China.” While its rhetoric is not linked to any
explicitly political slogans, Arab Idol used tropes of Arab unity which are central to the show’s
core values, similar to those explored by Jiang and Zhou.
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Voicing iconic singers on Idols and the recorded voice
In order to further explore how Arab Idol used the representation of iconic Arab voices
and singers to frame Arabness, I also build upon the historical and ethnographic studies that
address how the recorded voice can set a precedent or point of comparison for singers. Scholars
have shown that the voice can construct ideologies and “[shape] social reality” through the
means of media technologies (Schäfers 2017). Taylor (2009) discusses the influence of early—
sometimes musical—American films in providing a “standard voice” model in terms of accent
and class for immigrants and the undereducated. Weidman (2006), looking at how Karnatic
music students began to learn vocal style from gramophone recordings rather than from a guru,
notes how the advent of twentieth-century recording technology shaped ideals of Karnatic music,
particularly instilling fixed conceptions of the voice. Tongson’s intervention into how karaoke is
used as a judgement criterion on American Idol shows how adherence to the standard version of
a song and making the song one’s own are equally important (Tongson 2015, 85). In this way,
Tongson sees American Idol as a “relatable format of celebrity making” (86).
Anaar Desai-Stephens (2017) also pays close attention to the role of pre-established
notions of the voice in shaping contestants on Indian Idol. Desai-Stephens identifies a
prerequisite for contestants to perform well-known Bollywood film songs and to emulate famous
film singers. While singers must present a uniqueness in their singing, they are often judged on
their fidelity to this most recognizable and profitable genre of film music, a standard to which to
aspire. The importance of the film repertoire to Indian Idol is paramount: not only are a film
song’s title and its original singer’s name displayed when a contestant chooses to sing it, but the
name of the film and the song’s composer are displayed as well (96). Desai-Stephens argues for
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film songs as the “bearer of affective cultural memory” (98). These studies establish “standards”
of recorded singers and popular musical numbers that parallel Arab music contexts for Arab Idol.

Idols and commercial nationalism
Most academic research on the Idols franchise and its various global iterations has
unsurprisingly emerged from the fields of media and communication studies. While at first
glance the international versions of Idols seem formulaic, it is because the franchise formula is
basic enough that the show is quite conducive to adaptation. In their treatment of Idols’ various
global iterations, media studies scholars have noted that such formats can be easily franchised
and easily adapted to local tastes, not because of the content being traded but due to their nature
as formats with commercial parameters (Sen 2011; Ndlela 2011; Quail 2015). In other words,
format licenses are designed to be adapted, and therefore designed to take on commercially
viable local or nationalist tropes. On New Zealand Idol, for instance, local meanings manifest in
themes of fearlessness and fairness, and an effort to show nation-building by featuring the
country’s communities of Maori and Polynesian descent (De Bruin 2011). What is most obvious
is that each Idols iteration addresses a specific nation or imagined nation, with many iterations
including the country or region in the title.
National or regional unity is itself generally a trope of Idols formats (Meizel 2010, 293),
and is one that I explore on Arab Idol. Scholarship that grapples with commercial aspects of
television programming as they intersect with a focus on the nation provides a productive
framework for analyzing unity and Arabness—albeit on a regional scale—on Arab Idol. Several
studies on televised talent contests put forth the notion of “commercial nationalism,” or the
reproduction of a marketable, albeit problematic, national discourse, highlighting the roles of
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commercial interests that drive marketing strategies. This is a common theme in reality television
programming within a nation (Quail 2015) or across a discrete region (Volčič and Andrejevic
2011).12 In the name of profit, television programs resort to imbuing their programming with
stereotypical national discourses. In some cases, this phenomenon demonstrates a co-dependency
between state and commercial agendas, as national television programming is often dependent
on the market and on the consuming individual (Yang 2002). Although not using the term
“commercial nationalism,” Joost De Bruin notes how New Zealand (NZ) Idol is “caught up in
processes of nation-building that New Zealand television programmes in general have to respond
to” (De Bruin 2011, 239). Similarly, Oren Livio (2010) discusses instances of commercial
nationalism within four versions of the Idols franchise. Since the shows are so sensitively
tailored to public opinions, it is simply more commercially viable for the franchise as a whole to
embrace different tropes of nationalism across its offshoots.
The marketing of a unique national identity leads both to more identification and more
consumption. Christine Quail (2015) analyzes the use of commercial nationalism to represent
Canada for marketing purposes on the reality program offshoot, So You Think You Can Dance.
While the Canadian program identifies its national branding features in the form of geographies
of the nation, commodification of landmarks, cities, provinces, space, self-comparison to
America, and its diversity and multiculturalism policy, France’s Idols offshoot Nouvelle Star
essentializes its Frenchness by highlighting “intellectualism” and “musical taste” (CampaiolaVeen 2012). To showcase a preference for elite French taste over other Euro-American pop
music on the show, Campaiola-Veen argues that Nouvelle Star puts forth “aesthetic economics”
over “emotional pathways of global capitalist popular culture” with its visual and discursive
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aesthetic cues. One Idols spin-off that featured multiple countries was Asian Idol in 2007. It
showcased the winners of East Asian Idols offshoots thus far sparring in a one-time, two-day
competition. Jinna Tay (2011) examines the regional dynamics within the making of this show,
highlighting that the commercial aspects were of paramount importance in its production. The
notions of commercial nationalism that these scholars assert inform my understanding of why
Arabness, a most obvious kind of unity, was easily tapped into and was readily pursued on Arab
Idol. Scholars also question the idea that it is primarily American and European cultural
hegemony that spreads through formats such as Idols. For instance, Desai-Stephens
problematizes looking at Idols in terms of hybridity and adaptation, which assumes a
unidirectional cultural flow (2017, 52). In both this introduction and in Chapter Two, I suggest
that Arab Idol’s popularity is as much based in local cultural patterns as it is in the successful
transplant of a Euro-American franchise.
Building upon other scholars’ notions of commercial nationalism, I suggest a
“commercial supranational” framing of Arabness on Arab Idol: the signaling of superficial
markers of identity, but on the supranational level of Arabness. At the same time, it is also
important to note that Arab satellite networks such as MBC are owned by wealthy influential
individuals linked to state governments. Most importantly in the case of MBC and Arab Idol, this
connection is to Saudi Arabia.13 Therefore, the commercial can be intertwined with the
ideological on shows such as Arab Idol, something I allude to in Chapter Two.
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Scholarship on Arab Idol
Regarding research on Arab Idol in particular, Schulthies (2015) and Heckel (2014) have
examined how language and dialect inform or contest Arabness on this and similar
programming. Jarrar et al. (2019) have found that comments on YouTube videos of Arab Idol
performances provide a window into the political and nationalist discourses these renditions
evoke. Marwan Kraidy (2010; 2015), one of the foremost scholars on Arab reality television,
covered musical programs such as Arab Idol’s predecessor, Superstar. His and other scholarship
on Superstar attest to how a particular political moment can color both the production and public
discourse around a program (Kraidy 2010; Ghattas 2012; Meizel 2007).14 However, none of
these studies connects these important threads to specific musical aspects of the Arab programs.
My focus on Arab music and musicians, particularly through an emphasis on the voice, will
serve as a point of departure.

Terminology: Arabism, Arab nationalism, and Arabness
Terms and concepts such as Arabness, Arabism, pan-Arabism, and Arab nationalism
have been used interchangeably by some scholars, while others have sought to parse out their
differences. In order to answer how the “Arab” voice is constructed and to further explain my
use of Arabness as a primary frame in this dissertation, I provide some preliminary definitions to
distinguish between these political, intellectual, and other cultural concepts that traverse the Arab
world. Throughout this dissertation I use the term “pan-Arab” to refer to phenomena that occur
over the vast geographical region of Arabic-speaking countries, namely the twenty-two countries
belonging to the Arab League (Awad 2022) and their diasporas. I also refer to the “Arabic-
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speaking world,” due to the importance of the Arabic language to Arab identity.15 I further define
the Arab world through the reach of the media in the region.16 My use of “pan-Arab” does not
assume any reference to specific political or cultural ideologies often equated with “Arabism” or
“pan-Arabism.”
Many scholars have differentiated between “Arabism” and “Arabness,” with the former
usually referring to a political ideology and the latter representing identity formation (Attwa
2019; Abdel Rahim 2005; Monier 2014). Both “Arabism” and “pan-Arabism” have been used
interchangeably to define Arab political and intellectual movements, such as Arab socialism,
which flourished in the mid-twentieth century under Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser (191870). There has also been a preference to equate “Arab nationalism” or “Arabism” with Nasser’s
version of it, even though there existed other instances of it in the same era, such as the
intellectual Ba‘athist movement. As I will examine in Chapter One, Egypt’s central position for
most regional media dissemination played a large role in the attention that Egypt received over
other countries during the twentieth century. Nasser was on the popular front of an Arab socialist
nationalism while serving as Egypt’s president from 1954 until his death in 1970. Nasser also
had as an outlet the radio station Sawt al-‘Arab (Voice of the Arabs) for Arabist propaganda
leading up to the major defeat of the Six-Day War with Israel (1967). This war resulted in the
loss of Palestinian territories and ultimately was a major blow to general sentiment around Arab
unity. When it came to the question of Palestine and its Israeli occupation, Palestine was a
significant component of Nasser’s Arabist framing, as was anti-imperialism (Gerges 2018, 198).
Therefore, the defeat in this war in 1967—known in Arabic as the Naksa—marked the end of
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this secular Arab nationalist project, and further revealed how Nasser’s pan-Arab ideals were
ultimately linked to Egyptian economic development above all else (Gerges 2018, 207).
While Arabism has been associated with political movements in most scholarly and
popular discourse, international relations scholar Christopher Phillips seeks to differentiate
between Arabism and Arab nationalism. He defines Arabism as the more generic “idea of a
special bond existing between Arabic-speaking peoples,” something that remains relevant in the
present-day (2012, 1). On the other hand, he identifies Arab nationalism as just one branch of
Arabism, calling it “Old Arabism” and defining it as “a nationalism trying to unite Arabic
speakers into a single political unit that had developed since the nineteenth century” through to
the various twentieth-century failures of Nasser and the rise of political Islam—one that
ultimately failed (Phillips 2012, 14). Phillips additionally acknowledges a “New Arabism,” a
term coined by Shibley Telhami. First acknowledged by scholars with the emergence of panArab satellite media, particularly with the advent of the Qatari television network Al Jazeera in
1996, “New Arabism” describes a commercially driven but culturally and politically relevant
supranationalism. Regarding this arena of Arabism, Phillips writes, “What has changed in the
satellite era is therefore not the nature of Arab identity – it remains subordinated to state identity
– but the method and scope by which it is disseminated across the entire Arab world, not just
within individual states’ media” (Phillips 2012, 17). Ultimately, Phillips considers “Arabism
today [to be a movement that is] political as well as cultural,” though not explicitly associated
with the Arab nationalist movement(s) of the mid-twentieth century (Phillips 2012, 39).

20

Arabness as a primary frame for Arab Idol
My definition of “Arabness” builds upon Phillips’ conception of political and cultural
Arabism, which includes “New Arabism,” and integrates it with other scholars’ conceptions of
Arab identity formation. In his study on Al Jazeera, media scholar Abdel Rahim (2005) similarly
sees Arabness as a process of situational compounded identity that is constantly being
transformed, yet associated with politics, thereby giving it complex connotations. While
Arabness is both an ethnic and cultural identity that is upheld by various vehicles such as panArabism, language, religion, and media (Abdel Rahim 2005, 32), Abdel Rahim writes: “…it is
evident to Arab scholars and Arab audiences that the increasingly important issue of Arab
identity has been articulated within the constraints imposed by totalitarian regimes. The
incubation of the concept of Arabness by undemocratic governments has strained the sense of
Arab identity, defining it as increasingly void of the legal and institutional safeguards of freedom
and democracy” (48).
In her examination of the reality contest The Voice/Ahla Sawt, Attwa (2019) similarly
sees Arabness as a unifying factor that fuels the success of the show, expressed through national
dialects and through portraying an Arab diversity within the sphere of vague references to a past
political or nationalist “Arabism,” in this case an explicitly political or nationalist thread (13). In
this dissertation, I will primarily be considering Arab Idol’s interpretations of this everyday
arena—Arabness—that are connected to representing a pan-Arab regional identity, and that are
also inevitably colored by Arabist political rhetoric, although this is not limited to mid-century
“Arab nationalism.”
Similarly, Monier (2014) sees Arabness as a key feature of Arab hegemony in the Middle
East. She defines Arabness as “a regional metanarrative and significant constituent of regional

21

consciousness in the Middle East that impacts on the forms of regional cooperation between the
Arab and non-Arab states that are included as belonging to one region by the prevalent modern
usage of the term ‘Middle East’” (Monier 2014, 422). What Monier also brings attention to is
how the Arab world is often seen as regionally synonymous with the Middle East in the media
even though it also includes the non-Arab states of Turkey and Iran. She therefore sees Arabness
as the Middle East’s dominant regional identity.
Politics and current events also dictate that Arabness be an exclusionary or oppositional
concept. For example, Shi‘a Muslims are sometimes not portrayed as Arab on Gulf-controlled,
Sunni-majority media (Hammond 2017a, 3). As Julian Awwad (2005) highlights in his work on
Al Jazeera, which gained both increasing popularity and global scrutiny post 9-11, a pan-Arab
identification arose out of current events, and Al Jazeera channeled that process. Analyzing
several talk shows on the network, Awwad argues that these shows constructed an Arabness that
defined a world that was oppositional to the United States and Israel, and also one that was
infused with Islam. He also notes that this oppositional discourse is not a new framing in the
region. Awwad suggests that Al Jazeera filled a void left by the authoritarian environment of
politics in the region (Awwad 2005, 48). At the same time, in his understanding of Arabness as a
primary framing of the network, he sees its aspects as separate from those of a more explicitly
political and institutional pan-Arabism in the vein of mid-century Nasserism (Awwad 2005,
111). I build on both Attwa (2019) and Awwad’s notions of Arabness as a discursive pan-Arab
identification—one that is inevitably touched by politics but is not a primary medium for it—as I
explore the intersection of entertainment and politics on Arab Idol in the dissertation’s final
chapters.
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Post 9-11 Arab television was a major source of unity for Arab audiences in a
mediascape that otherwise tended to put a generic spin on the Arab world as representative of
extremism and terrorism. Indeed, entertainment programming played a huge role in this, with
Superstar also emerging in the years following 9-11. Early scholarship on Al Jazeera (Abdel
Rahim 2005; Awwad 2005) perceived it as a defender of pan-Arabness while deeming
entertainment programs, such as Who Wants to Be a Millionaire, as imitations of Western
programs (Abdel Rahim 2005, 52). Although this may have been the case with franchise
experiments at the turn of the millennium, Arab Idol, particularly with its title, came to take up
more of a pan-Arab mantle in the following decade. For instance, the word ‘uruba (Arabness), a
term most frequently associated with political Arab nationalism, was used on Arab Idol in
various ways, such as with the phrase ard al-‘uruba (land of Arabness) to refer to Palestine. I
suggest that Arab Idol spoke to a more cultural Arab identity while utilizing familiar rhetoric
from political ideologies: it thereby fit a framing of Arabness that was primarily cultural and
symbolically political and intellectual as well.17

Arabness as an ethnolinguistic identity
I also consider Arabness as an ethnolinguistic frame associated with the Arabic language.
The shared Arabic language is of great importance to Arab identity. Literary Arabic has a high
cultural value, a register of the language that was seen as sophisticated since pre-Islamic times
(Brustad 2015, 22). Its association with the holy book of Islam, the Qur’an, is also of tantamount
significance, and to a lesser extent with various texts from hundreds of years ago, which continue
to be read by Arabic speakers today.

17

See above for Attwa (2019)’s similar take regarding the show The Voice.
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In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Arabic language was largely associated
with Arab nationalist projects. Kristen Brustad (2015) argues that
during and after the struggle for independence, the Arabic language became entwined
with Arab nationalism. The consequence was that al-ʿarabiyya, as the shared language of
Arabic speakers in the larger unfulfilled Arab nation, came to represent the once and
future dream of pan-Arab nationhood. As such it took on—and retains—a powerful
symbolic worth (29).
The nineteenth-century Nahda, meaning “renaissance” or “awakening,” and concept of the
revival of an ‘uruba, or Arab identity, emerged in an era of rising nation states in Europe as well
as in the Middle East (Hammond 2017a, 1). However, the Nahda was not just a linguistic or
literary renaissance but a larger intellectual project with valences and goals that overlapped with
projects of enlightenment values and modernity. Furthermore, it would go on to have difference
resonances in the varying national projects of different countries (Di-Capua 2015, 70). The
founding of the Arab socialist Ba‘ath movement in Syria led by Michel Aflaq and Saleh al-Bitar,
which eventually led to the creation of the political Ba‘ath party, was an intellectual addition in
the lineage of the Nahda movement, as was the Arab Nationalist Movement, led by George
Habash (Phillips 2012, 12). Ba‘athism, which like Nasserism was a secular and socialist
movement, took cues from both Marxist and Fascist European models in order to incorporate a
version of socialism into state building (Schmidinger 2018, 56). Among other privileges, there
was a religious plurality incorporated into the system, albeit one that was stacked against
minorities such as Kurds when it came to their claims to territory (Schmidinger 2018, 57). Arab
nationalism in Syria was also an oppositional movement tied to the decline of the Ottoman
Empire, the rise of Turkish nationalism, and Zionism (Shannon 2015, 64).
I argue that the symbolism of the Arabic language is crucial to notions of Arabness on
Arab Idol, something this dissertation explores both regarding its aesthetic role in a pan-Arab
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vocal canon and its linguistic role in showcasing a diverse Arabness. With the proliferation of
satellite television, Arabic dialects have become increasingly common in the media, with
contestants from all over the Arabic-speaking world featured speaking and singing. At the same
time, certain dialects such as Egyptian and Lebanese are hegemonic on entertainment programs
(See Chapter Four). Satellite television shows how people interact using various registers,
dialects, or mixes of them (Brustad 2015, 33). Like Arabness, Arabic is central to Arab Idol, both
in the musical examples and in spoken discourse in various episodes.

Arab music and Arabness
Music is the most important domain of Arabness for my project. To analyze a show that
portrays its Arabness largely through its musical output, it is important also to “define” Arab
music for the parameters of this study. This is a daunting task, as Arab music, in terms of its
geographic reach and the types of music it encompasses, is itself a misnomer and therefore its
definition is problematic. Moreover, scholars of urban Arab musics of the early to mid-twentieth
century provide differing definitions of musical Arabness. In his study of music and nationalism
in the Arab world, Khuri (2018) adapts Phillips’ idea of Arabism, saying that for him Arabism
comprises “distinctive musical stimuli” (193). The phrase “al-musiqa al-‘arabiyya” is a broad
category for music and is very much formed by the media disseminating it. According to Salwa
Castelo-Branco (1980), “al-musiqa al-‘arabiyyah” came to connote urban secular Egyptian
music, with ensembles in Egypt such as the Firqat al-Musiqa al-Arabiyya. However, it is not a
phrase that comes up on Arab Idol, even though repertoire played by this ensemble may be
performed on the show. In the early twentieth century, the term “al-musiqa al-sharqiyya,”
meaning Eastern or Oriental music, was associated with institutions such as the Nadi al-Musiqa
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al-Sharqiyya in Egypt, a club dedicated to teaching this music to the upper class (Thomas 2006,
66). However, the switch from this term to al-musiqa al-‘arabiyya highlights the Arab aspect in
exclusion of Turkish or Persian music, which roughly coincided with the 1932 Cairo Conference
on Arab Music (Thomas 2006, 75). Yet in the Levant and Egypt today, the phrase al-musiqa alsharqiyya continues to be more common than “Arab music.”
During the Nahda period, writers on music such as the Egyptian musician Muhammad
Kamil al-Khula‘i focused on music’s role in the movement’s goals. He wrote that one of the
most important aspects of a singer’s art was the “conveying of an Arab identity” through a poetic
heritage. One way to do so was through particular attention to the mastery of language, including
its grammar and obscure words, rather than considering that heritage as something of the past
(Popper 2019, 357). Based on her examination of Khula‘i and other writers of this period, Popper
suggests there was an ambivalence and lack of agreement on what was to be considered foreign
or non-Arab, noting how singers such as ‘Abdu al-Hamuli (1846-1901) added Egyptian ‘urba, or
accidental notes, to Turkish genres and modes (Popper 2019, 523-24). In 1932, the Cairo
Conference on Arab Music brought together Arab music reformers wishing to position music in
a context more defined as “Arab” (Thomas 2006; Racy 1993). Much of the language used around
this conference foregrounded the need for a nahda or “awakening” around Arab music, aligned
with Arab nationalist values. The conference also followed a conviction that the development of
music would follow the development of nations (Thomas 2006, 73). The conference also
centered around a comparison of Arab standards of music to Western and European ones
(Thomas 2006, 73). This period resulted in many discussions around the standardization of
musical aspects such as maqamat (musical modes or scales).
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Arab “popular music” is anything but a defined category, as distinctions between folk,
classical, religious, and “popular” music have long been blurred. Danielson (1996) notes the
difficulty of identifying Arab musical practices that could be considered “popular music” in the
same way that music might be identified under a larger corpus of popular music in the United
States for instance, since much music is associated with turath (“heritage”). Rather, distinctions
within the Arab music repertoire are articulated more between regional performance traditions—
for example, Maghribi (North African), Mashriqi (Egyptian and Levantine), and Khaliji (Gulf).
In his discussion of the Egyptian long-song form, the ughniyya, Racy argues against the
distinction between classical and popular music—noting many shared stylistic elements and
instruments used across different performative contexts of Arab music—by proposing instead
that these regional musical practices fall under the category of a “central domain” (1981; 1982).
Beyond the music itself, the most prominent Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian singers of
the mid-twentieth century—many of whose most popular numbers are performed on Arab Idol
and other music programs—were simultaneously movie stars, recording artists, and recognized
radio and television personalities, an indication of the diverse contexts for the production of Arab
mass-mediated music. The most omnipresent of Arab stars in the twentieth century, the Egyptian
diva Umm Kulthum (1904?-1975), is a prime example of a popular music performer who
transcended a variety of genres and performed across a whole range of musical contexts.
Although a “popular” artist, she was viewed and judged by certain “art music values” (Lohman
2010, 14). Her repertory challenged popular music categorization (Danielson 1997, 14) and her
performances rose above contexts demarcated by class divisions, in part through her utilization
of the Arab musical aesthetic of tarab as a cultural common denominator.18 A cultural
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ambassador speaking on behalf of Gamal Abdel Nasser’s pan-Arab political movement, she
described the responses to tarab across the Arabic-speaking world “as evidence that affirms the
unity of the Arab people and its cohesiveness from the most ancient times” (Lohman 2010, 44).
She also sang sweeping numbers that sometimes combined Islamic and pan-Arab overtones,
such as in the Egyptian poet Ahmad Shawqi’s poem “Nahj al-Burda,” a response poem to one of
the most commonly utilized poems in popular Islamic practices, “Qasidat al-Burda” (mantle
ode), composed by Muhammad al-Busiri in the 13th century (Wien 2021). To connect the
importance of singer, repertoire, and song choice in the presentation of an Arab music canon on
Arab Idol, I further discuss Umm Kulthum and other singers, whose music appeared frequently
on Arab Idol, in Chapter Three.

Materiality and multiple voicings
My examination of the voice on Arab Idol will consider topical ethnomusicological and
anthropological analytical frameworks. Drawing on scholarship that considers the materiality of
the voice, I view the voice as a medium that contributes to multiple imaginings of Arabness on
Arab Idol. Amanda Weidman (2014) perceives the voice as a “crucial site where the realms of
the cultural and sociopolitical link to the level of the individual, a site where shared discourses
and values, affect, and aesthetics are made manifest in and contested through embodied practice”
(38). The voice is a channel by which contestants participate in their own identity construction; it
is itself a technology because it is a physical production, not just a metaphor evoking a myriad of
connotations. I also draw from several studies in linguistic anthropology and musicology that
discuss the voice in terms of “language materiality” (Shankar 2016; Shankar and Cavanaugh
2014) and “voicing” (Eidsheim 2015; Schulthies 2015; Weidman 2014). Shankar and Cavanaugh

28

argue that value and meaning created in language are not just symbolic but material. Therefore,
how the voice sounds is crucial to the production of meaning on various levels and in various
socio-cultural contexts: in their usage, “‘voice’ refers to the linguistic and material assemblage of
how someone sounds and the relative social value of that assemblage within a system of other
voices” (Shankar and Cavanaugh 2014, 359). Similarly, the case studies in what Feld et al.
(2004) term “vocal anthropology” link “the materiality of sound to the sociality of vocal
practice” (340). Laura Kunreuther (2006) also argues for an emotional immediacy in her study of
the voice on Nepalese FM talk radio, stating that radio and telephone technologies play a direct
role in the construction of the voice as a vehicle of immediacy, emotional directness, and
authenticity. In this dissertation, I show how the materiality of the voice specifically provides a
space for multiple interpretations of Arabness. While other studies of Arab Idol and satellite
music television programming look more at the symbolic aspects of the show, my project centers
on how vocal aesthetics and the actual singing voice make audible notions of supranationalism
and identity-making.
Weidman presents the concept of “voicing” to highlight the problematic nature of
assuming a one-to-one relationship between one’s voice and one’s individual identity, since
speakers have different relationships with their own voices, and what might seem to be a single
“voice” can readily be a collective product (Weidman 2014, 42). Theories of voicing, such as
Bakhtin’s concept of “heteroglossia” (Bakhtin 1981; Taylor 2009), provide evidence that the
voice is not an individual experience alone. For Becky Schulthies, a linguistic anthropologist
analyzing Arab vocal talent competitions, voicing is intertwined with “axes of adequation and
difference” such as national affiliations or supraregional forms (Schulthies 2015, 62). These
include the Maghrib as the Arab West (Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco) or the Mashriq as the
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Arab East (Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Iraq). In her ethnomusicology dissertation on
Indian Idol and neoliberalism, Anaar Desai-Stephens discusses the show’s discourses around
both the aesthetic and personality requirements of a singer (2017, 34). I utilize the notion of
voicing in order to examine how contestants navigate reproducing various imagined collective
constructions of the voice (e.g., as Arab, Lebanese, etc.) and their own conceptions of self. One
example of voicing is “code-switching,” which involves speakers moving between different
dialects or languages and varying their intonation patterns in different socio-linguistic scenarios.
Separate from codeswitching, “multivocality” is a way that Meizel complicates boundaries of
genre and identity, seeing singers as “negotiating their narratable selves by singing with many
voices” (2020, 7). While her work specifically examines crossings between gender, ethnic,
religious, and disabled subjectivities, I am interested in extending her thinking on voicing to
singers who are at once speaking to a pan-Arab voice and to a subnational or individual one at
any given time.

New directions in Arab popular music studies
The music on Arab Idol overlapped greatly with Arab music analyzed by
ethnomusicologists for decades, such as music of the mid-twentieth century “golden age.”19
Therefore, I see this study as a contribution to an already rich body of literature on Arab music.
Arab Idol’s musical numbers also included contemporary Arab popular music less scrutinized in
the field. Ethnomusicology and related disciplines have produced studies on Egyptian popular
music since the February 2011 revolution (Gilman 2014) and Lebanese avant-garde and popular
music scenes in Lebanon (Burkhalter 2013). Other research on alternative Arabic music scenes
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seeks to both distinguish them from a mainstream Arab popular music and to indicate how the
genres and styles of these indie scenes overlap with Arab popular musics (Munk 2021; Nickell
2020; Burkhalter 2013; El Zein 2016). However, when it comes to the modern Arab music
industry and some of the more contemporary mainstream popular singers, whose music is also
featured on Arab Idol, less literature exists. While various essays, particularly in the collection
edited by Michael Frishkopf, Music and Media in the Arab World (2010), have covered
prominent singers such as Nancy Ajram and Elissa, as well as the phenomenon of the videoclip
on Arab satellite media, no book length studies on the enormous Arab mainstream exist.
Furthermore, little attention has been paid to inter-regional industry relationships encapsulated in
music programs such as Arab Idol. My study of music on Arab Idol scratches the surface of this
mammoth industry, although this is an area that deserves much more attention.

Methods
Since 2015, I have made several visits to Lebanon, spending a period of three months
there in 2018. During each of my trips, I immersed myself in the music scenes of Beirut, and
took violin and voice lessons. In 2015, I had a chance to visit the MBC studios and watch a
session of the blind auditions stage of another reality television offshoot filmed there, The Voice,
and met with personnel who worked on both The Voice and Arab Idol. Because of the global
COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020, as well as the ongoing economic and security crisis in
Lebanon in 2020-21, I was able to conduct only limited field research for the project. I arrived in
Beirut, Lebanon in the middle of February 2020 for what I thought would be a ten-month trip;
however, my arrival coincided with the day that official cases of COVID-19 began to be
recorded in the country. Indeed, my flight arrived on the same day as a plane from Iran that was
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carrying the first positive-testing passengers into Beirut’s airport. One aspect of my research I
had planned to carry out was to take voice and music lessons at the Lebanese National Higher
Conservatory of Music. However, the week I arrived the conservatory had already preemptively
closed to help prevent the spread of the disease. Within a week of my arrival, I was mostly
remaining indoors, and by mid-March 2020, I had left the country, less than a month after
landing.
What I had originally imagined to be the main components of my research in 2020—
interviews and participant observation at the Arab Idol studios in greater Beirut—were
superseded by other methods. In the few weeks I spent indoors in Beirut, I was able to get some
sense of the satellite television music programming, watching as much as I could in that time.
My research primarily involved streaming Arab Idol episodes from digital platforms and
websites such as YouTube and Shahid. This allowed me to watch full episodes and crucial
performance clips from old seasons in order to develop the arguments presented in this
dissertation. I was also able to watch Season Four in near real-time in 2016-2017, when
YouTube videos of the show were readily available minutes after the live broadcast had taken
place, though many of them were taken down within days or weeks from the platform on
grounds of copyright infringement. I examined the backstories of contestants presented
throughout the development of the show. In addition, I analyzed musical performances by
contestants for song choice, noting the composer as well as the famous singer or singers
associated with each song; basic vocal production techniques used, such as ornaments and
modulations; the relationship between singer and instrumental ensemble; and improvisations and
musical arrangements of the song. In order to examine how specific aspects of the musical voice
might relate to or conflict with conceptions of Arabness that were presented on the show, I paid
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attention to musical and vocal gestures, patterns, and phrases. Moreover, I documented themes in
the celebrity judges’ feedback, such as their responses to the sung repertoire, often transcending
the contestant’s rendition and relating to the original sung version of the famous piece. It was
often common on Arab Idol for the judges to reference either the well-known star who originated
the performance number or the country or region of origin of the song—particularly if the
contestant hailed from the same one.
In my examination of the voice, particularly in Chapter Three, I rely on notes from voice
lessons that I took in Beirut in September 2018 with Rami al-Jundi, a Syrian vocalist and
percussionist. My second bachelor’s degree major in Middle East and Islamic Studies and years
of education in Arabic language have aided me in commenting upon discourse and codeswitching in the show. I also draw upon my professional-level study of Arab music theory and
violin with Levantine master musicians Youssef Kassab (2012-2013) and the late Bassam Saba
(2010-2017) in New York, as well as with Simon Shaheen (2010-2015) at the annual Arabic
Music Retreat in Massachusetts, one of the leading schools of Arab music in North America.
This training, along with my primary bachelor’s degree in violin performance, has helped
prepare me for salient analysis of the voice, vocal repertoire, and transnational Arab media. My
training and professional work has allowed me to perform a great deal of the Arab vocal “canon”
and in varying regional styles that I identify as prevalent on Arab Idol. I perform regularly as a
violinist with the Detroit-based ensemble, the National Arab Orchestra, as well as with New
York ensembles such as the New York Arabic Orchestra and Takht al-Nagham. My extensive
experience performing many of the musical numbers that appear on Arab Idol with these
ensembles places me in a unique position to analyze the nuances of Arab music and their
carrying of cultural associations and relationships to identity.
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Structure of the dissertation and chapter overview
I develop my argument over five chapters. Chapter One argues that the transnational
confluence of the music performance and recording industry in the Arab world with other media
industries, such as radio and broadcast and satellite television, has resulted in the crafting and
dissemination of an Arab musical canon that remains recognizable today. One key aim of this
chapter is to contextualize the pan-Arab mediascape for Arab popular vocal music often
performed on Arab Idol. This chapter anticipates my exploration in later chapters of how the
music and singing voice on Arab Idol recirculated canonical Arab popular music and reinforced
notions of Arabness.
In order to further contextualize the pan-Arab context of Arab Idol and the music
performed on it, Chapter Two traces Arabic-language televised singing and other vocal talent
competitions, such as poetry competitions, from the 1970s onwards. This allows me to situate the
two iterations of the Idols franchise, Superstar and Arab Idol, as successors of those earlier
shows, not merely as transplanted offshoots of a foreign Western program. While later chapters
discuss sawt in its meanings as voice, this chapter highlights a second meaning of sawt, “vote,”
in order to understand the blend of entertainment and politics on the show. This chapter also
shows how the first Arab iteration Superstar was explicitly political, whereas the more recent
Arab Idol chose to shy away from overt politics. While Superstar emerged during the post-9/11
American war in Iraq, Arab Idol emerged months after the Arab popular uprisings of 2011 across
the region calling for the toppling of long-standing regimes. Whereas the novel emphasis on
voting and participation from many Arab countries, coupled with the politics of the television
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network, resulted in politicized rivalries on the first iteration, I suggest that Arabness became the
discourse of choice on Arab Idol to offset the discord of the events of that decade.
Chapter Three delves into a discussion of vocal performance aesthetics in Arab music
and specifically on Arab Idol. While Chapter One explores the media that circulate and
recirculate music in the Arab world, this chapter uses the lens of voice to show how certain
musical conventions, iconic singers, and repertoire have become institutionalized and indexical
of a canonized Arab music. This chapter provides examples of how notions of a canonized Arab
voice were referenced and reproduced, particularly in this commercial microcosm of pan-Arab
satellite entertainment. I also argue that the stylized structure and format of songs on the program
aimed to evoke live performance conventions and audience-performer connections. Finally, I
argue that the recirculation of certain popular music repertoire on Arab Idol shaped and
reinforced a specific notion of a pan-Arab musical sphere. I examine conventions and repertoire
in performances from the two most recent seasons that bring to mind the famous singers that are
associated with these songs.
Chapter Four explores the contesting ways that Arab Idol located Arabness around its
contestants and their musical choices. It examines the musical expressions of what I argue are
primary cornerstones of Arabness on Arab Idol, such as the shared Arabic language, shared
regional identities, and shared experiences of current events. I argue that in order to remain
commercially viable, Arab Idol has evolved to stress non-specific pan-Arab shared connections. I
demonstrate how the program went out of its way to rhetorically connect Arabness with regional
identities, such as the Khalij or the Levant, rather than national ones, so as to gloss over other
specificities, such as national or religious identities, for its own brand of “commercial
supranationalism.” At the same time, this chapter shows how regional repertoire (e.g., Khaliji
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repertoire) was chosen for contestants, in addition to songs that were associated with their
specific country of origin, in order to cater to a more widespread audience. The chapter also
examines how varying articulations of Arabness played into the show’s celebration of the Arab
world’s diversity. This diversity included regional, national, and less frequently, ethnic and
linguistic diversity. Despite Arab Idol’s efforts to associate Arabness with celebration, I also
suggest that the show’s inevitable need to superficially acknowledge sociopolitical catastrophes,
such as wars that serve as a constant backdrop in the region, created tension between the feelgood unity Arab Idol tried to promote and the reality on the ground of division and destruction.
In Chapter Five, I demonstrate how Palestine became the one national imaginary that
Arab Idol did choose to highlight much more explicitly than any other one. Building on Chapter
Four, I argue that in yet another effort to seek a noncontroversial, palatable place to focus
positive shared sentiment, Arab Idol found it this time in explicit discourse around Palestinian
contestants and their performance numbers.20 I discuss the historical importance of Palestine to
Arab unity in the twentieth century, particularly as it has been expressed through music. I then
show how Arab Idol extracted this historical and musical concept, allowing for Palestine to
become a cornerstone of its idea of Arabness—its “commercial nationalism”—as well. I also
argue that the popularity and rise of Palestinian winner Muhammad ‘Assaf in 2013, whose
victory opened this chapter, increased and normalized the centering of attention on Palestine
during the last two seasons of Arab Idol. I analyze the performances of Palestinian contestants
that overtly reference Palestine, arguing that these performances also provide an exception to the
rule developed in the previous chapter: Arab Idol’s tendency to be non-nation-specific in its
references to Arabness. Here, I show that Palestine was in fact promoted on the show as the ard
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al-‘uruba (the land of Arabness), and that the musical examples exemplify this specific
articulation of Arabness as well.
Finally, this dissertation concludes with a review of my arguments and a discussion of
avenues for future research set up by this study. I examine the legacy of Arab Idol on YouTube
and other online platforms, and touch on the new series of national Arab offshoots of Idols that
began in 2021. I suggest that although Arab Idol may not return for another season, to better
analyze the mammoth Arab entertainment industry, mainstream Arab popular music and
televised music programming featuring this music should be arenas for further inquiry.
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Chapter One: Arab Music and Pan-Arab Entertainment Industries in the
20th and 21st Centuries
February 28, 2020: I’d been in Beirut for five days, and luckily for my research on
televised talent competitions as well as for my Arabic language practice, there was a television in
the apartment I presumed I’d be living in for a good part of the upcoming year. What I didn’t
realize was that another five days later, I would be spending most of my time indoors by this
very television—this, as anxieties around a global pandemic reaching Lebanon began to compel
more and more people to be cautious and remain home. It also meant more canceled events and
preemptive shutdowns of institutions, such as the Lebanese National Higher Conservatory of
Music. What I didn’t yet begin to consider was that two weeks later I would no longer even be in
the country.
I’d arrived in Lebanon at a time when the October 2019 revolution or thawra, which saw
the biggest demonstrations in the history of the country, was still relatively fresh in people’s
minds. In October, Lebanese of all ages, denominations, and class backgrounds united in the
streets to reject the corrupt cronyism seen across all levels of government, shouting the refrain,
Kullun ya‘ani kullun! (All of the [politicians] means all of them!). Four months since those initial
demonstrations began, turnout on the streets was much smaller, and the political and economic
situation was veering much more towards decline than improvement. However, when I went out
to a concert just before the pandemic shut everything down, the headlining performer referred to
his audience as thuwwar, revolutionaries, receiving a big cheer: the optimism hadn’t fully died
out. Yet my arrival in Beirut also coincided with the beginnings of a deteriorating economic
crisis which would get even worse later in 2020—coupled with a catastrophic explosion in
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August of that year that ruined much of the city—and become astronomically more devastating
the following year, making the global pandemic seem like a secondary concern to many.
Therefore, despite the feeling that the thawra was not yet over at this point in late February,
things seemed grim. There were more electricity cuts than ever. The value of the local currency,
the lira, was depreciating, and banks were no longer offering American dollars—used readily in
the country until this point—to their customers. While on previous visits to Lebanon I would use
a mix of dollars and liras to pay at any establishment, from taxis to restaurants, and be able to
take out dollars whenever I wanted to, for the first time the lira was no longer pegged to the
dollar at the long-time fixed rate of $1 to 1500LL (Lebanese lira). Dollars were slowly
disappearing, and the lira’s plummeting value had begun to take a toll. The best way to extract
any value from your dollars—if you had access to any—was by exchanging them on the black
market. I was advised to hold onto my dollars that I brought in from abroad, and to only use
them in an emergency. When I went to purchase my Lebanese SIM card from the electronics
shop down the block from my apartment, I had hoped to use my credit card as I often had in the
past. However, the shop assistant told me that they didn’t take credit cards anymore “after
everything that has happened.” I paid with liras, and a price that was much higher than I
remembered paying in 2018.
In January 2020, one of the big entertainment news stories in circulation was about
Nancy Ajram, the Lebanese pop star and celebrity who has also served on the judging panels of
the Arabic-language vocal talent reality programs, Arab Idol, The Voice, and Voice Kids.
Ajram’s husband had shot a Syrian intruder to death on their property, someone who had
allegedly been a former employee of the family, though Ajram denied this. While Ajram and her
husband received some backlash online, this story’s circulation was curiously limited. What
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would have been the ultimate trending story in any other era barely made the rounds this time:
the Lebanese were in the throes of a meaningful revolution, in comparison to which frivolous
stories such as the Nancy Ajram scandal were not registering. Furthermore, the impact of a
financial downfall and impending crisis was just beginning to settle in.
Withdrawn to my apartment during my brief time in Beirut—less than a month
altogether—I began to get a sense of the entertainment satellite channels and their television
programming. Aghani played Arab popular music videos most of the day. This included singers
like Carole Smaha, Asala, Myriam Fares, Samira Said, and Rouwaida Attieh, who also happened
to be the Syrian runner-up in the first season of Superstar, the Idols franchise’s first iteration in
the Arab world. An Arabic-language “MTV” also provided a range of music-related programs,
primarily from the Arab popular sphere.
NourSat was a Christian Maronite channel that featured music videos and broadcast
religious events with music that sometimes bordered on amateur. On a Shi‘a religious-themed
channel, I watched some music videos that were tributes to Shi‘a martyrs as well as to the late
Qasem Soleimani, who had been the second most powerful man in Iran. These videos were
particularly charged at this time, less than two months after his assassination by an American
drone strike in early January 2020. Even though the Iranian military escalation that had followed
the assassination was no longer in the news, it had clearly not been forgotten among certain
groups and audiences. This was also apparent to me from the posters of Soleimani visible in
neighborhoods associated with the Lebanese Shi‘a militant and political group, Hezbollah.
Driving past these neighborhoods from the airport, I’d seen huge images plastered on buildings
before heading towards the predominantly Christian, eastern Beirut neighborhood of Achrafieh,
where I’d be staying.
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The satellite network Al-Jadid replayed a television spot about the Lebanese revolution
featuring a commonly used social media hashtag in Arabic associated with the movement,
Lubnan yantafid1 (Lebanon rises), interspersed with video footage of people in the streets
chanting al-sha‘b yurid isqat al-nizam (the people want the fall of the regime). On a “classics”
channel, there was a constant stream of black-and-white films and concert broadcasts. The first
programming I came across upon flipping to this channel was a video of none other than the
Egyptian icon Umm Kulthum in a live concert, performing one of her many beloved songs,
“Lissa Fakir.” MBC—a channel of the Middle East Broadcasting Center Group network—was
one that I was paying a lot of attention to, as it produces Arab Idol and other reality
entertainment television programming. However, in Lebanon, these MBC-produced music
competitions are broadcast on the Lebanese national channel LBCI (Lebanese Broadcasting
Corporation International) for Lebanese audiences. That February, I watched some live episodes
of the pan-Arab offshoot of the international format, The Voice Kids—a sub-franchise of The
Voice. It was wrapping up its latest season and aired weekly at primetime on LBCI.
Nancy Ajram, mere weeks into her uncharacteristically low-profile scandal, was a judge
on The Voice Kids. On one of the final live episodes, the young contestants performed a group
rendition of her latest hit “Albi ya Albi,” whose music video was also playing constantly on the
satellite channel Aghani and had additionally been raking in thousands of views and likes on
YouTube. The music of Nancy Ajram as well as the songs of the other judges, such as Lebanese
singer Assi El Hallani’s song “Idhaki,” were promoted on The Voice Kids. These hit songs of the
judges were heavily intertwined with the media development of the show. During its finale
episode of the season in early March 2020, the young winner Muhammad Islam scored a deal

1

Lubnan yantafid hashtag in Arabic: #ﻟﺒﻨﺎن_ﯾﻨﺘﻔﺾ
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with Platinum Records, the record company associated with the MBC network, and with which
the winners of Arab Idol have signed deals as well.
One of the substantial pre-recorded bits that aired on Voice Kids episodes between live
footage was a clip of the children visiting the headquarters of the application developer,
Anghami. Anghami (“my songs”, or “my melodies” in Arabic) is a multi-language music
streaming app, particularly catering to the Arab world and Arab diaspora. It competes with
Spotify’s increasing popularity in the region and is therefore constantly expanding its offerings.
Anghami features the performances of contestants on the Arab vocal talent competition
programs, such as The Voice and Arab Idol. In this clip, the audience is shown how the young
contestants record the songs that they also perform live, which are then made available for
streaming once the episode airs. Arab Idol and the other pan-Arab shows have spent a
considerable amount of money on these various commercial arms and on investing in contestants
who will go on to become a part of the music and media industry. Just from getting an overview
of this entertainment landscape and watching some live episodes of The Voice Kids—filmed in
the same studios as Arab Idol—I was able to observe just how intertwined the various corporate
branches of the Arabic-language media and music industries are.
***
In all its global iterations, the Idols franchise is important to and profitable for two
separate yet intertwined industries: television and music. The music business company BMG and
media company Fremantle Media, which produces Idols, work in tandem in various countries to
produce its local iterations. For instance, in the Norwegian context, the success of Idols requires
the collaboration of television and music business professionals: music producers transform
television producers’ visions into reality by doing the song editing, mixing, or arranging (Kjus
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2017). Indian Idol, which is licensed by Sony Entertainment Television, is both a “corporate
network” and a “brand” that combines the collective skills of media and music industry talents
(Desai-Stephens 2017, 36).
As with other Idols offshoots in their respective countries, Arab Idol is part of a network
of entertainment industries. It originated in the context of decades of rich transnational overlap
between music and the media that have served as outlets for Arab singers and vocal music.
Throughout the twentieth century, the trajectories of both Arab music and media industries were
not only largely intertwined but covered a pan-Arab regional span. In this chapter, I argue that
the confluence of the music industry with other media industries, such as radio and television—
both broadcast and satellite—contributed to the crafting and dissemination of a pan-Arab musical
canon that remains recognizable today.
Tracing this longstanding—and notably transnational—legacy of the music and media
industries will allow for the exploration of the now-ubiquitous markers of an Arab vocal-musical
canon that were constantly referenced on Arab Idol—markers that had been established over
decades of dissemination.2 First, I explore how the media and music industries themselves shape
notions of Arabness. In particular, the intersection of Arab music and media industries and the
emergence of the satellite television landscape—built to serve a pan-Arab audience—set the
scene for Arab Idol. The show has straddled both the music and satellite television industries in a
transnational setting, becoming a fixture of this new regional media model. Therefore, one key
aim is to provide the pan-Arab mediascape context for twentieth- and twenty-first-century Arab
popular vocal music often performed on Arab Idol. This chapter will anticipate my exploration in
later chapters of how the music and singing voice on Arab Idol recirculated canonical Arab

2

See Chapter Three.
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popular music that has been disseminated over decades in a pan-Arab sphere, and how they
reinforced notions of Arabness. It will also shed light on music that has continued to be of
relevance in the contemporary media context of Arab Idol.

Transmedial Arab entertainment industries in the 20th century and media capitalism
Andrea Stanton (2020a) has suggested that it is helpful to apply a transnational—as
opposed to a national—lens to study broadcast media, which have always reached past national
borders. She further notes how media scholars and historians highlight the “entanglement” of
media, emphasizing how the history of media is not just transnational but transmedial, crossing
not just borders but media types as well. Similarly, Ziad Fahmy’s concept of “media capitalism”
(2011)—the role of the combined industries of print, sound, and performance media to mold a
community—better accounts for the overlap of entertainment industries in early twentiethcentury Egypt. Building on Anderson (1991)’s conception of “imagined communities,” Fahmy
(2011; 2020) argues that in addition to print capitalism forming a national identity, media
capitalism via non-print audiovisual media allowed for more Egyptians to be reached in the early
twentieth century. As it is a system that involves various media aiming for monetary gain, I view
this framing as applicable to the present day as well as to the larger Middle East and North
African region, particularly in the examination of televised music talent reality competitions.
Another significance of thinking in terms of a media capitalism framework is that different kinds
of audiovisual media, old and new, can all be assumed to coexist, or intertwine, as in the
examples of this chapter.3

3

See Fahmy (2011)’s discussion of the broader and less visual-centric scope of media capitalism (97).
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Regarding musical performance in the early twentieth century, the theater and music
industries were “inexorably linked” (Fahmy 2011, 125). For instance, Egyptian composer Sayyid
Darwish wrote songs for various theater groups, which were also successful as recordings. His
success allowed him to circumvent the norm of exclusive recording company contracts that most
composers were beholden to, allowing him to work widely. Other examples include the
flexibility of performers in burlesque scenes who were also recording artists, or how famous
lyricists would also write azjal (colloquial Egyptian poetry) in newspapers that they edited or
owned (Fahmy 2011, 97). The intertwining of various entertainment industries was obvious in
the early 1900s with the recording industry, as record companies like Gramophone or Odeon
gained the rights to work with performers, lyricists, and music from other performance sectors
(Fahmy 2011, 112).
Fahmy argues that this emergent media capitalism allowed for Egyptians of all walks of
life to become involved in identity discourses, participating in “a variety of expanding public
spheres” (Fahmy 2011, 132). What Fahmy argues was crucial to the success of all these various
media was that they were being produced in colloquial Arabic. Low rates of literacy created a
reality that trumped the elite assumption of fusha, an elevated literary Arabic also known today
as Modern Standard Arabic, as a primary cultural frame. Arab media scholar Walter Armbrust
(1996) also stresses the importance of the vernacular to the ubiquity of popular culture in Egypt.
Regarding the relationship of media, nationalisms, and the Arabic language, Armbrust (2000)
points out that while classical Arabic was defended by so many state-building entities, popular
culture was a different story: “The importance of nontraditional media in constructing Egyptian
and Arab nationalism has been substantially unacknowledged by the cultural establishment”
(303). Many songs that were originally written for comedic or musical plays, such as taqatiq (pl.;
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sing. taqtuqa) like Sayyid Darwish’s “Salima ya Salama,” could easily be sung by both literate
and illiterate Egyptians (Fahmy 2011, 116).
The most prominent Egyptian, Lebanese, and Syrian singers of the mid-twentieth
century—many of whose most popular numbers have been performed on Arab Idol and other
contemporary programs—were simultaneously movie stars, recording artists, and radio and
television regulars, an indication of the diverse contexts for popular music production.4 Such
transmedial activity included the most famous singer of Egypt and the region, Umm Kulthum
(Danielson 1997; Lohman 2010), as well as singers such as Layla Murad, Farid al-Atrash,
Asmahan, ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab, and Sabah. The prolific Egyptian
composer Muhammad Fawzi also worked for both the record industry and the film industry. He
owned the record company Misrphon—later acquired by the state—which ran a transnational
operation, renting out its factories and spaces to recording companies across the Arab world
(Frishkopf 2008, 37).
While artists covered ground across entertainment media, they also gained momentum
across the Arab region, although the main locus of activity was Egypt. Before World War I,
artists from cities such as Istanbul, Aleppo, and Damascus would either visit or reside
permanently in Cairo (Racy 1976, 28). Considering the relationship between Arab media and
place, Joe Khalil (2013) argues for the analysis of regional media in terms of shifting media
cities and supranational media organizations. He describes Arab media cities as “sites for
mediation of various local, regional, and international trajectories which vary in intensity”
(Khalil 2013, 192). One of these important media cities is Cairo. To contextualize the pan-Arab
music and media industries, the following sections examine the trajectory of twentieth-century

4

Diverse performance contexts for popular artists also hold true in the United States and in other international cases.
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entertainment industries in Egypt, a crucial media hub for the region’s transnational music
history, in more detail.

The recording industry in Egypt (and Lebanon)
As Egyptian music specialist Salwa El-Shawan Castelo-Branco (1993) writes, “the
history of music in twentieth-century Egypt is closely linked to the history of its music media”
(1237). The Arab music recording industry arose in Cairo at the beginning of the twentieth
century. Gramophones started to play a crucial role in the formation of an Egyptian musical
identity (Fahmy 2011, 73). The relationship of Egypt’s music and media industries to Egypt’s
development as a nation was a crucial component of the region’s history and has also received a
lot of scholarly attention (Abu Lughod 2005; Fahmy 2011; Frishkopf 2008). By the 1940s, many
recording companies had ended their operations (Frishkopf 2008, 31). The rise of Gamal Abdel
Nasser and his socialist and statist nationalism led to the “decimation” of private-sector local
recording companies, all to be replaced by the state’s company SonoCairo, or Sawt al-Qahira
(Frishkopf 2008, 30).
Due to the circulation of artists and production logistics, Egypt played a pivotal role in
what Racy (1976) argues has always been a pan-regional, not just national, predominantly
Arabic-language record industry. Egypt’s established central role as a music hub in the region
and its potential to create a large market attracted European record companies to set up business
in Cairo at the turn of the twentieth century (Racy 1976, 28). While many European record
companies operated in the Arab world, their manufacturing was still done in Europe. These
included the British companies Gramophone and Columbia, German Polyphon, and French
Pathé (Racy 1978, 47). Owned by the Lebanese Bayda brothers, Beirut-based Baidaphon was the
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biggest non-European record company that operated in the region during the phonograph era
beginning in the early 1900s and gained traction across a wider Middle Eastern-North African
market from Tunisia to Iran (Frishkopf 2008, 40). As one of the region’s record companies that
wasn’t Egypt-based, Baidaphon still had relationships with famous artists not just in Lebanon but
also in Egypt, including entertainment luminaries such as Munira al-Mahdiyya, a famous singer
and later theater company owner. Cairophon, a branch of Baidaphon, dominated as the primary
Egyptian record company through the 1950s, under the supervision of leading star Muhammad
‘Abd al-Wahab (Frishkopf 2008, 32). Other than his ownership of shares in Cairophon, these two
companies and most others that operated in Egypt and the region were foreign-owned (Frishkopf
2008, 33). The institutionalization of Egyptian popular culture, including both comedy and
musical theater, coupled with the press and the recording industry, not only affected twentiethcentury Egyptians’ nationalism but undoubtedly made an impact on Egypt’s dominance in the
region. The consumption of Egyptian records in the early twentieth century was not just a
phenomenon within Egypt: cylinders and discs made their way across the Levant as well as to
Iraq (Baghdad).

The Egyptian film industry and Arab music
The rising popularity of musical films in the 1930s in Egypt and the Arab world resulted
in significant overlap of the film and music industries, with film songs frequently being produced
as phonograms and disseminated widely by leading record companies and radio stations
(Castelo-Branco 1980, 91-92). A lot of film, music, and media that circulated in the region were
also imported from outside of the Arab world, including many early foreign-produced films and
records with Egyptian content (Farrell 2012, 116). Additionally, from their earliest years,
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Egyptian musical films often utilized American and European film tropes, and musically drew
inspiration from European operatic music as well as global popular musical trends of the era,
such as Latin American rhythms, instruments, and musical forms. Many Arabic musical numbers
and songs combined regional Arab styles with European and global musical styles that were
already popular in the region and consumed via records, radio, and film.
Al-Warda al-Baida (The White Rose, 1933) was the first musical film to make profits
across the Middle East, not just in Egypt (Farrell 2012, 131). While critiqued in later years for its
social content and focus on upper class living, the film, which featured Arabic music front and
center and starred Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab in the leading role, was considered a successful
film at the time of its premiere (Armbrust 1996, 114). The so-called golden age of cinema—the
1940s to 1960s—coincided with the height of pan-Arab political ideology and regional
consolidation. In 1945, Egypt joined the Arab League, a regional organization formed with five
other Arab states. In the 1950s and 1960s, political and pan-Arab rhetoric centered around unity
with Palestine. At the end of this period in the 1960s, the state took over film production
(Hammond 2015). At the same time, the presence and musical subject matter of the
aforementioned Syrian musicians and film stars Farid al-Atrash and Asmahan gave Egyptian
films a pan-Arab dimension. The emergence of other regional power players in the entertainment
industry was becoming apparent; some films during this time were bankrolled by Lebanese
financiers (Armbrust 2000, 301).
Musical films combined visual and narrative elements with musical ones, meaning that
music became linked with certain important images and narratives, and certainly became
inextricable from the movie and the music stars that were performing them. Indeed, rather than
being studio-driven, movies were star-driven: audiences flocked to theaters primarily to
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experience their favorite singers premiere new songs in the film. Just as they had been
disseminated on records, musical forms from Egyptian theater were also disseminated further in
films. Musical films also ingrained music and concepts of live performance into their viewers in
a myriad of ways. Not only were hit songs featured prominently in a film, but their main musical
themes would reappear instrumentally throughout the film. Some films would feature scenes
involving staged performances with audiences, and these performances-in-a-performance,
complete with audience applause, set the precedent for a musical or dance performance for
decades to come. Furthermore, the songs, costumes, and styles of staging in this era of films have
remained in the pan-Arab popular cultural sphere and the present era, including performances on
Arab Idol. Sometimes, entire musical numbers from these classic films were referenced when
they were recreated on the talent competition’s stage.5

Radio as a transnational medium
Since the first half of the twentieth century, radio has also been a supraregional
disseminator of popular music in the Arab world. As Stanton has noted, radio was intrinsically a
transnational medium, with short- and medium-wave radio with good frequencies reaching past
national borders, particularly in regions with smaller states, such as the Middle East (2020a, 3).
Radio broadcasting in Egypt began in the 1920s with amateurs experimenting with the novel
technology of wireless radio transmitters. In this early period, radio catered to the elite; radios
were nearly absent in rural areas. This would change in the post-colonial era, as radio became
regarded as a useful tool to develop national agendas, and with the availability of cheaper
transistor radios. After a period of amateur radio, national radio stations such as the Egyptian

5

See Chapter Three.

50

state radio, known as Radio Cairo, began to broadcast within the region on medium-wave
frequencies (Stanton 2020a, 2).
Established in 1934, Radio Cairo (Idha‘at al-Qahira) was strongly associated with its
broadcasts of live performances by Arab singers and other entertainment programming (Stanton
2020a, 2). Egyptian radio would broadcast both live concerts as well as audio from films (Nassar
2010, 68). Music personalities featured on mid-twentieth-century radio, such as the composer
and conductor Muhammad Hassan al-Shuga‘i (1903-63), had his ambitions set beyond Egypt’s
purview. Appointed as an artistic consultant to Egyptian radio, al-Shuga‘i’s main goals were to
present and develop various genres of Arab song (Nassar 2010, 71). Established in 1936, the
Palestine Broadcasting Service (Radio Jerusalem) also had live and recorded entertainment, with
broadcasts in Arabic, Hebrew, and English (Stanton 2020a, 2). These two stations were able to
reach a regional audience, as opposed to initiatives started elsewhere; stations in Mosul,
Damascus, and Beirut faced varying technical and logistical difficulties, and thereby aired for
very few hours a day (Stanton 2020a, 2). While the Palestinian radio station existed for twelve
years until the creation of the state of Israel (Stanton 2013), Egyptian radio continued to develop
over the coming decades. Umm Kulthum’s live concerts were a major feature of Egyptian radio,
and conversely radio was the primary medium by which Umm Kulthum reached audiences.
From 1937 until her final illness thirty-six years later, Umm Kulthum’s concerts were famously
broadcast on the first Thursday of the month (Danielson 1996, 86-87). By the middle of the
1960s, Cairo’s radio broadcasts reached Baghdad (Khalil 2013, 194), with programming
emphasizing Arab unity and fusha (media Arabic), rather than Egyptian Arabic, as the broadcast
language. With the rise of Egyptian broadcast radio stations from the 1950s to the late 1970s,
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radio played a major role for three decades in forming musical trends, shaping artists’ careers,
and impacting the development of urban popular music (Castelo-Branco 1993, 1235).

Imperial radio services and pan-Arab rhetoric
Leading up to World War II, the transnational Arab media was privy to imperial ambition
and influence. More radio services were introduced into the Arab world by European colonial
powers in the 1930s to promote their political and economic interests and to stave off the
influence of rival powers (Stanton 2020a; Ayish 2011a, 68). Radio stations controlled by
European powers would resort to pan-Arab rhetoric in order to control a larger span of the region
than their imperial contenders. Furthermore, these stations utilized the broadcasting of
gramophone records of Arab musicians to attract listeners to their Arabic-language coverage. For
instance, Italian radio station Radio Bari would play Arabic music in tandem with announcing
Italy’s commitment to Arab nationalist movements. Meanwhile, the BBC (British Broadcasting
Corporation) wanted to counter Radio Bari’s as well as Germany’s radio propaganda with its
own radio news service. It launched its own Arabic language service in 1938 from London,
which, along with news, also aired Arab music in order to attract non-British listeners (Stanton
2020a). Also of significance at this time is that Egypt and Palestine, along with their broadcast
media, were both to some extent under British control and financing. Furthermore, BBC
employees and other British officials would work and be involved and consulted regularly at
these two stations, and the shared broadcast language of Arabic and connection to Great Britain
correlated with the circulation of many of the same officials (Stanton 2020a, 5). Similarly, the
first Lebanese radio station was created by the French in 1936 to counteract the propaganda on
German and Italian stations (Ayish 2011a). A year later in Algeria, France also began radio
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broadcasting to serve its French community there, with its broadcasts being relayed from Paris.
These are examples of how European imperial radio stations intentionally contributed to fueling
Arab nationalism themselves, and possibly a notion of what “pan-Arab music” could be, though
this would need to be investigated more. In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, radio
stations, such as the U.S. State Department-funded Voice of America during the Cold War, and
later Radio Sawa and its sister satellite network Al-Hurra in the Bush era of the early 2000s,
featured Arabic music and Western popular music in tandem with U.S.-sanctioned news
broadcasts (Bothwell 2013).

Sawt al-‘Arab and political Arab radio initiatives
In part as a response to the imperial motives described above, two main themes of Arab
radio stations based in authoritarian countries were the fight against Western colonialism and
Arab nationalism (Ayish 2011a, 71). No situation exemplifies this more than radio under
Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, particularly with his Sawt al-‘Arab (Voice of the
Arabs) radio station during the 1950s and 1960s. While it was an Egyptian program, its selfexplanatory name showed how it was meant to evoke the identity of Arabs as a whole, with
earlier, primarily anti-imperialist, rhetoric replaced and entangled with calls for pan-Arab unity
(Musleh-Motut 2006, 54). While Sawt al-‘Arab first began as a half-hour radio program in 1953,
it expanded into an around-the-clock service by 1960, broadcasting revolutionary views of the
Egyptian regime across the Arab world, and promoting a shared Arab identity. The main aims of
the station were “to liberate the Arab people; to unite the Arab countries; to liberate Arab
resources from imperialism’s grasp; and to encourage the use of those resources for the
development of Arab civilisation, science and culture” (Musleh-Motut 2006, 54). In addition to
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its often-inaccurate news coverage and other nationalistic content, it featured patriotic songs by
Umm Kulthum, ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz, and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab to draw in listeners
(Musleh-Motut 2006, 23). With her songs monopolized by state media, and due to her alliance
with Nasser, Umm Kulthum was shaped and indeed shaped herself as a symbol of pan-Arab
nationalism and Arabness. The prominence of the media in the region and the dissemination of
singers such as Umm Kulthum also ensured that musical aspects of Arab music, such as
maqamat and iqa‘at (rhythmic modes), remained familiar in listeners’ ears (Lohman 2010, 42).
During this period, Nasser also transformed from an Egyptian domestic-oriented leader to
a pan-Arab one—at least in terms of public rhetoric—where Islam was not necessarily part and
parcel of his Arabism. Some early political decisions marking this transition included his urging
of other Arab nations to reject the American-led Baghdad Pact in 1955 (Musleh-Motut 2006, 26),
the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, and nationalizing the Aswan Dam to
maintain control of the Suez Canal in the face of what came to be known as the Suez Crisis of
1956. Nasser initiated the short-lived and ill-fated United Arab Republic with Syria (1958-61), a
project mostly to Egypt’s benefit that caused “rifts” almost immediately (Schmidinger 2018, 53).
His popularity remained high up until the 1967 Six-Day War, known in Arabic as the Naksa
(setback), with the humiliating defeat of Jordan, Egypt, and Syria in the war. Nasser’s
commitment to pan-Arabism was always with Egypt at the heart of his interests, though his
regime’s broadcasting of false information and hope on Sawt al-‘Arab’s airwaves leading up to
the Six-Day War damaged the radio station’s credibility. Yet the cultural impact remained: panArab rhetorical devices used on Sawt al-‘Arab, such as min al-muhit ila al-khalij (from the
Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf), would make it onto the lips of the emcees of Arab Idol several
decades later.
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Radio was also used as a political mobilization tool in countries such as Syria, Yemen,
Iraq, and Libya, where music and entertainment were also capitalized upon and coupled with
political propaganda. In the twenty-first century, with radio as with television, Lebanon has been
the center of privately-owned stations. It has led the Arab region in ventures for private radio,
with an emphasis on entertainment programming catered to young audiences (Nassar 2010, 73).

Music and the voice on Arab radio
In addition to broadcasting music, Egyptian radio became a source for Qur’an reciters to
make names for themselves and impacted their careers. The vocal art of recitation became highly
revered as reciters gained prestige for being on the radio (Castelo-Branco 1993). Vocal repertoire
in secular music dominated during the heyday of radio in Egypt, although instrumental
compositions and poetry competitions were also included (Castelo-Branco 1993, 1235). On radio
stations, screening committees were tasked with creating guidelines that set the length, style, and
textual content of the songs. For instance, instrumental introductions and interludes for vocal
numbers were a necessity. The radio had its own ensembles, such as an Arab instrumental group,
symphonic orchestra, and jazz ensemble (Nassar 2010, 69). Radio was also seminal for the
creation of both large Arabic ensembles and a symphony orchestra that would later become the
Cairo Symphony Orchestra. Radio during the 1950s through the 1970s played a major role in the
patronage of composers, songwriters, and performers both vocal and instrumental (CasteloBranco 1993, 1236). Because music of the so-called Golden Age of Arabic music (1925-1975)
was recorded and mediated so extensively, it traveled well “and became universal in the Arab
world,” thereby often being synonymous with the Arab world (Farraj and Shumays 2019, 2).
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Arab television: A transition from national to satellite television systems
Like the utilization of radio, Arab countries used television as a tool for national control
and consolidation during the mid-twentieth century. The state medium of television in Egypt
was, like radio, instrumental in its featuring of singers who were associated with state-building
projects, again most famously, Umm Kulthum. Yet during the 1970s and 1980s regional
collaborative efforts to pool media resources and to increase transmission across borders already
existed; this was being done by institutions including the Arab League, the Arab States
Broadcasting Union, and the Saudi Arabian Gulfvision (Ayish 2011b, 88). However, radio
overshadowed television in terms of reach, and because television stations were not financially
independent and relied largely on government subsidies, Arab television broadcasters fell short
in developing crucial infrastructure and technical capabilities, and were unable to produce
programming based on viewers’ preferences as opposed to official government ones (Ayish
2011b, 89). Also during this period, cassettes challenged the hegemony of radio and of Sawt alQahira, and new styles that the older medium had previously censored began to emerge
(Castelo-Branco 1987).
Eventually, however, the increased regional consolidation pushed Arab television into the
global sphere. Regional satellite systems such as ARABSAT and NILESAT allowed for both
governments and private companies to reach a pan-Arab audience (Ayish 2011b, 95). Kraidy and
Khalil (2009) further posit that to understand Arab television is to recognize it as a pan-Arab
industry and as a single integrated market, arguing that today’s pan-Arab television landscape
differs from both the regional national systems preceding it, as well as from global media
systems at large today. In the 1990s, the emergence of Qatari satellite network Al Jazeera had
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great significance in the region following the Gulf War as an “independent Arab outlet” for
news, bringing with it an international, and certainly Arab, influence.
The advent of satellite television also meant that media would become pan-Arab in a very
new and literal way, ushering in a new era of transnational media and music. As Kraidy and
Khalil observe,
Unlike media in post-Soviet societies, national Arab broadcasting systems were not
subjected to the standardizing influence of Soviet communism; rather television systems
in Arab states evolved as discrete entities with minimal overlaps until the early 1990s,
when satellite technology transformed Arab television into a transnational field, based on
a pan-Arab infrastructure of satellite technology established by the Arab Satellite
Organization (ARABSAT) (Kraidy & Khalil 2009, 2; see also El-Hibri 2017).
The exact reception footprint of satellite media in the Arab world very substantively created a
pan-Arab consumer community.

Figure 1.1: Scope of MBC satellite footprint across Arabic-speaking countries. Source: MBC
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While post-colonial national television was concerned with catering to viewers as consumers of
programming (Abu Lughod 2002), a transition from national to satellite television systems
signaled a shift to catering to consumerism instead. For instance, Christa Salamandra’s research
(2013) on Syrian serial television dramas on pan-Arab networks sheds light on how transnational
commercial motivations overlap with socio-cultural and state-based ambitions. It is important to
emphasize that while a pan-Arab consumer audience was created or addressed by satellite media,
it did not necessarily create a single political community.

Lebanon’s satellite media rise and dominance
The transition from national television systems to satellite television in the region was
paralleled by a geographical shift, as Beirut replaced Cairo as the Arab world’s media hub.6
Although the national mode of dissemination had worked in favor of Egypt in promoting its
regional dominance—incidentally under the auspices of the British and then intentionally with
Egypt’s later pan-Arab ambitions (Stanton 2020a, 3)—and its association with musical output,
the last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed more fragmentation. Private companies now
vied for control of the airwaves and establishment on satellite technology. Lebanon was the
exception to the rule of government-controlled national broadcasting in the region in the way
local television’s advent progressed. It was the first country in the Middle East that allowed
private television and radio to be broadcast within its borders (El Richani 2013, 70). During its
early days of television, its economic policies had already focused more on licensing as opposed
to the regulation of content (Khalil 2013, 195). Lebanon left media ownership to private
investors, who exported products regionally with television and film studios offering services to

6

See Khalil 2013 on media cities, also mentioned earlier in chapter.
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regional talent. Therefore, Beirut became a center for media, and later a hub for popular music
production and superstars (Khalil 2013). Before the Lebanese Civil War began in 1975, two
private television services (Compagnie de Television du Liban (CTL) and Proche-Orient
(TeleOrient) existed. However, with the early years of the war these companies suffered losses,
and a government-controlled channel, TéléLiban, was formed (Ayish 2011b, 90).
The Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) resulted in media outlets moving out of Lebanon to
Europe, Dubai, Amman, and Kuwait. During this time in Lebanon, varying militias involved in
the conflict would take over radio and television stations, a common method of asserting
authority (Cody 2019). TeleOrient was co-opted by Muslim leaders in West Beirut, while in East
Beirut the television was run by pro-government, mostly Christian, militias (Cody 2019, 127).
Once the conflict had fully escalated, various factions also created their own mouthpieces on
radio and television to broadcast their news and consolidate their audience.
The multitude of Lebanese channels during the civil war served as a start for many
satellite networks. The political affiliations of different media stations were shaped by these
wartime developments, with different factions controlling specific channels, and remained
apparent on twenty-first century satellite media when different political groups continued to
prefer their own outlets for propaganda. For instance, after the assassination of former Prime
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005, his family-owned media station, Future Television, remained
dedicated to promoting news related to this assassination, and propaganda in line with it. LBC
(Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation) was founded in 1985 as an organ for the Lebanese Forces,
a Christian nationalist militia faction. LBC, or LBCI as of 1992, was the most successful wartime
channel, and is the oldest continuously run private satellite channel (Khalil & Kraidy 2009, 41).
It is still the primary satellite channel in Lebanon and is the channel on which MBC-produced
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Idols and Voice iterations air for Lebanese audiences today. After the Lebanese Civil War ended,
media companies launched satellite channels on the already existing multitude of channels in
Lebanon. Satellite channels transcended state control by running their operations from Europe,
combined with content production networks in Egypt and Lebanon (Khalil 2013,196). As a result
of its open market, its long-term relationship with the West, and its fragmented media system,
Lebanon was well disposed to satellite media technology, as opposed to Egypt, Syria, and other
surrounding countries, with their more nationalized media systems. Beirut became a hub for
media without having any government-led initiatives to do so, being conducive to laissez-faire
policies and private media (Khalil 2013, 197).7

Arab satellite television and entertainment
Scholarship on satellite technology provides insight for understanding Arab Idol’s broad
pan-Arab scope. The launching of Arab satellites to serve an entire region led to the churning out
of programming to fill the time, and induced sky competition and terrestrial competition with the
establishment of media cities (Abdel Rahim 2005, 51). A burst of satellite channels in the 1990s
and 2000s translated into technology and news channels reaching the entire Arab region
(Reynolds 2015, 17; Abdel Rahim 2005). Kraidy and Khalil (2009) argue that it is significant
that a strong pan-Arab entertainment channel, rather than a strong regional news channel,
emerged onto the Arab sphere from Lebanon’s “anarchic” air waves following its civil war (31).
They argue that the reality television phenomenon is the “result of complex overlaps of political,
business, religious, and representational forces locally and transnationally” (Kraidy & Khalil
2009, 53). Entertainment satellite television launched in a big way on Lebanese channels. In their

7

See Chapter Two for a more in-depth analysis of Lebanese entertainment channel’s ideological profiles.
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business of creating pop stars from reality television, satellite television channels like LBC and
MBC were also driven by commercial motives, thereby allowing corporate strategy to shape how
they created incentives for their consumers and stars with deals and sponsorships, respectively
(Abdel Aziz 2010, 87). According to Kraidy and Khalil, entertainment channels pushed for the
commercialization of Arab television industries, and MBC and LBCI shaped Arab television into
a commercially driven industry, with MBC leading in the adaptations of global entertainment
franchise formats into Arabic. These channels’ range of programming and advertising support
allowed them to become conglomerates with various branches that each have target audiences.
Syria has also contributed to the pan-Arab entertainment industry, with television serials, or
musalsalat, airing on pan-Arab channels across the region (Salamandra 2013). Salamandra’s
research on these serials (2013) sheds light on how transnational commercial motivations overlap
with socio-cultural and state-based ambitions. This environment contrasts from state-television
focuses and their “nation-building intelligentsia” of television producers, as discussed by AbuLughod (2005) in her monograph examining late twentieth century Egyptian television serials
and debates on identity. Syrian radio shows would host interviews with Syrian contestants from
pan-Arab televised competitions, lamenting that Syrians aren’t able to win as much as those from
countries with stronger media industries, and that Syria was not reaching the pan-Arab level as
much as others (Bothwell 2018, 99). The other takeaway from the rise of entertainment channels
rather than that of news channels is that they attract a larger range of audience members —not
just the default category of adult males—thereby further shaping and increasing the range of
national and pan-Arab industries.
With the satellite media in the early 1990s largely dominated by private media channels
based out of Lebanon, a new era of popular music came to be associated with Beirut, rather than
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Cairo. Superstar, the Idols franchise’s first iteration in the Arab world, would get its start on a
pan-Arab media structure that was already well established. Around the time that Superstar first
became a phenomenon, the number of musical variety programs on satellite television
outnumbered any other type of program. In 2007, the private sector included 117
“music/varieties” programs, compared to 90 “general /varied programs” and 55
“cinema/drama/series” (see Table 7, Ayish 2011b, 86). Audio production technology developed
alongside the film and television industries (Abdel Aziz 2010, 82). Examined further in Chapter
Two, Beirut has long been a center for talent competition shows, with Lebanese television
studios producing various vocal talent competitions, from Studio El Fan (Arts Studio) in the
1970s to Superstar (Cestor 2010).

Shaping Arab music: Pan-Arab satellite television and the videoclip
Scholars have acknowledged how the pan-Arab media environment has shaped the
sphere in which popular music is produced and consumed, and within which music has been
constructed as pan-Arab. Frishkopf (2010) sees Arab music as “a category called into existence
by mass media” (12). Umm Kulthum’s life paralleled the rise of media, an important factor in
her being a pan-Arab, not just Egyptian, celebrity. She represented an earlier era of pan-Arab
media; now it is satellite television that carries on a similar pan-Arab role. Kubala (2010) has
noted the importance of pan-Arab music entertainment channels and video clips as the media by
which music artists and pop stars gained widespread popularity in the era of satellite television.
Kraidy (2015) argues that it is impossible to look at an Arab celebrity today outside of a
transnational Arab context, seeing the Arab superstar as inherently pan-Arab. In the satellite
television era, music artists and pop stars began to gain popularity through videoclips and pan-
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Arab music entertainment channels (Kraidy & Khalil 2009; Kubala 2010). With all its music
programming, the satellite medium parallels the music industry’s transformation: satellite
television became the preferred medium for creating stars. Rather than creating full movies with
hit songs to promote, satellite television was the origin of video clips, which became a more
commercially viable format to get hit songs straight to consumers (Cestor 2010). Frishkopf
(2010) suggests that recent patterns in widespread, shared music and media consumption may
have ushered in a new emergent variety of pan-Arabism, in contrast to the top-down panArabism of the Nasserist era (22-24). These channels were Beirut-based yet Gulf-run and have
produced music videos that transformed singers into megastars (Hammond 2017b).
The literature on Arab music television has focused on video clips (Frishkopf 2010;
Abdel Fattah 2010; Saleh 2020; Kozman et al. 2021; Al-Barghouti 2010, 227), whereas Arab
Idol emphasizes its different features. While much of Arab popular music and media scholarship
has focused on the imagery and gendered content of the videoclip, my research on Arab Idol
highlights a contrast with the fervor around music videos in general to show how the latter visual
phenomenon prioritizes an emphasis on the musical aspects instead. While Arab Idol features a
lot of the same singers and stars from the sphere of videoclips and music videos working in the
capacity of judges and special guests, I argue that the use of a range of repertoire, what I see as a
canonical Arab music repertoire that includes some contemporary pop, but more older twentiethcentury popular music, overrules the emphasis on other visual aspects that dominate in
videoclips.
At the same time, one important reason to look at the overlap of the media and music
industries is that Arab Idol is as much a visual product as it is a sonic one, creating an
audiovisual experience. While an earlier era was visually characterized by dignified broadcasts—
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the visual aspects of Egyptian music television in the mid-twentieth century were educational in
their focus on decor, lighting, recognizing important instruments, their players, and the
conductor, for instance (Nassar 2010, 73)—the era of videoclips brought an aesthetic concerned
more with provocative image saturation. Televisual aspects of the video clip were essential to
their success, and they also gave the visual element dominance, more so than earlier television
(Marcus 2015, 157). Abdel Aziz (2010) argues that the precursor of videoclips were staged and
danced versions of famous songs on television, and in films. Indeed, these staged versions of
famous songs would make a comeback on Arab Idol and be recreated frequently, whether sung
solo or in group formats with many contestants, more as formulaic filler entertainment than as an
extra tune for judgement by the judges or audience. What is interesting about Arab Idol is that it
prefers older visual and musical aesthetics, such as those of movie musicals and old concerts,
rather than emulating videoclips or music videos, despite contestants choosing to compete with
more contemporary videoclip-era songs.

Pan-Arab media production: Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf
One of the most important elements of transnational Arab media is the working
relationship between Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf, particularly Dubai, that facilitates the
production of their pan-Arab programming. While the MBC reality television shows such as
Arab Idol are all filmed in Lebanese studios, the media companies are largely Saudi owned.
Kraidy argues that “Saudi Arabia and Lebanon are better understood as a dynamic pair whose
multifaceted interactions shape a hypermedia space that ‘covers’ the entire Arab region.” (Kraidy
2011, 287).8 Meanwhile, the media company MBC and others run their operations out of Dubai

8

Kraidy (2011) theorizes hypermedia space to be created by “communication processes between a
variety of information and media technologies” (285).
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in the United Arab Emirates. MBC, originally launched in London, moved to Dubai in 2002. In
the early days of satellite television in the 1990s until the early 2000s, indeed since the Lebanese
Civil War, London was the center of pan-Arab media (Salamandra 2003). In the early 2000s,
global tensions and the post-9/11 political climate were contributing factors to the move of
satellite hubs from London to the Arab world (Kraidy & Khalil 2009, 23). Furthermore, when the
Gulf began to build more sophisticated technological systems, there was more of an incentive to
bring the industries back to the region (Salamandra 2003). London was considered more of an
Arabic news hub, so perhaps the move to the Gulf allowed for a greater focus on entertainment
production. Despite their long-term base in London, satellite channels catered to local Arab
interests instead of London, lending their programming a more “cosmopolitan” edge,
“[reflecting] the interests of sponsoring states and state-controlled markets rather than those of an
expanding public sphere in the Arab world” (Salamandra 2003).
With this move, MBC became a multi-channel television company, becoming known for
its entertainment programming. Dubai Media City (DMC) began as a government-led initiative
for an economic free zone specifically for media in 2001 (Khalil 2013, 197). Other DMC-based
media companies include Reuters, BBC, Showtime, and Sony. Dubai has aimed for strategic
positioning due to its geopolitical centrality. As Khalil writes, it has become a major regional
hub for people fleeing difficult situations in their own countries: most of the labor force in media
is made up of Lebanese, Egyptians, Iraqis, and Syrians (Khalil 2013, 201). All this allowed for
MBC and other media companies’ headquarters to plant seeds in Dubai rather than Lebanon.
Due to Saudi ownership and shareholding in Lebanese and other entertainment channels,
Saudi Arabia has maintained a consistent stake of influence in television, even if ambiguously.
Kraidy argues that the 1991 Gulf War “catalyzed the creation of offshore Saudi-owned satellite
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channels” (Kraidy 2013, 32). It fueled Saudi princes and business moguls to invest more in panArab media, and saw MBC launched by Waleed al-Ibrahim. Kraidy argues that Saudi media
cannot be understood separately form the Arab world because of Saudi Arabia’s privileged role
in the region’s media. Programming on Saudi-financed satellite television is generally quite
liberal, even in the mere fact that much of it constitutes entertainment, but conversations about
politics and religion are banned, and a critical tone towards Saudi Arabia is not allowed (Kraidy
& Khalil 2009, 43). Saudi Arabia, with its stakes in ownership, allows for liberal narratives to
circulate as long as they do not harbor hostilities towards Saudi Arabia (Kraidy 2013, 33).
MBC’s criteria for not offending Saudi Arabia with its programming was to not include human
rights issues and to maintain politically “neutral” entertainment (Salamandra 2003).
Before Saudi Arabia became integrated into pan-Arab media, its clerics maintained a
large influence over what television was seen as suitable for the country’s audiences (Kraidy
2013, 30). Nevertheless, as Saudi Arabia’s role accommodated a wider regional space,
conservative clerics no longer held the same sway behind the scenes, as there was no longer a
discrete national media arena they could police. Because television audiences, production
logistics, and station operations became so much larger, it was unfeasible for state control to be
asserted over them, regardless of Saudi ownership of satellite channels. Therefore, they became
more prominently vocal about their grievances in the era of global formats being aired on
satellite television.
This is where the Saudi and Lebanese symbiotic relationship becomes relevant. While
Saudi Arabia owned the capital from which Lebanon could benefit, Lebanon boasted access to
multi-faceted realms of culture, media, politics, economics, religion, and tourism that enticed
Saudi Arabia (Kraidy 2010, 89). Saudi media already had a precedent of hiring Lebanese fleeing
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the civil war, though this process intensified with the era of satellite media (Yaghi 2017, 41).
Saudi financing allowed MBC to establish Beirut as an entertainment hub in the region. It also
enabled the establishment of a Lebanese cultural hegemony. It wasn’t just the copious
employment of Lebanese talent to work in the various levels of the industries, but the prevalence
of Lebanese hosts, emcees, and, language-wise, of Lebanese accents and dialect (Kraidy 2010,
79-80). While Egypt was still considered a cultural center where Lebanese talent sought to
perform during the 1990s and onward, Egyptians conversely wanted to travel to Lebanon and the
Gulf to be on pan-Arab satellite programming (Hammond 2017b). The confluence of sociopolitical and technological developments was also particularly salient in the reality television
programming produced by means of this Saudi-Lebanese relationship (see Kraidy 2010 and
2011). The popularity of entertainment shows helped bring Lebanese politics, dialect, and talent
to a pan-Arab audience (Kraidy 2011, 298). The Saudi regime has become directly or indirectly
the owner of most influential pan-Arab television channels and print media (Yaghi 2017, 42).

Conclusions
This chapter explored how the intersection of Arab music and media industries along
with the emergence of new pan-Arab satellite media set the scene for Arab Idol, a show wellsuited for and building upon this mediascape. Entertainment media shaped Arabness through the
transnational and transmedial reach of recording and film industries, broadcast radio, and
satellite television across the Arabic-speaking world. As Danielson (1996) has written, “the mass
media in the Arab world has not only allowed for mass production of music…it has also
effectively brought Arab traditions into the twentieth century and promulgated virtuosic and
beautiful performances of old and valued arts” (303). Also interestingly, satellite technology was
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engineered for the purpose of covering the Arabic-speaking world, creating a pan-Arab
community of consumers in this way. This was bolstered by the relationships between Saudi
Arabia, Lebanon, and Dubai, which together maintain this pan-Arab production in the realm of
entertainment industries. This chapter has also served to contextualize the media-defined region
within which Arab music and vocal aesthetics circulate on Arab Idol and elsewhere, which will
be discussed further in the next chapter. Chapter Three will also analyze specific examples of the
pan-Arab musical canon that the convergence of these entertainment industries contributed to
crafting and disseminating. Another salient takeaway from this chapter is the effects of varying
levels of influence that European, American, and other foreign involvement have on what gets
broadcast—and what doesn’t. The next chapter examines Arab Idol in its context as an offshoot
of a Euro-American franchise, but particularly against the grain of it merely being a Western
program’s iteration.
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Chapter Two: Local Valences of Entertainment and Politics on Arab Idol
Media coverage in both English and Arabic of the advent of the Idols phenomenon in the
Arab world has centered around how Arab music reality shows imitate American or European
programs (Najmi 2012; El Shush 2012; MacKenzie 2004). This assumption of Arab Idol being
no more than a mere clone even informs the mindset of the Arab Idol producers themselves. In
the summer of 2015, I made a trip to the MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Center) studios in
greater Beirut, a visit set up by a contact who worked in Public Relations at MBC. The Arabic
offshoot of The Voice, called both The Voice Arabia and Ahla Sawt, was currently filming its
blind audition segments in the same space where Arab Idol was filmed.1 When I arrived at her
office ahead of the taping, it turned out that she had also arranged for me to speak briefly to a
producer of the show, as well as its music director, both of whom also work on Arab Idol. Upon
meeting the producer, I introduced myself, telling him that I was interested in researching MBC’s
music programming, particularly Arab Idol. I added that I was a music Ph.D. student, and for
that reason I was interested in the musical aspects of the show.
The producer’s first reaction was that of confusion. Was I telling him I was an American
student and that I didn’t want to study American Idol, but Arab Idol instead? Did I not know or
realize that Arab Idol was simply American Idol…just in Arabic? What was so special about the
Arabic version to me, and why would I come to Lebanon just to study a show I already had in
my country, the country where it had first become a phenomenon? In our version, we have
contestants sing the songs of our equivalents of Celine Dion and other famous singers, and the

1

The Voice and Arab Idol have production cycles at different times of the year, as they both occupy the primetime
slot on MBC1 when they are on air.
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best singer wins, he explained, looking skeptical that we’d have much more to discuss. He
added, the format is exactly the same, because the shows are under a license agreement: it’s just
the Arabic version of American Idol. I then explained to him that I knew the names of Arab
artists whose music was performed on the program. At this point the producer’s tone and
expression changed, and he began to share more about the music by famous artists they preferred
to showcase on the show: classics by ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz and Umm Kulthum and Fairouz rather
than the current pop hits of Nancy Ajram or Elissa. While a brief chat with him and the music
director gradually gave me an introduction to how music is chosen and featured on Arab Idol,
what stood out to me was the producer’s first statement: This is just American Idol, but in Arabic.
***
Chapter One demonstrated how the intersection of Arab music and media industries
along with the emergence of the new satellite television landscape—built to serve a pan-Arab
audience—set the scene for Arab Idol to become a fixture of this new model of regional media. It
also showed how the transnational media and music industries formed not just a pan-Arab
audience but ensured the ubiquity of popular Arab music across the region. To further flesh out
the televisual backdrop that allowed for the circulation of stars and repertoire to become known
across the region—in other words, “pan-Arab”—I first examine one aspect of regional music
programming: televised singing competitions that were produced in Lebanon beginning in the
1970s. By doing so, I situate the Arabic iterations of the Idols franchise along a trajectory of
recent popular programs, placing it as a successor to these earlier television shows rather than
simply being yet another local offshoot of the global franchise. I argue that the continuity
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between televised music programming and other early competitions allowed for Idols to fit the
environment of competitions of the voice (sawt) typical of the Arab popular music sphere.2
Second, this chapter also suggests how the introduction of the first Arab iteration of Idols
in 2003, Superstar3, brought novelty to this trajectory of song contests with its televised
backstories of contestants from various backgrounds across the Arab region and audience voting.
In particular, these reality television aspects accentuated national rivalries between contestants.
While later chapters of the dissertation take on voice, or sawt, on Arab Idol, this dissertation
would be remiss not to consider sawt in its crucial secondary meaning of “vote.” The word sawt
is used frequently on Arab Idol, in the dual juxtaposed connotations of judges describing the
voice of a contestant and emcees or contestants directing audiences to ask them to send in their
vote for a contestant. The use of sawt in the context of voting, then, brings another layer of
meaning to the discourse on Arab Idol. Furthermore, voting (taswit) is of particular interest in an
era when discourses of democracy or democracy promotion and questions over the possibility of
having a sawt—a say or vote in the local politics—are in constant circulation.
While Superstar emerged during the post-9/11American war in Iraq, Arab Idol
coincidentally emerged months after the Arab popular uprisings of 2011 across the region calling
for the toppling of long-standing regimes. I suggest that Arabness became a more relevant
discourse on Arab Idol because the discourse of Arab unity was a way for the network to offset
the discord of the events of that decade. This chapter ultimately serves to present a political
backdrop and overview of the Arab vocal talent show environment as context for aspects of the
show discussed later in the dissertation.

2

I use the plural Idols to refer to the global franchise. When I refer to one of the two iterations of Idols in the Arab
world, I mention it by name (i.e., Superstar or Arab Idol).
3
The first iteration of Idols, Superstar, ran from 2003-2008. See also: Table 2.1.
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Televised song competitions and local precedents for Arab Idol
While Euro-American talent competition formats such as Idols first arrived in their
various manifestations on pan-Arab satellite television in the early 2000s, the televised singing
competition was already a familiar model in the region, notably in Lebanon, where the Arabic
iteration of Idols is produced and filmed. Decades before Idols first aired on a Lebanese satellite
television network for a pan-Arab audience, Lebanese audiences witnessed singers competing on
the show Studio El Fann (Art Studio). Studio El Fann debuted in the 1970s on TéléLiban, the
only official Lebanese television channel at the time. The show, launched by media and music
industry mogul Simon Asmar, provided a platform that helped launch the career of young and
aspiring singers in Lebanon. In 1988, Studio El Fann moved networks from TéléLiban to LBC
(Lebanese Broadcast Corporation), which became one of the country’s primary satellite networks
in the 1990s.4 Other vocal talent programs during this period included Ka’as al-Nujum (Cup of
the Stars) and Nujum al-Mustaqbal (Stars of the Future). These shows all involved young singers
performing Arabic musical numbers in front of a panel of judges. Another show dating to this era
before the advent of reality talent shows was Ya Layl Ya ‘Ayn, a karaoke-style song show whose
title represents an oft repeated vocal refrain in popular songs and in vocal improvisations. Its
format was inspired by the French variety game show, La Fureur, and has run until at least 2020
on LBCI (Kraidy & Khalil 2009, 42).
The celebrity hype that surrounded contestants competing on these earlier televised talent
competitions was already common before the Idols phenomenon arrived in the region. A familiar
cast of celebrities and pop stars constantly appeared on the same shows. Audience familiarity

4

LBC becomes LBCI (LBC International) as a satellite network.
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with certain luminaries was exploited by Lebanese televised programs, which invited contestants
who received various levels of fame on earlier shows in order to boost the popularity of new
shows, as well as to increase the exposure of lesser-known singers or stars they were featuring at
the same time. For instance, Ya Layl Ya ‘Ayn featured singers who had previously appeared on
Studio el Fann, explicitly promoting them as Studio el Fann stars in order to gain a larger
viewership (Haugbolle 2013, 81). In line with this circulation of budding stars across various
programs, Idols’ first iteration Superstar would also feature familiar contestants. Lebanese singer
Melhem Zein, who competed on Ka’as al-Nujum in 1998, went on to appear as a contestant on
Superstar in 2003, coming in third in the latter competition’s first season. Zein would also go on
to appear as a guest in later seasons of Superstar, and subsequent contestants of this show came
to sing his newest hits once he became a part of the popular music industry himself. The
popularity of Lebanese winners of televised contests would also seep into musical spheres
outside of Lebanon. As Beau Bothwell (2018) writes in his examination of music on Syrian
radio, Syrian radio music shows would often discuss or compare the winners of Studio el Fann
and Superstar, rather than singers who became famous from local performing contexts,
indicating the Lebanese dominance of the popular culture programming in the region (95-96).
Many contestants of these earlier vocal talent shows went on to achieve mega stardom in
Lebanon and across the region. Furthermore, they would reappear on the franchise talent shows
of the 2000s and 2010s in various capacities. For example, Lebanese stars Ragheb Alama and
Wael Kfoury both got their starts as contestants on Studio el Fann, and in recent years appeared
on different seasons of Arab Idol as judges. Alama was also a featured celebrity judge on The
Voice, as was his fellow former Studio El Fann winner turned contemporary Lebanese pop star,
Assi El Hallani. Making a breakthrough in 1995 at the age of twelve, Nancy Ajram’s early career
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was jumpstarted on Lebanese vocal competition programs, such as Nujum al-Mustaqbal (Cestor
2010, 110). Ajram, one of the Arab recorded music industry’s most famous stars, has been
another of the mainstay celebrity judges on Arab Idol and on other vocal talent competitions,
such as The Voice. These are examples of how such competitions were a clear route to stardom
for aspiring singers. The legacy of televised vocal talent competitions in Lebanon since the
1970s provides a backdrop for the ongoing popularity of music in competition form in Lebanon.
It also shows how a recognizable cast of characters from the Lebanese pop industry and these
mediated musical programs continue to remain in the subconscious of the fans of televised song
competitions, creating a through line both between contemporary reality shows, and between
earlier shows and the new crop of global transplants. The next section will discuss other
mechanisms by which the two Arab iterations of Idols maintained continuity with its
predecessors and with regional music television generally, rather than simply taking on the
requisites of the franchise, particularly through repertoire and performance conventions.

Superstar: Idols’ first iteration and continuity with local televised music programming
In 2003, two years after Pop Idol hit British television screens, and one year after
American Idol began to air in the United States, the British media company Fremantle Media
began to license the Idols format all around the world. That year saw the licensing of the Idols
format for the first time to an Arab satellite network, from which it would be broadcast to a panArab audience. This was also the first of the franchise’s endeavors introduced in a context that
was neither European nor primarily English-speaking. The format was licensed to the Lebanese
satellite television network, Future Television, owned by Rafiq al-Hariri, the former prime
minister of Lebanon. This first iteration of Idols on Future Television, Superstar, debuted in
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summer 2003, running for four subsequent seasons through 2008. What made the Arabic version
of Idols stand apart from the other existing iterations that had burst onto the global arena within
the past year was its conception as a regional program; the pan-Arab offshoot of the Idols
franchise was the first to involve contestants from across a range of countries (Meizel 2007). As
discussed in Chapter One, from the perspective of television trends in the region, Superstar fit
right into the pan-Arab media structure that had been established to reach a regional audience.
Like shows that came before, it continued to feature singers and celebrities who were already
used to appearing from one show to another.

Table 2.1: Iterations of the Idols franchise on Arab satellite television
TITLE
Superstar

SATELLITE
NETWORK
Future Television

SEASONS
Season One (2003)
Season Two (2004)
Season Three (2005-06)
Season Four (2007)
Season Five (2008)

Arab Idol

Middle East Broadcasting

Season One (2011-12)

Center (MBC)

Season Two (2013)
Season Three (2014)
Season Four (2017)

Iraq Idol

MBC

2021

Saudi Idol

MBC

2022 (projected)

Several through lines linked Superstar, and later Arab Idol, with previous Lebanese talent
competitions. In addition to the familiar cast of characters often circulating on these programs,
with judges who were hyped not only because they were famous pop singers but because they
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were contestants themselves on famous televised competitions a generation earlier, certain
conventions on the show would remain the same. Although judges were no longer tasked with
determining the outcome of the contest—a change due to newly introduced audience voting—
singers would continue to perform in front of a panel of judges and be prepared to face feedback
and criticism of their singing technique. On Superstar, songs were exclusively performed in the
Arabic language. Contestants did not perform songs in English or French, despite the
pervasiveness of Arab pop stars performing in English and French in video clips and other media
formats. As with other televised Arab music performances, contestants performed before a full
backing orchestra with a mix of Arab and European instruments, with space for improvisation by
the studio orchestra members on violin, nay, qanun, or synthesizer, and time for the singer to
extemporize, rather than conforming to global pop-song lengths of three minutes.
Indeed, one way that Superstar maintained a continuity with local televised contests and
music programming was through the producers’ decision that the Arabic version run longer than
other global offshoots of Idols. One of the negotiations between Future Television and Fremantle
Media was to increase show time so that episodes would run for one-and-a-half hours rather than
the contractually obligated one-hour slot. Producers argued that this was necessary due to the
lengthiness of Arab pop songs (Ghattas 2012, 127). The performance of similar canonical
musical selections, particularly from an earlier era of pan-Arab repertoire, was still seen as a
standard for judging the voice (see Chapter Three). Finally, with Elias Rahbani, a musician who
hailed from the most famous musical family in Lebanon, presiding as lead judge on Superstar,
the connection of the show to other existing popular culture norms and mainstays was clear; so
was the dominance of Lebanese culture on music television. Elias Rahbani (1938-2021) was the
youngest brother of Mansur and ‘Assi Rahbani, who as a duo were known as the Rahbani
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brothers and wrote music for Lebanon’s most famous singer, Fairouz. ‘Assi was married to
Fairouz, and their son Ziad Rahbani is also a famous musician and composer in Lebanon today.
Elias was himself a prolific composer, writing songs for Lebanese stars Fairouz and Sabah, and
for film soundtracks. The Lebanese origins of these early shows and of the reality competitions
contributed to cementing a Lebanese hegemony on entertainment television in terms of judges
and culture. Indeed, Lebanese judges would continue to dominate on Idols’ second iteration,
Arab Idol, several years later. This precedent also translated into many more Lebanese
contestants than other nationals appearing in these early seasons, including from the Lebanese
diaspora.
Superstar emerged against the backdrop of conservative backlash to other popular,
regionally broadcast programs, particularly towards Euro-American reality television transplants.
Reality television shows in the Arab world had been at the center of various moral debates and
controversies in the early 2000s.5 For instance, the airing of another European reality television
adaptation, Big Brother—with the Arabic title El Ra’is—sparked outrage from Bahraini “clerics”
once they learned that men and women were sharing common areas on the show. Retribution
was so swift that the show was off the MBC network after its very first episode (Kraidy 2010),
having been cancelled following an official request from Bahrain’s government (Khalil 2017,
30). Similarly, there were various controversies around the Arabic offshoot of the Spanish format
Star Academy, another televised music reality contest, which was similarly critiqued for
featuring the cohabitation of men and women. There were further conservative Islamic concerns
around the “foreign influence” of El Ra’is and the fact that it and other reality programs were
imported from the West. This argument maintained that these shows lacked the authenticity of an

5

See also Chapter One’s section regarding Saudi influence.
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Islamic Arabness, with the disapproval being linked to a perceived alignment with the otherness
of the West (Awwad 2005, 244). Yet Star Academy, regardless of being half Saudi-owned at the
time, survived, and was still running in 2022 (Kraidy & Khalil 2009, 43).
On the other hand, Superstar did not face such moral backlash: the first season of
Superstar reversed Future Television’s fortunes, and became wildly successful. I attribute this in
part to how well it incorporated non-controversial music programming of an earlier era.
Superstar capitalized on the less visual, more wholesome popularity of music associated with
dignified stars of previous decades. Visually, not only did the show offer a change from the more
pervasive videoclip, but it was rooted in cultural specificity, rather than depicting dyed-blonde
women in settings that could represent any country (Elmessiri 2010, 170).6 Additionally,
precautions to sidestep moral and religious contentions had been thoroughly pursued. For
example, one of Future Television’s negotiations with Fremantle Media was to allow them to
produce the Arab offshoot of Idols as “Superstar,” without the word “Idol” in the show title.
While Superstar wasn’t the only Idols global offshoot that removed “Idol” from its title, the
specific reasons for the pan-Arab show doing so correlated with the need to stay off the radar of
conservative Islamic gatekeepers: for them, the concept of crowning an “idol” would have hinted
at blasphemous practices of idolatry and idol worship. With Superstar to be filmed and produced
from Lebanon, these were important steps to complete before the show established roots in the
regional hub, otherwise known for popular music and racy “non-halal” music videos. As scholars
have noted, it was political and national anxieties that rose to the fore with Idols rather than
moral ones related to Islam (Kraidy 2011; Ghattas 2012; Meizel 2007). These aspects are
discussed later in the chapter.

6

See also Chapter One.
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Reality television, audience voting, and “bringing democracy to the Middle East”
In the early 1990s, Arab franchise offshoots in the realm of game shows were beginning
to proliferate. For instance, the Lebanese television network TéléLiban aired a copycat version of
Wheel of Fortune, Dulab al-Huzz (Kraidy 2010, 31). The format licensing of the game shows in
the region was part of a developing phase where even more formats were being brought to the
region (Khalil 2017; Thomas 2009). However, it was from the middle of the 2000s onward that
the licensing of franchise offshoots reached a phase of maturity, with these shows successfully
becoming mainstays on Arab television (Khalil 2017). In particular, this proliferation happened
with talent competitions.
With reality television came novel ways of interacting with audiences. What
distinguished Superstar, and Arab Idol later, from other Lebanese mediated vocal talent
competitions discussed above was the addition of the “reality” aspect: Idols came with a brand of
behind-the-scenes features, backstories, and vignettes of musical and character development of
the contestants. More significantly, Idols brought in the novel element of viewer voting. Kraidy
(2010) has highlighted how the Arab news network Al Jazeera had already pioneered certain
practices for Arab television that blurred the lines between public and private spheres. The
network was known for developing live or recorded programs that veered away from a script and
included people expressing opinions, weighing in either on the phone or via online forms
(Kraidy 2010, 28). This novelty set the stage for reality shows among other programs on panArab television. Kraidy also argued that entertainment television “is an active contributor to
shaping what Arab publics discuss and do in both the social and political realms…[promoting]
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participatory practices like voting, campaigning and alliance building, via mobile telephones and
related devices” (Kraidy 2011, 285).
Complementing her work on American Idol, ethnomusicologist Katherine Meizel (2007;
2010; 2011) has examined the role of the participatory voting process on Superstar and the
relationship of Western democracy promotion to audience agency. She notes that “[t]he Idols
format is built on an inescapably political premise, a conflation of consumer choice and
democratic process in which a nation-wide or regionwide audience votes to select a new pop
star” (Meizel 2010, 298). She further argues that “viewer participation, the chance to compete, or
the chance to vote for a contest winner can be sold and experienced as real political action”
(Meizel 2010, 291-92). She describes the potent influence of the “American Dream,” the premise
of anyone being able to make it big, as a major aspect of the franchise, coupled with the act of
voting (Meizel 2010, 292). Meizel states that “reality-show politics sells, particularly when it
forecasts a brighter future in a struggling region” (Meizel 2010, 304). The democratic aspect of
voting is propagated on many iterations of the format, often glossed with discussions of
highlighting a country’s democracy (Meizel 2011) or how it is moving towards one (Jiang
2018a).
With one of Idols’ main elements being its voting system and related high viewer
participation, a common narrative particularly in Western media discourse was that the novelty of
voting was the sole reason that the show became so popular in the Arab world, with an emphasis
on this feature’s American origins. Indeed, this is a primary draw for all global iterations. Yet
Western journalists were misled to think that an embracing of democratic values was the primary
impetus for the popularity of shows like Star Academy or El Ra’is, when in fact they were
critiqued both by conservative voices for veering away from vaguely Islamic values, and by
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creative elites for the shows’ decadence and low creative standards (Khalil & Kraidy 2009, 53).
Furthermore, the primetime slot placement of these shows was connected to their revenue
generating power, as it was the advertising industry that encouraged and even bankrolled these
shows (Khalil & Kraidy 2009, 53). When American or international media have covered Idols’
introduction to the Arab world, they have tended to place a heightened focus on the arrival of
democracy via voting for the first time in the Arab world.7 Indeed, a Fremantle Media
spokesperson went so far as to make a bold statement that the Idols format might have been the
first opportunity that Arabs had to vote (Meizel 2010, 298).8 Similar to how Al Jazeera received
global attention due to the context of the war on terror, I suggest that the media focused on
“democracy” on Superstar in order to fit the global context of news cycles’ emphasis of so-called
democratization efforts in Iraq. The earliest media coverage in 2003-04 also came a mere two
years after the September 11 attacks in the United States, and more specifically coincided with
the early days of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a time when the American government was
congratulating itself on “bringing democracy” to the country by means of war and destruction.
In the context of the same political events, American Idol itself capitalized upon how
America positions itself in the world. With the launch of its first season only nine months after
9/11, bringing the country together and reaffirming American culture was a major theme of
American Idol (Meizel 2011, 9). Bochanty-Aguero (2011) suggests that American Idol promoted
patriotism on the show in the waving of American flags, the repeated refrain of “God Bless
America,” and its airing during primetime to present a picture of democracy in contrast to the
chaos demonstrated in the footage from Iraq that was aired directly after the show (263). In this
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For instance, NPR Morning Edition 2003:
https://legacy.npr.org/programs/morning/transcripts/2003/aug/030819.mccarthy.html
8
The Arab world has of course had elections for many decades, some even democratic and quasi transparent.
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way American Idol “present[ed] a multi-faceted notion of ‘Americannness’ as the show
negotiat[ed] its local and global status by positioning itself in relation to the ‘world’” (BochantyAguero 2011, 261). In relation to the Iraq war, there have been various Idols-like shows in the
early 2000s. The relationship of Idols to American imperialist interests was also revealed in a
short-term license of Military Idol, later renamed Operation SuperStar, which was open to
anyone in the US army overseas (Meizel 2011). The U.S. Department of Defense also created its
own competition in Iraq called Talents, based in Mosul, which pushed narratives of bringing
democracy to the region (Meizel 2011, 211). In other words, this news coverage of Idols in the
Arab world came at a time when the hot topic of bringing democracy to the Middle East was at
peak fetishization. At the same time, a homegrown show, Iraq Star, aired on the Iraqi al-Sumaria
satellite channel, attempted to demonstrate Iraqi political unity (Meizel 2010, 293). While almost
an exact copy of American Idol, it had no affiliation with the program (Meizel 2010, 293). It was
filmed during so-called democratization efforts in Baghdad, with its finale filmed in Beirut.
These shows were representative of the era in which Idols first emerged, that of the Iraq war and
the rhetoric of democracy associated with it, making parallels with entertainment programming
around the world and in the Arab region.

Reality politics, voting, and national(ist) rivalries on Superstar
Audience voting within the Arab satellite footprint offered audiences a chance to show
national allegiances to their compatriots in connection with political and cultural rivalries in the
region. Combined with the voting component, the move to involving a wider regional audience
and proactively featuring contestants from across the Arab world paved the way for competing
nationalisms to become a major element of Superstar. From the onset, Superstar targeted a pan-
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Arab viewership, auditioning contestants from around the Arabic-speaking world and from Arab
diasporas in countries such as France (Meizel 2007). The pan-Arab concept was proposed by
Future Television in contract negotiations with Fremantle Media, aiming to cater to “the Arab
who was looking to the past and hoping for a better future” (Meizel 2007, 162). Additionally,
advertisements preceding the airing of the very first episode invoked an imagined pan-Arab
community (Kraidy 2010, 148). Yet in addition to the promotion of messages of unity,
nationalist rivalries between Arab countries were simultaneously built into Superstar’s structure
(Kraidy 2010; Ghattas 2012; Meizel 2007).
As with preceding entertainment programs, Lebanon’s precedence remained, with
familiar personnel from Lebanese shows and the filming location of Lebanon staying constant,
on top of a Lebanese network hosting the program. However, Idols initiated a new system that
relied on telemobile companies from across the Arab world to engage viewers in the region.
Viewers voted for their preferred contestant by calling in or texting the show via their country’s
mobile telephone company. This aspect, in addition to the larger number of contestants from
countries across the region, increased audience engagement in the talent competition compared
to earlier singing contests. This element of voting combined with nationalist rivalries to bring
politics to the fore. Part of the appeal was seeing which country’s contestant would be able to
win over another country’s “representative.” Superstar arguably caused nationalist proclivities
on entertainment television to become overt rather than latent.
Voting very clearly followed national biases on Superstar, with viewers typically voting
for their country’s contestants (Meizel 2010; Kraidy 2011). Not only was this encouraged by the
rhetoric on the program, whether by the judges or through the backstories about the contestants
highlighting their national backgrounds, but it was also aggressively pushed by corporate and
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political entities within different countries. Because voting was done most commonly by texting
via national mobile carriers, these companies were often eager to provide discounts for their
voting consumers to encourage them to engage more. In some cases, there were rumors of
political leaders asking mobile carriers to subsidize or discount phone lines and texting. For
instance, Libyan leader Mu‘mar al-Qaddafi was rumored to have invested heavily in his
country’s advertising and telecommunications when Libyan Ayman al-Aathar was one of the
finalists in the second season (Kraidy 2010). Qaddafi and Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat each
gave verbal support to the contestants from their respective countries in the 2004 second season
(Meizel 2007, 161). Moreover, local businesses would also often look for marketing
opportunities when contestants of their nation were in the finals, displaying the country’s
contestant(s) on their merchandise or advertising to draw in more customers. The cost of voting
by phone or text also meant that Superstar voters in wealthier countries could often skew the
results: viewers can vote as many times as they want if they are willing to pay for the texts. Such
systems contributed to undermining any pan-Arab identity and instead bolstered national
identities, favoring populous larger countries such as Egypt over smaller ones such as Tunisia.
The finalists of the first season of Superstar were two young women Diana Karazon (from
Jordan), and Ruwaiya Attieh (from Syria). Not only did Future Television’s marketing stir up
Jordanian-Syrian tensions, mobilization efforts by both Jordan and Syria’s phone companies
urged their customers to vote for their compatriots. Low voting costs by a Jordanian carrier may
have contributed to Karazon’s win (Meizel 2007, 166). Furthermore, allegiances for respective
Superstar finalists would render insignificant any debates over the negative aspects of a Western
transplant show taking up everyone’s time, a debate more in the moral realm. When Diana
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Karazon became the first season’s winner, Jordanians’ pride in her triumph mitigated any such
debates (Meizel 2007, 166).

Future Television and Lebanese political and entertainment hegemony
The ideological profile of the satellite channel on which Superstar aired, Future
Television (al-Mustaqbal), also contributed to heightened political tensions. Previously owned
by the late former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri, the Future network was named after his
political party, the Future Movement (Tayar al-Mustaqbal). As a former political envoy to Saudi
Arabia, Hariri was instrumental to the Ta’if Accord, which marked an official end to the
Lebanese civil war (1975-1990) and took place in the Saudi city of Ta’if. Hariri served as prime
minister from 1992 to 1998, and again from 2000 to 2004. Hariri had become a billionaire
businessman through his work on pre- and post-civil war construction projects in connection
with the royal family in Saudi Arabia. In fact, he was both a Lebanese and Saudi national, and
many of Future Television’s investors were Saudi (Ghattas 2012, 128). With his television
station, Hariri had hoped to further his brand of Lebanese identity and post-civil war
construction, and attract tourism (Ghattas 2012, 124). The Future Movement also pushed for a
revival of the Arabic language, since French had become a more common broadcast language on
other Lebanese stations (Ghattas 2012, 128), a move that was later complemented by the allArabic music featured on Superstar. The fact that the show was aired on a Lebanese politician’s
media network compounded the politics of the moment and heightened tensions, particularly
between Lebanon and Syria within the context of Syria’s longtime occupation of its neighbor.
When one of the Lebanese finalists was eliminated towards the end of the first season’s cycle,
riots erupted in front of and inside the Future Television headquarters (Meizel 2007, 159). There
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had long been the assumption among Lebanese that Syrian intelligence had the final say in
Lebanon, leading to the popular belief that Superstar results had therefore been tampered with.
Despite the pan-Arab audience of the show, Lebanese concerns such as these would be brought
to the forefront, by dint of the focus of this Lebanese channel. As Ghattas (2012) writes, Future
Television, while appealing to a pan-Arab audience, was constructed with the aim of bolstering a
Lebanese identity, and therefore it was inevitable for Superstar to be associated with such an
aim.
The politics of Superstar’s Season Three provoked new tensions when Hariri was
assassinated in February 2005 in Beirut. This not only consumed the Future Television network
but rocked the entire country. The assassination triggered demonstrations, as there was
speculation that Syria may have been responsible. These demonstrations, dubbed the Cedar
Revolution by the U.S. State Department, resulted in international pressure forcing remaining
Syrian troops out of Lebanon in April 2005 (Alexander 2009, 635-6).910 Kraidy (2011) argues
that demonstrators applied the use of vocabulary and mobile phones from entertainment reality
television programming to tangible political situations, including the Cedar Revolution. In
pursuit of the story of Hariri’s assassination, Future Television had become a fulltime critic of
Syria. When in February 2006 the live episodes of Superstar’s much-delayed third season finally
began to air, a year after the assassination, Future Television continued to display an on-screen
graphic noting how many days had passed since Hariri’s death, even during Superstar’s
primetime airings (Ghattas 2012, 126).11 The group of twelve finalists even sang a song
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“Cedar” also evokes the national emblem, the cedar tree, which is featured on the Lebanese flag.
Hariri’s son, Sa‘ad assumed the prime minister position in April 2005 as well, the assumed new leader of the
Future Movement.
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Similarly, in one season of Turkey’s Singing for a Dream, based on a Mexican television format, Celenk (2010)
argues that the timing of that season’s airing, during Turkey’s 2007 intervention into Northern Iraq, resulted in the
show being a channel for nationalist speech.
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composed just for the show to mark Hariri’s one-year death anniversary. A play on Future TV’s
former slogan, Li ‘Uyunak (for your eyes),12 referring to Hariri and doing right by his political
party, the song was called “Li ‘Uyunak Ghanayna” (For your eyes we sang), sung directly for the
deceased prime minister (Ghattas 2012, 126).13
Kraidy argues that Syrian women have faced the brunt of verbal attacks and on-stage
fallout in response to nationalist rivalries that have played out on the competition stage (Kraidy
2010, 196). At this time, the third season’s two finalists were the male Saudi contestant Ibrahim
Hakami and the female Syrian contestant Shahad Barmada. In this tense political environment,
Barmada faced discrimination on Lebanese satellite television, including on Superstar, with
insults picked up by microphones during the live episodes. The eventual win of the Saudi
contestant was widely accepted as the result of the political environment: Future’s Saudi
investors were placated by this decision, and Barmada’s lack of popularity was attributed to her
Syrianness, overriding any public debates over her voice or talent (Ghattas 2012; Kraidy 2010).
Media broadcasters speculated as to whether the voting system had been rigged following
Barmada’s loss, although this was denied by Future Television (Ghattas 2012, 130). Similarly,
the same year on the rival reality music program Star Academy, which aired on the Lebanese
Broadcasting Corporation network, the Syrian contestant was also voted out presumably by the
audience, with rumors that this was staged by producers; there was an awkward silence on stage
as she walked out, in the wake of the Hariri assassination (Kraidy 2011, 299). Superstar brought
politics into its program in large part due to this network’s political and national origins,
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After Hariri’s death, Future TV’s slogan had become “the truth,” to signal the Future party’s vow to get to the
bottom of his assassination.
13
“Li ‘Uyunak Ghanayna”: https://youtu.be/wKAFHRx4GXo
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combined with the new fervor and controversy around reality television techniques of the
program, particularly voting.

Arab Idol: Arabness and a new political moment
Several years after Superstar’s contract expired in 2008, the satellite network MBC
(Middle East Broadcasting Center) obtained the rights to the Idols format. The new show was
called Arab Idol, with its first season beginning in 2011. The renaming was not a casual effort at
rebranding. In fact, in order to avoid a resurgence of conservative religious and social backlash,
MBC had employed linguistic experts to argue that the origin of the word “idol” was not in
idolatry; rather it evoked the “beloved” (Miladi 2015). Therefore, “Mahbub al-‘Arab” (The
Arabs’ beloved) was readily employed as the translation and alternate Arabic title of Arab Idol,
in written, visual, and verbal references on the show, in order to distinguish the producers’ idea
of what the appropriate cultural associations of Idols should be.
In this new era of the Idols offshoot, political valences changed as Arabness became a
more overt theme on Arab Idol.14 Less emphasis was placed on the national origin of contestants,
though of course it was impossible to eliminate this factor altogether. An automatic coding of
contestants as “Arab” was evident through the use of pan-Arab rhetoric employed by the judges
and emcee on the program, with ample references to kul al-‘alam al-‘arabi (the entire Arab
world) or al-watan al-‘arabi (the Arab homeland).15 Both terms refer to the wide region of
Arabic-speaking countries and Arabs in the diaspora. These terms, which were also used in the
earlier iteration of Superstar, were readily utilized in this new offshoot; this time, they were used
more so to emphasize a pan-Arab unity. As discussed in the Introduction, pan-Arab rhetoric
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See Chapter Four.
One example of the use of these phrases is in Season Four’s finale: https://youtu.be/sG0rBbPsveE.
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represents much more than a cohesive regional consciousness. It evokes past and present
political and cultural movements as well as Arab nationalist ideologies, in particular pan-Arab
nationalism that arose in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Arabness is also capitalized
upon as a commercial strategy to include and bring in large numbers of viewers from all Arabicspeaking countries and their diasporas. However, while Arab Idol catered more to a transnational
Arab audience to override highlighting specific nations and their rivalries than its previous
iteration, each contestant and judge was still ascribed a national affiliation (e.g., Lebanon,
Yemen), particularly when the emcee introduced them for the first time.16 This element of the
program posed a continued contradiction to the pan-Arabness otherwise propagated on the
program, with national identification constituting an important aspect of the show. However,
there was significantly less national competition than in Superstar. Indeed, the decreased
importance of national background evolved over the course of the iteration’s four seasons and
will be discussed further in Chapter Four.
As American Idol had first hit television screens in the United States nine months to the
day after 9/11, Arab Idol too was revamped in a fraught political moment in the Arab world, in
the aftermath of the Arab uprisings of 2011 and the backdrop of the Syrian revolution. As with
American Idol, a show that highlighted the need for unity in a difficult era, I argue that Arab Idol
propagated a similar message with renewed vigor. As for the ideological profile of the MBC
network, this increasingly commercial network was not nearly as politically overt with its new
iteration of Idols as Future Television had been with Superstar. However, I suggest that Saudi
Arabia’s ownership of MBC Group is of great import in the context of the Arab uprisings.17 I
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As discussed in Chapter Four, this was done visually in earlier seasons and then more subtly and only verbally in
later seasons.
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See also Chapter One.
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suggest that Saudi Arabia’s role in suppressing popular uprisings of the era might explain why an
attitude of safe Arab unity superseded the previous encouragement of nationalist rivalries.18
Other reality shows such as The Voice and a reboot of X-Factor premiered not too long after
Arab Idol, in 2012 and 2013, respectively. The timing of the revival of these shows, which were
broadcast to the Arabic-speaking world at large on Gulf-financed Arab networks, could be
related to Saudi political motivations to address the uprisings. Saudi government and
businessmen had also invested heavily in Future Television, resulting in Saudi Arabia directly or
indirectly becoming the owner of most major pan-Arab networks (Yaghi 2017, 42). Buying
advertising space during the coveted primetime hour has been a major form of Saudi cooptation;
indeed, product placement is constantly visible on Arab Idol, a sort of “deep-pocket diplomacy”
(Yaghi 2017, 42). LBC, the channel on which Arab Idol and other MBC talent competitions are
broadcast for Lebanese viewers is highly invested in by Saudis although it is subject to Lebanese
laws (Kraidy 2011).
“Vote for me”: Sawt as vote on Arab Idol
In Arabic, sawt (pl. aswat) has multiple meanings. While the most common meaning is
“voice” as well as related meanings such as “tone” or “tune,” sawt also carries the meaning of
“vote.” Taswit, meaning “voting” or “casting a vote,” connotes giving or using one’s voice.19 As
with all Idols iterations, Arab Idol began with audition rounds, followed by group elimination
rounds whose finalists were determined by the panel of celebrity judges. Next, contestants
moved onto live performances, during which the audiences had a chance to vote for their favorite
contestant and the contestant(s) receiving the fewest votes on an episode was eliminated. In early
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See also Chapter Four.
Taswit is derived from triliteral Arabic roots for sawt, s-w-t. Also from the same roots, musawwit means “voter.”

90

episodes of Arab Idol each season, before eventually moving to audience voting on live episodes,
there was also an emphasis on the “voting” of judges. In the audition phase, judges frequently
used the phrase, “‘Atik(i) sawti” (I give you my vote) to indicate their endorsement of the
contestant moving on to the next round.20 This indicates the importance of rhetoric around voting
from the earliest stages of the show.
During the live episodes, at the end of each contestant’s performance, the host or emcee
would tell the audience, Sawwatulu/a raqam…(“Vote for Contestant Number x).21

Fig. 2.2: Screenshot example of voting number 14 below ‘Ammar Muhammad’s name, with
tickertape of national phone numbers at the bottom.
Figure 2.2 displays a moment soon after contestant ‘Ammar Muhammad’s performance and the
subsequent feedback from judges. Before the show moved onto another segment or contestant,
the host Ahmad Fahmy told the audience that the text message they must send should simply
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One example: Nancy Ajram saying this phrase to a contestant in Season Four, Episode 3:
https://youtu.be/06wwhCE79BM @38:55
21
One example: Season Four, Episode 13: https://youtu.be/92GTsFm1DVA: @1:13:42
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state the contestant’s number, for example 14, if they were voting for Muhammad. As he stated
this, Muhammad’s full name was displayed onscreen in Arabic, with the phrase lil-taswit 14 (to
vote: 14) underneath it. At the bottom of the screen, a tickertape of the mobile phone numbers for
all the Arab countries where the text message votes can be submitted was running across the
screen (See Table 2.3). Voters were instructed to text 4–5-digit phone numbers with the number
representing the contestant. For example, a viewer in Bahrain who has a phone plan with the
telemobile company Zain would text the phone number “94040” with “14” as the body of their
text, to cast a vote for ‘Ammar Muhammad.

Table 2.3: Mobile companies and national phone numbers for voting, Season Four
Country
Saudi Arabia

United Arab Emirates
Kuwait
Qatar
Egypt
Palestine*
Algeria
Morocco
Tunisia**
Oman
Syria
Bahrain
Iraq

Telemobile companies
1) STC
2) Mobily
3) Zain
4) Virgin Mobile
1) Etisalat
2) du
1) Ooredoo
2) VIVA
1) Ooredoo
1) GSM
1) Jawwal
2) Wataniya
1) GSM
1) Orange
2) INWI
1) GSM
1) Oman Tel
2) Ooredoo
1) Syriatel
2) MTN
1) Zain
2) Batelco
3) VIVA
1) Asiacell
2) Zain
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3) Korek
Lebanon
1) GSM
Jordan
1) Zain
2) Orange
3) Umniah
4) Friendi
Yemen
1) MTN
2) Sabaphone
3) Yemen mobile
4) Y Telecom
Mauritania
1) Mauritel
Sudan
1) Zain
[International number]
1) GSM
*No phone numbers from within the state of Israel are listed.
** In both Seasons Three and 4, Libya was a glaring omission of countries whose mobile
companies are involved in the audience voting process.
Similarly, after a contestant introduced themselves or presented a voiceover for a video
clip about their lives that was included in these episodes, the clip featured them looking at the
camera and pointing to their competition number on the screen, saying “Sawwatli raqam…”
(Vote for me, #...).22

Fig. 2.4: Screenshot of contestant Muhammad bin Salih (Season Four, Episode 13).

22

One example: Muhammad bin Salih in Season Four Episode 13: https://youtu.be/92GTsFm1DVA @51:10.
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For example, in a pre-recorded vignette that introduced one of his live performances,
Muhammad Bin Salih held up six fingers at the end of the vignette, telling the audience to vote
for him, number six, right before the screen cut to a shot of him beginning his live performance
(Fig. 2.4).
Information on voting was also shared by contestants on their Instagram pages, as well as
on Arab Idol’s official Instagram.

:
Figure 2.5: Screenshot from Arab Idol’s Instagram account with the voting information for
contestant # 20, Muhanad Husayn.
An Instagram post on Arab Idol’s official account in Season Four in 2017 was re-posted from
Jordanian contestant Muhanad Husayn’s Instagram account (Fig 2.5). The text reads, Sawwatu
bi-irsal al-raqam 20 lil-irqam al-talia: (Vote by sending the number 20 to one of the following
numbers). Number 20 was Muhanad’s official voting number, and the phone numbers listed
below are organized by country. These examples show just how salient and prominent the use of
sawt as vote was in both on- and off-screen contexts on Arab Idol, inextricably juxtaposing for
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audience voters the aswat (votes) they must cast for their favorite aswat (voices). Sawt or taswit
are often made dramatically interchangeable with qarar (decision), particularly the decision of
the audience (qarar al-jumhur) in the show hosts’ rhetoric. 23

Other Arab talent competitions after the 2011 Arab uprisings
Various other talent shows arose in 2011 and 2012 on Arab satellite television, for which
sawt, in its dual meanings of voice and vote, is a crucial component of the appeal. Two other
reality formats with Arabic iterations originated by Idols’ Simon Cowell and Fremantle Media
are X Factor (X Factor Arabia) and Got Talent (Arabs Got Talent). Arabs Got Talent made U.S.
headlines in 2012 when American singer Jennifer Grout performed classic Arab music, playing
‘ud and singing in Arabic even though her conversational Arabic was limited at the time. Along
with Arab Idol and these shows, Endemol’s The Voice (The Voice Arabia/Ahla Sawt) has been a
popular transplant produced on the MBC Group satellite network. While Idols episodes garner
more viewers as the show progresses, with the final winning round receiving the highest
anticipation, the most popular portion of Voice is its earliest “blind audition” round. The Voice
and its variations have arguably become the bigger phenomenon in the Arab region, featuring
higher-caliber singers and a wider range of repertoire than on Arab Idol, and have been renewed
for more seasons regularly on MBC. In addition to its main format for adults, Voice Kids has
seen several seasons, its most recent one ending right before the beginning of the COVID-19
pandemic in February 2020. During the pandemic, the show also aired the sub-variation Voice
Seniors for the first time (2020). It is worth mentioning that these Arab vocal talent competitions

23

Verbs other than sawwat/taswit that mean to vote in Arabic include: iqtara‘/iqtira‘ and intakhaba/intikhab (both
used for elections and voting at the polls); I‘lan (announcement/pronouncement) is used for a vote of no confidence
(i‘lan ‘adam thiqa).
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have featured more European and American popular music, a contrast from Arab Idol, which
featured repertoire that is almost exclusively Arab song.
With talent-based reality shows’ great success, Beirut has also produced homegrown
shows, particularly in the 2010s. These shows, including Najm el Komedia (Comedy Star),
Golden Mics, Fanan Al Arab (Arab Star), Arab Casting, and Mozee al-Arab (Broadcaster of the
Arabs), have maintained the proven formulas of casting regional talent, having celebrity judges,
live weekly performances, and of course an online or mobile voting system (Khalil 2017, 40).
Another type of vocal talent show on satellite television, poetry talent competitions, also
arose in this era. Two of the most prominent of these contemporary contests were the Abu Dhabibased shows, Sha‘ir al-milyun (Poet of the millions) and Amir al shu‘ara (Prince of poets). Like
the reality song competitions that began to crop up on Arab satellite television at this time,
contestants performed in front of a panel of judges consisting of poets and literature professors
and were additionally asked to improvise verses on the spot. A combination of jury assessment
and audience voting determined the winner (Khalil 2017, 41). While Sha‘ir was rooted in Nabati
and pre-Islamic Bedouin poetic traditions celebrated in the Arabian Gulf, Amir was about
classical poetry more broadly speaking, and had a larger regional appeal (Khalil 2017, 41). One
example of a poet who acquired fame on such a poetry contest was the Egyptian Hisham al-Jakh.
Jakh, who gained recognition during the 2011 uprising in Egypt, also performed his poems on
Amir al shu‘ara that same year, becoming a household name more from his participation on this
contest than from the uprising (Hassan Muhammad 2017). The relevance of poetry and
recognition of poetic talent in the landscape of contemporary televised talent competition was
also apparent when another Egyptian poet whose verses had provided a soundtrack for the
political uprisings of 2011, ‘Amr Qattamesh, won the Arab offshoot of the reality television
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format, Arabs Got Talent. A poet being voted for over musical acts on this program also shows
how vocal performance in the form of poetry has maintained a competitive edge, even on an
imported franchise from the same company behind Idols. It also indexes the high cultural value
of poetry in Arab culture traditionally and in some corners even today. In addition, it is important
to note that “Golden-Age” Arab song, often appearing on Arab Idol, was based in strong poetic
texts.

Table 2.6: Vocal talent competitions on Arab television (2010s-present)
The Voice Arabia/Ahla Sawt
(2012-2019)
Voice Kids

(2016-2020)

Voice Seniors

(2020)

Arab Idol/Mahbub al-‘Arab

(2011-2017)

X-Factor Arabia

(2006-2007; 2013-2018)

Arabs Got Talent

(2011-2019)

Sha‘ir al-Milyun

(2006-2020)

Amir al-Shu‘ara

(2007-2011(?))

Superstar

(2003-2008)

While Arab Idol has not aired since 2017, a new nation-specific offshoot of the Idols
phenomenon also came out during the COVID-19 pandemic. Iraq Idol aired in early 2021 from
the MBC’s Lebanese studios, featuring an Iraqi emcee and three Iraqi celebrity singers as judges:
Hatim al-‘Iraqi, Rahma Riad, and Sayf Nabil. It contrasts greatly with the aforementioned show
Talents, which was constructed by the psychological-operations department of the Pentagon in
Iraq; this Iraqi show arrived by way of being yet another iteration of a highly successful
commercial enterprise, rather than a soft-power strategy. Iraq Idol was filmed in the same studios
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in Beirut as Arab Idol and the Voice Arabia, yet its viewing audience was primarily Iraqis,
catering only to those with phone providers in Iraq, as well as in Kuwait and Jordan where many
displaced Iraqis live, to vote by text. It was carried only on some local branches of MBC, though
all full-length episodes were available to view on YouTube around the world when it first aired,
before the bootleg videos were taken down for copyright infringement. However, personnel
involved were aware that the larger Arab world would be watching, even though it was not
carried on primetime television in all Arab countries. Various references were made to how the
Arab world might see just how much talent exists in Iraq. While the musical numbers
represented various Iraqi genres and popular numbers, towards the later episodes the contestants
started performing a wide range of Arabic music from across the Gulf and Egypt and Syria. As of
November 2021, there has been a call for contestants to participate in another upcoming national
iteration of the show, suggesting that this national route might be the new direction in which the
Idols franchise on MBC is going. Sometime in 2022, MBC will produce Saudi Idol, perhaps
indicating that Arab Idol may well be a program of the past.

Conclusions
This chapter has served to provide context for how Arab Idol fits into a trajectory of song
competitions in Lebanon and on Arab satellite television. It has also shown how the proliferation
of franchised formats changed the game of talent programs in the Arab world. In particular,
reality television discourses of audience voting entered the vocabulary of these programs with
the first Idols iteration, Superstar. Its coupling with the wider range of contestants now
participating from across the Arab world translated into the heightening of national rivalries on
Superstar. However, the relationship of politics to entertainment has changed significantly since
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the Superstar era compared to the more generic Arabness of the post-Arab uprisings and Saudidominated context of Arab Idol. I argued that Arabness became a more relevant discourse on
Arab Idol because it allowed the network to offset the disunity and conflicts of current events.
This chapter also placed Arab Idol in the context of other pan-Arab vocal talent shows that all
cropped up in this similar time frame. It explored sawt in its meaning of “vote,” a complement to
sawt’s definition that is salient and primary to this dissertation, that of the singing voice.
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Chapter Three: Canonical Sawt: Arab Vocal Aesthetics, Performance
Conventions, Iconic Singers, and Repertoire on Arab Idol
This chapter examines sawt in its vocal and musical contexts. In this domain, sawt (pl.
aswat) not only denotes voice: its definitions also include “melody,” “song,” and “verses set to
music” (Nelson 1985, 71). Also, in the realm of sound, the phrase ‘ilm al-aswat (literally, science
of sounds) translates to “phonetics.” In musical contexts, sawt has carried various connotations
of “song”; it is also a specific genre of music in Kuwait and Bahrain (Alsalhi 2018).1 Sawt can
imply not just a vocal quality but vocal skill, as in the context of Qur’anic recitation, where the
related verb yisawwatu denotes recitation in a melodic style (Nelson 1985, 71). While aspects
like stage presence (hudur) and appearance (shakal) are highlighted by the panel of judges
(lajnat al-tahkim), it is the voice—sawt— that is the primary object of rhetoric on Arab Idol. The
judges’ immediate responses after a contestant’s performance revolve around whether it was
agreeable or not: whether the contestant had a nice voice (e.g., “sawtak hilu,” your voice is
good)2 or didn’t sing particularly well (“sawtik mish [q]awwi,” your voice was not strong).3
Other times the feedback is often about the appropriateness of the song choice itself, often linked
to an iconic singer associated with its recognizability. I use the lens of sawt to argue that the
confluence of certain vocal aesthetics, performance conventions, and popular repertoire,
combined with their evocation of iconic singers, signals a musical Arabness that Arab Idol
considers central to its marketability. I further argue that these vocal techniques, songs, and

1

The genre sawt is also distinguished by rhythmic cycles of the same name. For a full-length study on the Kuwaiti
and Bahrain musical genre, see Alsalhi 2018.
2
Sawtak when addressing a male contestant; Sawtik when addressing a female contestant.
3
In recent years, the MBC network’s other Arabic franchise offshoot The Voice (of the Endemol media company)
has gained more popularity as a competitive program for serious voices: its alternate Arabic title is Ahla Sawt (“the
best voice”). However, it emphasizes American pop music over Arab music.
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iconic voices form a pan-Arab canon—one that is associated primarily with Egyptian and
Levantine Golden Age voices—that Arab Idol seeks to reify.
I first examine the role of the voice in Arab culture, outlining significant vocal aesthetics
and techniques that are generally associated with Arab music. I then present performance
conventions in Arab music, arguing that the stylized structure and format of songs on Arab Idol
evoke live performance conventions that are typical of Arab music. Finally, I discuss repertoire
that I argue has come to be largely recognized due to its circulation via various media, whose
relationship to Arab music was discussed in Chapter One. I connect this repertoire to the
importance placed on song choice on the show, and finally to Arab Idol’s conception of an Arab
canon that is at once continuous and innovative. I demonstrate how these aesthetics and
repertoire are referenced and reified on Arab Idol, providing analysis of performances and
commentary in various episodes. In most examples, I connect these to the iconic singers with
which they are associated, who Arab Idol’s judges, emcees, and production often highlight. Most
examples analyzed are from Season 3 (2013-2014) and Season 4 (2016-2017).4 I also provide
relevant anecdotes from my lessons in Arab voice and vocal music and my musical experience as
a professional musician performing this repertoire. I argue that Arab Idol is yet another medium
for canonizing an Arab voice through its circulation and amplification of Arab musical
conventions and repertoire that have already been institutionalized. Arab Idol shapes and
reinforces a notion of an Arab musical canon that aligns with its presentation of Arabness: music
that uncontroversially reaches a pan-Arab regional audience. However, it also expands the canon

4

As noted in Chapter Two, no new seasons of Arab Idol have aired since 2017, although an offshoot filmed in the
same Beirut studios, called Iraq Idol, took place in the spring of 2021 over a much shorter season, and for Iraqi and
Iraqi diaspora contestants only.
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to include more contemporary Arab popular music, and to better represent the diversity of
contestants, particularly from the Gulf, as will be seen in Chapter Four.

Framing the “canonical”
Meizel (2011) notes how American Idol is responsible for anthologizing older American
popular music, with contestants choosing to perform songs that they’ve previously heard on the
show (58). I also conceive of “canonic” in a similar sense to Anaar Desai-Stephens (2017) when
she talks about iconic voices in Hindi music referenced on Indian Idol. As she states:
In the context of Hindi film song, the ‘original’ song is always already mediated, created
for the explicit purpose of reproduction and circulation; this is equally true for the
beloved iconic and canonic voices that mark them….However, as Hindi film songs
circulate widely over long periods of time, they become the center of a community of
nostalgic sentiment that, in turn, reifies ‘the original’ as a canonic set of sounds and
affective associations (90-91).
Key to the Arab canon that Arab Idol promotes are the iconic singers who are indexical of their
famous repertoire. Golden Age singers have become associated with an Arab canon because their
output via various mass media was so significant: it was never just a single song or movie for
which they were famous, so the breadth of these singers’ careers and repertoire destined them for
canonization. Sometimes they are singers who actively engineered their heritagization, such as
Umm Kulthum (Lohman 2010) or ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz (Asmar & Hood 2001, 350).
I further consider the vocal techniques discussed in this chapter similarly to how Feld et
al. (2004) see “a canonical catalogue of vocal techniques” in country music, and therefore just as
relevant to conceptions of an Arab canon as the iconic singers and repertoire themselves. A
canon is more than a set of repertoire; it also has an ideological nature (Samson 2001; Weber
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1999, 340).5 The selection of certain repertoire and techniques in music institutions can become
canonized in the sense that they can “dictate aesthetics and musical value systems for future
generations” (Gordon 2014, 147). I see Arab Idol as contributing to a canon that already exists.
A canon is also by definition an “instrument of exclusion” (Samson 2001). The Arab music
canon on Arab Idol excluded a lot of North African and Gulf music, though this changed by
Season Four, and with the new national offshoots. At the same time, the canon is open to
innovation. In particular, this is so with the inclusion of more contemporary music, as well as
music from different countries other than Egypt, with some Lebanese and Syrian hits.
Ultimately for a singer, tapping into both a pre-established canon and engaging with musicians
and pop songs in the industry is the best bet on Arab Idol, as above all mass marketing is the
primary motivation for the program.

Vocal aesthetics in Arab music
The voice holds an elevated status across various strata of Arab culture. Vocal music has
been the prevalent form of performance for centuries. In early Islamic court culture, singers
would perform sung poetry, sometimes under the auspices of a competition set up by their
patrons (Sawa 1989a).6 Basic musicianship was a prerequisite in such cases, including the need
to ornament melodies, articulate words clearly, and use the proper phrasing and breathing (172).
A singer’s talent and skill in their performance, a command over a large repertoire, and
cleverness in knowing the audience’s taste, were among the reasons one would win the
competition (183). Song choice was also a standard by which singers would be judged, and

5

One instance of a state canonization project is the Tunisian Ministry of Cultural Affairs publishing of an official
canon of the ma’luf genre (Davis 1996, 425).
6
See also this dissertation’s Introduction.
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therefore held great importance. The singer and sung poetry’s centrality have been maintained in
modern contexts, with singers remaining the stars of films and plays in the twentieth century
(Danielson 1997, 11). The performances of instrumental ensembles of various sizes today often
center their musical program around the featured appearances of singers. Many of these
parameters have come up on Arab Idol as well. It is the vocalist that determines the melodic and
dynamic range of the instrumentalists that accompany or respond to vocal lines, setting
parameters for how they phrase their rendition or translation (tarjama) of the vocal line. The
following examples of Arab vocal aesthetics are ones that I argue define an “Arab” voice, and
are further defined as such on Arab Idol and in other contemporary contexts.

Qur’anic tajwid, poetry, and Arabic pronunciation
Virginia Danielson (1997) writes that in Egypt, “conceptions of verbal art exist along a
continuum from the spoken (in which music is never present) to the sung in which melody
overwhelms text” (10). Non-musical contexts, such as Islamic Qur’anic recitation and poetry
recitation, further inform the various aspects of vocal aesthetics that are important to Arab music.
Islam is an inextricable cornerstone of Arab culture: central to Islam is the Qur’an, or holy book
comprising of God’s revelations to the prophet Muhammad, whose text is in Arabic. The
language of the Qur’an, including words, metaphors, and full verses, endlessly quotable,
frequently makes its way into popular culture. In order to preserve the divine language of
revelation, pronunciation is of paramount importance in Qur’anic recitation. To guide the
pronunciation, there exists a “system of rules regulating the correct oral rendering of the
Qur’an,” known as tajwid (Nelson 1985, 14). The word tajwid (literally, “to make better”; “to
improve”) denotes the art of the recitation of the Qur’an, particularly the treatment of text as it
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relates to pronunciation, prolongation of vowels, and articulation of letters (al-Furuqi 1987).
Rather than thinking of tajwid as “melodic recitation,” Kristina Nelson (1985) states that it is
better to think of it in terms of a system that shapes and explains the sound (16).7 Rhyme,
assonance, and rhythm, as well as timbral techniques, are learned in order to best present the
imagery of the prose and to play the role of oratorical literary devices (Nelson 1985, 7). Long,
single-breath phrases, with specific rules for dividing text according to parameters of waqf
(pause) and ibtida’ (beginning), are also important for the reciter to best demonstrate the
meaning clearly rather than to produce an accurate sound (Nelson 1985, 27).
Many Arab singers have also been trained in tajwid, aspects of which carry over into
song. The great Egyptian singer Umm Kulthum was trained in the Islamic tradition and was
famous for the clarity of her pronunciation (Danielson 1997, 22; 96), as was Muhammad ‘Abd
al-Wahab. In Aleppo, singers such as Sabah Fakhri and Bakri al-Kurdi were muezzins, and many
singers, both Muslim and non-Muslim, have been trained in either the call to prayer or religious
song (inshad) (Shannon 2006, 153). Religious training was “thought to inculcate proper
pronunciation (lafz, nutq, or ilqa’), skill in the interpretation of the lyrics (taswir al ma‘na), and a
proper moral stance (khulq, ikhlaqiyya)” (Shannon 2006, 154). Students at music conservatories
in Egypt also study tajwid with a religious scholar in order to improve their diction (Nelson
1985, 37). The importance of pronunciation appears across other outlets of the Arabic verbal
arts, particularly in the context of oral Arabic poetry performance (Sawa 1989a; Toorawa 2015).
The contemporary term for formal, or Modern Standard, Arabic (al-fusha) also reflects a literary
register of Arabic in contradistinction to colloquial Arabic (al-‘ammiyya). Its meaning, “the
eloquent,” underscores the importance of needing to speak beautifully and eloquently and

7

Indeed, there is a centuries-old debate about whether music is antithetical to Islam. See Nelson’s (1985) Chapter 3
on the “sama‘ polemic” regarding debates over the permissibility of musical audition.
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pronouncing well, and also “reflects the continued cultural importance of being able to speak
beautifully and correctly” (Brustad 2015, 23).
Also important to pronunciation is enunciating words in the right rhythm: a musician’s
rhythmic sensibility is also based on religious cantillation and poetic meters (Blum 2013).
Duration of tones and rhythmic motifs in song have precedents both in tajwid and poetic
contexts. The importance of maintaining long phrases while keeping controlled breath and clear
pronunciation is important to singing as well (Danielson 1997, 93). While learning the text of a
muwashshah in vocal lessons in Beirut with the Syrian singer and percussionist Rami al-Jundi,
we first worked on not just pronouncing the words but on reciting them in the correct rhythm for
the correct length of time. Then, regarding pronunciation, I had to pay special attention to the
tanwin, an “n” sound appended to indefinite nouns, in relation to aligning my breathing with the
end of sung phrases. It was therefore important to practice speaking the lyrics with the rhythm
alone before working in the melody in order to work on diction-related concerns. This method
helped me when I would make errors, in the form of compensating my pronunciation, such as by
adding a shadda, or double consonant, where there was only a single consonant, while trying too
hard to land rhythmically on the right beat.
The importance of proper pronunciation in Arabic singing has come up in the feedback
that judges give on Arab Idol, albeit in the tackiest of ways. One of the judges, Ahlam alShamsi8, has bashed contestants for bad pronunciation, even making fun of their diction. Early
pre-recorded audition episodes were heavily edited to create humorous sequences that make fun
of singers who were socially awkward or did not sing well. Exaggerated ridicule is a theme of
the audition stage of the Idols franchise regardless of global iteration and has carried over from

8

She is more well-known monosyllabically by her stage name, Ahlam.
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the original Pop Idol and American Idol variants; British founder and producer Simon Cowell
was known for encouraging these stints. Indeed, compilations of contestant bloopers are a
common feature across the global variants. In one such episode in Season Three of Arab Idol, a
compilation of badly delivered Arabic or mispronunciation became fodder for ridicule.9
Featuring a series of auditions in Berlin, the episode first portrayed how many contestants
struggled with completing their written audition applications in Arabic, which the emcee told the
audience in a voiceover was due to their being removed from their homelands. The compilation
began with a Lebanese female contestant in Berlin who was criticized for not pronouncing the
“sh” sound clearly in a few words, enunciating the “s” sound in the song instead. After this
moment, the episode segued to a compilation of badly delivered Arabic and English language
songs, with humorous circus-like music in the background. This compilation did not just make
fun of poor Arabic pronunciation, but featured contestants with poor English pronunciation or
those who demonstrated overall poor singing.
Pronunciation has also come up on Arab Idol in reference to regional dialects. In Season
Four, Tunisian contestant Hussam al-Shuwaykhi performed a song by the Lebanese singer
Milhem Barakat, “‘Ala Babi Wa’if Qamarayn.” Lebanese judge Wael Kfoury, loved the
rendition, singing along in the chorus of al-Shuwaykhi’s performance and even singing a verse
of the song once the contestant had finished.10 This prompted the studio band to start up again
and accompany him as the crowd enjoyed his impromptu rendition. However, his main comment
regarded al-Shuwaykhi’s pronunciation of Lebanese dialect as a non-Lebanese performer: Allahja al-libnani shway sa‘ba (the Lebanese dialect is a bit difficult). Kfoury advised him to pick
songs in dialects with which he is more comfortable in this earlier stage of the live semi-finals

9

Season Three, Episode 3 (from notes; no link available).
Season Four, Episode 13, 6 Jan 2017. 54:10 https://youtu.be/92GTsFm1DVA
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for the purposes of gaining audience votes, telling him that for now singing in this dialect didn’t
help his chances (Ma btsa‘adak / “It doesn’t help you”).11 His implication was that although
Lebanese popular music is well-known and trendy, being a non-Lebanese contestant was not
working for him as a North African, which also carries derogatory connotations. As watered
down as these examples may seem, I argue that they nevertheless reflect the importance of
Arabic pronunciation, as the ridicule of mispronunciation is something that producers bank on
being culturally relatable to their audiences.

Taswir al-ma‘na/Conveying the lyrics
Proper conveying of the meaning of lyrics, whether they comprise a famous poem put to
music or fresh lyrics written for the song, is one of the most important functions of vocal music
in Arab culture (Danielson 1997; Shannon 2006; Racy 2003; Sawa 1989a).12 This concept,
taswir al-ma‘na in Arabic, traverses religious and colloquial settings. Picturing meaning is seen
as essential to Qur’anic recitation (Nelson 1985, 63). The setting of modern or old poetry to
music has also been done with great care by many composers for this purpose.13 Similarly, Umm
Kulthum asked the Egyptian poet Ahmad Rami to assist her with choosing the optimal sections
of older poems to set to music, and also asked him to write her colloquial poetry to be
understood by a wider audience, working with him to learn principles of poetry that best
conveyed the meaning of the lines in song (Danielson 1997, 56). As discussed later in the
chapter, singers’ utilization of timbral color shifts specifically serves to amplify the text. In fact,

11

Commentary by Wael Kfoury on dialect. 58:10 https://youtu.be/92GTsFm1DVA
See Introduction chapter for examples.
13
See Racy 2003 for his description of Egyptian composer Riad al-Sunbati’s approach to setting lyrics to music.
12
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most aspects of vocal aesthetics and techniques discussed in this chapter enhance an
understanding of lyrics, in addition to beautifying the voice.
A.J. Racy (2003) writes about the importance of a “sonic-semantic presence” in music, as
well as in religious and literary contexts (174-75). For instance, certain key expressions that
become song titles and are used in the lyrics of a song are chosen for their “appealing sonicsemantic ambiance” (Racy 2003, 175).14 Puns, double entendres, and word substitutions
maintain significant appeal in performance (Racy 2003, 170). He also writes about how certain
texts can create a certain jaww, meaning “ambience” (Racy 1991, 14) or “atmosphere” (16).15
When that is lacking it is often associated with a lack of creativity for the performer. Some
examples of impactful lyrics on Arab Idol are depicted in Table 3.2.

Correct pitch and maqam
The framework of maqam—Arab music’s melodic system—is a central feature of Arab
music, and therefore of vocal aesthetics as well. The iqa‘ rhythmic system also dictates song,
encompassing the concepts of meter, rhythmic mode, rhythm, tempo, and dynamics (Sawa
1989a, 207) The structure of a maqam (pl. maqamat) often comprises a one- to one-and-a halfnote octave, although popular songs’ melodies are usually defined by four or five notes of a
melody.16 The vocalist’s melodic range in a performance determines the melodic range,
variations, and modulations that instrumental accompanists should be emulating on their
respective instruments in their musical responses to these vocal lines, tarjama (literally,
translation) or lawazim (sing. lazima, response).

14

The examples produced by Racy (2003) are al-qudud al-halabiyya).
Another more common meaning of jaww is “weather.”
16
In Iraq, “Iraqi maqam” indicates a specific performance form. (For in-depth studies on the topic, see Simms 2004;
al-Aadamy 2011; Garvey 2020).
15
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Qur’anic vocal training, particularly in the performative mujawwad style reserved for
public recitation, has greatly influenced musical arts in the region.17 At the same time, the
melodic characteristics of Qur’anic recitation are “dictated...by the aesthetics of the
improvisatory style of Arabic music” (Nelson 1985, 125). Musical artistry is in fact required for
best fulfilling the intent of an ideal recitation, which follows the parameter of the maqam
framework (Nelson 1985, xv). Musical characteristics of tajwid include good phrasing, a sense of
melodic modulations, and conceptions of improvisatory style, ambitus, and register that many
singers seek to emulate, and that even instrumentalists study as a model for their improvisations,
or taqasim (sing. taqsim, literally “division”). Basic to the utility of maqamat in recitation is their
association with moods or emotion, with huzn (“sorrow” or “grief”) being an important intention
(Nelson 1985, 90). Although the mujawwad style follows the maqamat, it must be reiterated that
Qur’anic recitation is not considered music in Islam, as the divine text gives it a status that deems
it separate from music (see Nelson 1985). Furthermore, it must be clarified that neither Qur’anic
recitation nor religious songs are considered or deemed appropriate to be performed on the
commercial music stage, including on Arab Idol. The comparisons made here are to connect the
legacy and carryover of the vocal aesthetics into popular music. In addition to training in
Qur’anic recitation, many singers in Cairo are trained in religious song known as tawashih
(Danielson 1997, 24). The Sufi zawiya is where many singers receive training; the performative
dhikr, or Sufi ritual prayer, was a primary context for both devout and nonreligious participants
to acquire a strong voice and a solid background in maqamat (Shannon 2006, 124).
Essential to any maqam-based performance, singing in tune and maintaining correct
pitches—including the range of microtonal intervals that are part of certain maqamat—comprise

17

The verb jawwada—of which tajwid is the infinitive form and mujawwad is a related passive participle—means
“to do better” but denotes reciting melodically (Nelson 1985, 87).
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an important aspect of Arab Idol. When Palestinian contestant Haitham Khalaila performed the
Milhem Barakat song “‘Ala Babi Wa’if,” Kfoury praised him for his movement from maqam
hijaz18 to maqam rast19, noting that it was very hard to get right.20 The intonation in the
modulation between maqamat was particularly impressive to Wael Kfoury. The Arabic term for
being out of tune is nashaz, although this is used infrequently on Arab Idol. Instead, judges
sometimes made references to tabaqa for intonation in general. In another instance in Season
Four, judge Hasan al-Shafi‘i told Saudi contestant Bandar Mugri to focus on his intonation for
the next performance (rakkiz bil-intonation), using the English word.21 In another hybrid phrase,
this time of Arabic with French, a judge tells a contestant they are “barra al-tonalité” (outside of
the tonality).

Improvisation and the mawwal as a benchmark for the Arab voice
Iqtirah (improvisation) was an important element of medieval Islamic singing
competitions (Imhof 2013, 17).22 Improvisations would be twofold: both of an extemporized text
and of a newly created musical setting for the text (Sawa 1989a, 142). As Sawa (1989) writes,
while the main function of songs in a court setting was entertainment, the main function of
improvisation in a performance was for emotional expression (202). Regarding strictly musical
aspects, Racy (2003) also sees twentieth-century performance as operating on two levels of
compositional consciousness: the first being creation within the parameters of “modal sense,”
and the second being the generation of melodic material based on material previously introduced
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Maqam hijaz (Maqam World): https://www.maqamworld.com/en/maqam/hijaz.php
Maqam rast (Maqam World): https://www.maqamworld.com/en/maqam/rast.php
20
Season Three, Episode 10 ~ 1:15:38: https://youtu.be/bxyFTjvq_AQ
21
Season Four, Episode 13. https://youtu.be/92GTsFm1DVA
22
Irtijal is the more commonly used term for improvisation.
19
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in a performance (214). In vocal improvisations, certain conventions throughout the
improvisation dictate and maintain the structure of a maqam. The singer or instrumentalist relies
upon specific opening and closing phrases in an improvisation in order to keep that maqam’s
integrity, and establish it for the listener. Improvisation follows a certain path (sayyir) and
phrases end with a qafla (pl. qaflat), meaning “lock.”23 The qafla is the showstopping moment
where the singer shows their mastery of the rules around the melodic material.24 Other aspects of
improvisation include tikrar, or the repetition of a musical line for added effect. A performer
might also use the basis of a melody of a song to start an improvisation within a song, which is
known as tafrid (Farraj & Shumays 2019, 83).
Vocal improvisations can take place on both non-text vocables or on a set text. The
former category includes the layali, melodic extemporization and repetition of the vocables ya
layl and ya ‘ayn. A layali section might precede a musically improved text, and singers also
often insert an impromptu layali in the middle of a composition.25 Other examples of vocables
that are often improvised upon include aman, auf, and yaba. Vocal syllables or vocables are also
used for textual stretching within a lyric (see also Racy 2003, 90). Vocal improvisational genres
include classical odes called qasa’id (sing. qasida).26 Qasa’id exist in musical form, as well as in
the form of non-musical poetry (Danielson 1997, 11). Musically improvised colloquial verse is
generally called a mawwal (pl. mawawil), and it can often be inserted into or before the
performance of a composed song.27 Unlike the layali, which is just the repetition of a singular
word or two, the articulation of text is as important as vocal artistry in the performance of a

23

There is a parallel precedent in Qur’anic recitation, where the ending or stopping point is known as the waqf.
Example of qafla: https://youtu.be/WulyuEnzLss 7:04-7:19. See also Table 3.2.
25
Example of layali (see also: Figure 3.2; Table 3.3): https://youtu.be/WulyuEnzLss
26
Example of qasida: “Khamrat al-Hubb”, performed by Sabah Fakhri, https://youtu.be/7jMSkFkQkDY
27
The word “mawwal” originally denoted the person who recited a mawaliya but has come to be the common term
for the poem or song (Cachia 1977).
24
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mawwal (Danielson 1997, 10). Contemporary singers and students emulate famous recordings of
mawawil that are widely consumed. Indeed, mawawil by famous singers are often used as
benchmarks and are referenced by singers and learners. Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab’s recordings
of mawawil have served as models for diction, enunciation, intonation, ornaments, and
modulations (Farraj & Shumays 2019, 351-2).28 The Lebanese singer and composer Wadi‘ alSafi has also recorded many mawawil as individual pieces (Farraj & Shumays 2019, 352).29 Such
reliance on recordings as learning models makes aspiring singers fall onto formulaic or
memorized improvisations. Rote learning also applies to singers’ use of ornaments, discussed
later in the chapter.30
The mawwal in particular is regularly featured as a benchmark for excellence on Arab
Idol. In Season Three, each of the four judges was tasked with providing four respective
contestants who had previously been voted out on earlier episodes, with al-fursa al-dhahabiyya,
a “golden opportunity” to get back into the competition. For this intervention, judge Wael
Kfoury called up two promising contestants, Haitham Khalaila and ‘Ali Najm, to perform so that
he could choose the better of the two to return to the competition. However, after this microcompetition, Kfoury found it difficult to choose between them. After some dragged on
anticipation, he finally asked them each to sing an improvised verse on the spot, bala musiqa
(without accompaniment), in order to make his final decision. This gave the two contestants an
extra boost of confidence, performing improvisations to great applause. It was also this process
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Example: the mawwal “Illi Rah” by ‘Abd al-Wahab: https://youtu.be/XHdZ9kNWxeg
Examples of mawawil composed by al-Safi: 1) “Walaw Hayk Bititla’u Minna” (How could you turn your back on
us?) https://youtu.be/ELRUS42bnzE, performed by Wad‘i al-Safi; “Libnan Ya It‘it Sama” (Lebanon, piece of
heaven) https://youtu.be/4fRsBvM8xCI recording performed by Lebanese singer and Arab Idol judge, Wael Kfoury
(both song titles/title translations are from Farraj & Shumays 2019, 352)
30
In another parallel with the Qur’anic mujawwad style, Qur’anic reciters fall into the habit of performing “set
texts” from studying the recordings of famous reciters (Nelson 2013).
29
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that finally allowed Kfoury to make his choice: for him, Khalaila sang the superior mawwal. This
exemplifies how the mawwal is seen as a benchmark of the voice on Arab Idol.
For the season finale, contestant Ya‘qub Shahin also performed a qasida composed and
made famous by Sabah Fakhri, “Khamrat al-Hubb.”31 This was Shahin’s performance during the
very last episode when presumably all votes had been cast and the judges were simply there to
cheer him on rather than provide feedback. He did not sing consistently in tune, but that did not
seem to bother the audience or the judges, who were swept away with his performance. In
another live episode, Shahin’s entire performance was a full-length mawwal, rather than
transitioning midway to a popular song backed up by the house band, as is common in Arab Idol
performances (see Table 3.3). This was a decision that the judges all enjoyed, and they
demonstrated their approval of the mawwal as the best way to showcase his voice. Wael Kfoury
commented that Shahin was a mutrib bil ma‘na: a mutrib, or master singer, in every sense of the
word. They were swept away by his familiarity and facility with the mawwal genre. He was the
one contestant who was consistently called upon to perform mawawil, and he was at ease
performing them. His background in Assyrian Christian church music, and the vocal solo music
associated with that tradition, likely contributed to this in part. His focus on the words and lyrics
and his delivery were also a big part of the audience’s and judge’s positive reaction.
Additionally, his performance revealed how vocal genres such as the mawwal are understood
today as canonized or key elements of the pan-Arab repertoire, despite the often very different
dialects in which they are sung. As Nancy Ajram told Shahin in an earlier live episode, also in
response to a mawwal, “You have all the ingredients (‘andak kull al-makawwanat) to be Arab
Idol.32 And indeed, he won the title.

31
32

Season 4 finale: https://youtu.be/qWX8VHFsqyk
Season 4, Episode 7.
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Table 3.1. Roadmap of Ya‘qub Shahin’s performance of a mawwal (Season 4, Episode 13):
https://youtu.be/92GTsFm1DVA
Violin taqsim
1:38:16
Vocal improvisation on vocable “aman” (first 1:38:45
phrase)
Violin tarjama (response)
1:39:24
Vocal improvisation on vocable “aman”
1:39:30
(second phrase)
Violin tarjama
1:40:13
Mawwal (“Ya Man Hawa”)
1:40:30-1:43:11
Melodic ornaments
Ornamental alterations have an aesthetic function, made in order to beautify music and to
“intensify the tarab in the listener” (Sawa 1989a, 188).33 In his examination of medieval musical
practices, Sawa notes that according to polymath al-Farabi, ornaments were not superfluous but
necessary to a melody (Sawa 1981, 80). In the context of medieval court competitions,
alterations were often a major winning factor, as they served to confuse a singer’s rival if they
were competing by performing the same song (Sawa 1981, 80). Oral transmission was a primary
way of passing down musical compositions, although ornaments hindered this, as they were so
central to performance and musicians would learn various ornamented versions of the same song
(Sawa 1989b). Sawa argues that the parallels with twentieth-century musical practices are too
much to be ignored. Farraj and Shumays (2019) also see singers as “composing simultaneously
on two levels” (77): when singers or musicians improvise, they are composing a new melody on
one level, and when they create ornaments upon it, that is akin to a secondary level of
composition.

33

Tarab, a musical state or aesthetic of elation, is discussed later in this chapter.
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Vocalists use a wide range of ornaments in Arab music that operate within a modal
framework, and other ornaments that provide more of a timbral effect, the latter of which will be
discussed further in the next section; sometimes both types are used together. Many ornaments
are precomposed, and built into vocal preludes or textless singing (Sawa 1989a, 188). Often on
Arab Idol, celebrity judges increasingly reacted and engaged when a contestant performed with
more ornamentation. Intricately ornate traditions are often associated with singers such as
Asmahan, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab, Marie Jubran, Layla Murad, and Umm Kulthum; this
melismatic singing is often referred to as al-sawt al-murajja‘ (“the reverberating voice”, Racy
2003, 185). Performers from later decades such as ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz and Warda al-Jaza’iriya,
whose songs are popular on Arab Idol and other shows, feature fewer ornaments than earlier
generations. Indeed, the expectation for elaborate ornamentation has decreased and come to
require fewer technical prerequisites for being a successful singer today (Farraj and Shumays
2019).
One example of a melisma or melismatic phrasing in Arab song is the singing of many
notes in quick succession on a single syllable of text, usually a vowelled consonant (Racy 2003,
90). One of the most common forms of melisma occurs when notes are added as embellishment
above and below the more central melodic pitch. These are common in songs, mawawil, and
even in the layali section, in which the “ya” of the vocable phrase “ya layl” is very melismatic
(Racy 2003, 90; see Figure 3.2; see layali in Table 3.3).
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Figure 3.2: Layali by Laure Daccache over a metered instrumental shiftiteli vamp in “Aminti
Billah.” https://youtu.be/WulyuEnzLss @5:26-5:37.

The “ahat” section of a dawr, where the singer and chorus vocalize on the “ah,” is another
example of melismatic phrasing, particularly in a precomposed setting (Racy 2003, 90). Textual
stretching is also accomplished not just through melismas but through the repetition and
fragmentation of text (Racy 2003, 91; See Table 3.3). One of the most common melodic vocal
ornamentation techniques and examples of melisma is ‘urba, which means “the lowering of the
pitch” or “embellishment” with ‘urab being the brief utilization of accidental notes in order to
enrich a phrase (Farraj & Shumays 2019).34 These are indications of both a singer’s vocal
control, venturing into tasteful modulations, and of artistic mastery. In Arab Idol’s Season Four,
Wael Kfoury commented on a performance of Palestinian contestant Amir Dandan’s beautiful
ornamentation, noting how he performed his ‘urab with such ease (‘Andak suhula mish tabi‘i bil‘urab: You have an unbelievable ease with your ‘urab).35 Other ornaments include slides
between notes; quick notes from above or below the main note; or sustained and repeated
patterns of melisma over one central tonality, at different speeds (See Table 3.3). An additional
example of an ornament is the wavering of a note, although more slowly than a European

34
35

https://youtu.be/ID8rkvkmDBQ 31:15-31:40 (See also Table 3.3).
Season 4, Episode 13, 6 Jan 2017. https://youtu.be/92GTsFm1DVA
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classical vibrato. The use of slow trills by Asmahan in the song “Gharam wa Intiqam”
contributes to her “lawn tarab” by evoking tarab (Zuhur 2000, 173; also see Racy 1982 re:
“lawn tarab”). The ornament technique of tabdil, which Sawa (1981) records in the medieval
context, the replacement of a note by its octave or another note, is also a common practice today
(82).36 Another realm of expression that falls under the umbrella of rhythmic or melodic
ornaments includes small deviations in the rhythm by means of omitting words in a phrase.

Table 3.3: Examples of improvisational elements and melodic & timbral ornaments in Arab song
Qafla (end of
improvisatory
phrase)

“Aminti
https://youtu.be/WulyuEnzLss
Billah”
-5:30-5:37 (see also Figure 3.2)
(Performer:
Laure
-7:04-7:19
Daccache;
Composer:
Farid Ghusn)

Example of
melismatic
phrasing with
simultaneous
tarjama
(translation) by
the
instrumentalists

“Aghadan
Alqak”
(Performer:
Umm
Kulthum;
Composer:
Muhammad
‘Abd alWahab)

https://youtu.be/ID8rkvkmDBQ
-31:15-31:26

36

Example of tabdil: https://youtu.be/yXi3vLal23A: 1:00-1:05 all in same octave; 10:54: second half of phrase is
raised an octave. See also Table 3.3.
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Layali in the
middle of a
song

Tikrar
(repetition)

“Aminti
Billah”
(Performer:
Laure
Daccache;
Composer:
Farid Ghusn)
“Aghadan
Alqak”
(Performer:
Umm
Kulthum;
Composer:
Muhammad
‘Abd alWahab)

https://youtu.be/WulyuEnzLss
4:40-7:19
In this case, the layali is performed over a percussion vamp in
the shiftiteli rhythm. (See Figure 3.2)

https://youtu.be/ID8rkvkmDBQ
28:30-29:50
ّﻏﺪا ً ﺗﺄﺗﻠﻖ اﻟﺠﻨﺔ أﻧﮭﺎرا ً وظﻼ
ض ﺗﻮﻟّﻰ
ٍ وﻏﺪا ً ﻧﻨﺴﻰ ﻓﻼ ﻧﺄﺳﻰ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺎ
(Wa) ghadan ta’taliq al-ganatu
Anharan wa dhilla
Wa ghadan nansa fa-la na’sa ‘ala madin tawalla
29:54-31:00
و
ﻏﺪا ً ﻧﺰھﻮ ﻓﻼ ﻧﻌﺮف ﻟﻠﻐﯿﺐ ﻣﺤﻼ
وﻏﺪا ً ﻟﻠﺤﺎﺿﺮ اﻟﺰاھﺮ ﻧﺤﯿﺎ ﻟﯿﺲ إﻻ
Wa ghadan nazhu fa-la n‘arif lil-ghaybi mahala
Wa ghadan lil-hadir al-zahir nahiya (nahiya) laysa illa...

Tafrid (use of
a song’s
melodic
material for
improvisation)

“Ya Bahjat alRuh”
(Performer:
Sabah Fakhri;
Composer:
Sayyid
Darwish)

https://youtu.be/yXi3vLal23A
The phrase and melodic material of the song beginning at 1:19
(lyrics below) is used for melodic improvisation starting at 1:29
and is developed further for several minutes.
ت ﻛﺎِس اﻟﺮاح واﺳﻘﻨﻲ اﻷﻗﺪاح
ِ ھﺎ
Hat il-ka’s il-rah wa isqini al-aqdah
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Tabdil (replacement of
a note by its octave or
another note)

“Ya Bahjat al-Ruh”
(Performer: Sabah
Fakhri; Composer:
Sayyid Darwish

https://youtu.be/yXi3vLal23A
1:00-1:05 : all in one octave:

10:52-11:02: second half of phrase is
raised an octave:

Ghunna (timbral
placement of nasal
resonance)

Bahhah (timbral
hoarseness)

Example of nasal
idiom/technique: “Layh
Tilwa’ayni” (Performer:
Umm Kulthum;
Composer: Muhammad
al-Qasabji)
“Inta ‘Umri” (Performer
Umm Kulthum;
Composer: Muhammad
‘Abd al-Wahab)

https://youtu.be/d3ykilrZXFU
2:19-2:25

https://youtu.be/1wBvuZVE7FI
9:24

Timbral ornaments, tessitura, and juxtapositions of idioms
Another crucial domain of vocal aesthetics in Arab music is timbre. Timbral ornaments
are often utilized particularly for the purpose of enhancing the audience’s understanding of the
text. One example of a timbral technique is the proper placement of a nasal resonance, known as
ghunna (Danielson 1997, 93).37 In accordance with the rules of tajwid, ghunna both prolongs
duration and changes timbre in Qur’anic recitation; it is used particularly in higher registers, or
when a certain combination of letters is expressed (Nelson 1985, 21; Danielson 1997; Faruqi
1987). Ghunna is also linked historically to Arabic singing. It can serve as a coloristic device in
layali, often creating a cadence, and it can also hone the impact of a word or phrase (Danielson

37

In the medieval Islamic context zamm denotes complete nasality, while ghunna denotes “half-nasality” (Sawa
1989a, 101).
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1997, 98). Similarly, the timbral effect of hoarseness, bahhah, is also a way of heightening the
emotional impact of a text (Danielson 1997, 139). Also, in terms of timbral effects, Danielson
(1997) writes, “coloristic change between head or chest resonance or into falsetto was used for
ornamentation, to draw attention to a particular point in the text or melodic line” (92). However,
it was seen as a mistake or a weakness if done for show or incorrectly timed (Danielson 1997,
92). In an audition episode of Arab Idol, the judges told a contestant auditioning in Casablanca in
English that “less is more” for having performed with too much variation of melodic and timbral
ornamentation.38
The featuring of operatic or pseudo-operatic technique also falls under timbral ornaments,
although it applies to longer sections of a song. The singer Asmahan (born Amal al-Atrash) was
known for her operatic interludes, as well as Arab music sections in pieces written by her brother
Farid al-Atrash. One famous example of a song with these juxtaposed styles is “Layali al-Uns fi
Vienna” with its main theme in a waltz form.39 At the end of the song, Asmahan sings an
operatic rendition of the main melodic theme as a climactic finale. This vocalization style is also
linked to the ahat section of the dawr, which dates to the mid-nineteenth century and had similar
influences.40 However, the technique for ahat doesn’t involve as much of a change in vocal
timbre or quality, as it does in the juxtapositions of Asmahan’s oeuvre. For example, the pseudooperatic ahat section in Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab’s dawr “Ahub Ashufak” is noticeably not
sung with a different vocal quality as in the closer-to-operatic style of Asmahan in “Layali alUns.”41

38

Season 3, Episode 4 (no link).
“Layali al-Uns fi Vienna”: https://youtu.be/ylfkUx66XWI
40
See also Abu Mrad 2004.
41
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab’s dawr “Ahub Ashufak”: https://youtu.be/EsRGgh5SwWw The pseudo-operatic
“ahat” section is @ 3:27.
39
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Switching between Arabic and operatic styles is seen as a mark of prowess in Arab
repertoire. The contemporary Lebanese singer, Abeer Nehme, is known for her performances in
both Arab and European styles, her signature being a performance of something traditional,
following by an operation rendition that surprises and “wows” her audience. One example is her
performance of “Lama Bada Yatathana,” a song often falsely attributed to Andalusian origin,
although it was written by Egyptian composer ‘Abd al-Rahim al-Maslub in the late nineteenth
century (Shannon 2015, 153). Nehme’s performance of it with the National Arab Orchestra in
Houston, Texas had an interlude and ending of her singing the melody in a high register and
clearly operatic style, causing immediate and ongoing applause.42 In a cringey twist on pseudooperatic ostentation in Arab Idol’s third season, while almost all musical performances by
contestants had been of Arab popular music, there was one number where the contestants joined
together to sing something different, presumably to represent the talent of singers in a different
singing style. The musical selection that was chosen to convey this was, amusingly, a medley of
numbers from the Broadway musical Phantom of the Opera, sung with Arabic lyrics.43 This was
more than likely a last-minute attempt to fill up the primetime slot with more entertainment.

Tarab and ihsas
One governing aesthetic in Arab music performance that connects vocal aesthetics to the
emotional responses they create is the concept of tarab, a state of musical elation. Shannon
(2015) has described tarab as “the set of emotional responses to music characteristic of much
Middle Eastern music…that index Arabness in important ways” (104).44 Anecdotes of song

42

https://youtu.be/Cbfut3RxLuk
Phantom of the Opera medley in Arabic: https://youtu.be/C8fYtFDFDFc. Further humorously, all the male
contestants were wearing white phantom masks covering half their faces.
44
See also Shannon (2006) chapter section “Tarab defined” (161-3).
43
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competitions in medieval Islamic courts described tarab as the impact of music on audience: the
evocation of emotions through music (Imhof 2013,16). Umayyad and Abbasid caliphs planned
and greatly enjoyed musical competitions, within which a performer’s capability of bringing the
caliph or audience member to a state of tarab, would be cause for them to win the contest (Sawa
1989a).45 It was also connected to a singer’s presentation of proper song choice and
demonstrations of artistic creativity (1989a). Not just associated with an earlier time period,
tarab can be considered a “moving target rather than a phenomenon fixed in time” (Racy 2003).
Tarab can refer to a music genre as well (Farraj & Shumays 2019, 363), with lawn tarab (a tarab
“color”) referring to a sound or idiom bringing to mind a certain emotive music style (Racy
2003, 75). Shannon (2006) argues for an understanding of various “tarab cultures” depending on
the different contexts and locales in which tarab-style music is performed and experienced (162163).46 Tarab can also have pan-Arab connotations through its association with an urban domain
(Racy 1991, 15).
The word “mutrib”—the commander of tarab—is also a synonym for a singer (Racy
2003; Farraj & Shumays 2019, 6). In the twentieth to twenty-first centuries, listeners are
encouraged to react verbally and physically to performances, both to the performer’s artful
navigation of the maqam framework, as well as their mastery of conveying lyrics. Racy (1991)
argues that the relationship of the performer with the audience creates an “ecstatic feedback
model of creativity” between them. When this is not in place, there is a lack of jaww

45

Sawa (1989a) has presented medieval anecdotes that present descriptions of tarab that include “an acute emotion
of joy or grief” (194) and “genuine feelings that moved the audience were the seal of performance excellence”
(205). Other examples of anecdotes relating tarab to courtly competitions: Whoever would get the caliph Al-Hadi to
a state of tarab would be rewarded (Sawa 1989a, 179). One singer caused the elite referee “to weep from tarab”
(180); The Caliph al-Mu’tasim stood up from a seated position “under the effects of tarab (193); a singer caused the
caliph Harun to “clap and stamp from tarab”; Due to one performance, Harun and his vizir “danced under the effect
of tarab” (193); Another listener tore his garment from the effects of tarab, throwing himself into the water (193).
46
See also Chapter Three.

123

(atmosphere). Similarly, saltana, or “modal ecstasy,” on the part of the performer is also
“recognized as the road to excellence and emotional effectiveness in performance” (Racy 1991,
13).47
Judges or emcees on Arab Idol referred to both tarab and saltana in passing. However,
more so than these two concepts, “ihsas”—meaning feeling—was frequently invoked on Arab
Idol.48 Ihsas is a term that Racy (1991) has connected with tarab, seeing ihsas as “the emotional
power and talent to musically affect, or engage the listener ecstatically…Musically, [it] implies
correct intonation, rhythmic accuracy, and good judgement regarding modal progressions and
tonal emphases” (11-12). A common expression of praise from judges was, “Allah ‘ala ihsasak”
([God’s] praise for your feeling). For instance, when a trio of brothers, Ahmad, Zakariya, and
‘Abd al-Rizaq from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, auditioned in Bahrain49, this was the phrase that
Ahlam exclaimed after Zakariya sang a phrase, where otherwise intonation was clearly lacking.
During one contestant’s performance of a song whose refrain included the words ihsas, the host
Annabella Hilal quipped that he brought all his ihsas to it.50 This was in response to a lyric in the
song “Ghariba al-Nas”, a contemporary song performed by Lebanese singer Wael Jarrar: “ma
fish ihsas" (There is no ihsas). During the audition of the Moroccan contestant Iman Qarqibu, the
judges reacted to her ihsas, particularly to her deep voice, and when she used ornamentation in a
tasteful way.51 Ruh (literally soul), the “locally based ability to feel tarab music or to perform it
affectively” was also referenced on Arab Idol (Racy 2003, 228; see also Shannon 2006, 156).52

47

Example of saltana in a performance by Umm Kulthum of “Ghulubtu Asalih Fi Ruhi”:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1FL3bHWuRkE , 39:05-42:20.
48
Ihsas can refer to the presence of a sounding person, and also to a spiritually powerful situation.
49
Season 3, Episode 4.
50
Season 3, Episode 12: https://youtu.be/LTuZtKQVGpI
51
Season One, Episode Two: https://youtu.be/zGUT2vUzHnM @3:00.
52
Sidq is the state of emotional sincerity, which Shannon describes “implies genuine feeling, a lack of artifice, and a
surrender by the vocalist to the true meaning of the words of the song” (155). However, this is not mentioned on
Arab Idol to my knowledge.
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Performance parameters and conventions reproduced on Arab Idol
On the live episodes of Arab Idol, there was a formulaic structure of performances and
formulaic conventions surrounding them that have been taken from other standards of televised,
recorded, or live Arab performances. A televised performance of the Egyptian singer
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Mutalib exemplifies a performance standard that has also appeared on Arab
Idol (See Table 3.4).

Table 3.4: Standard performance format frequently emulated on Arab Idol. Muhammad ‘Abd alMutalib performance (1974, live in concert in Syria): https://youtu.be/d1SHgmIi1jo
Dulab (short introductory instrumental piece)

0:00

Taqsim (instrumental improvisation)

0:39

Layali (vocal entrance and beginning of improvisation)

2:06

Mawwal (continued vocal improvisation, with tarjama
(instrumental responses)

2:26-3:42
(“Salimti amri li sahib ilamri”/I have
surrendered)
3:44
“Bitisalini Hababak Lih”
(Composer: Muhammad
‘Uthman Khalifa)

Song with full ensemble and rhythmic accompaniment

A typical performance format of a song on Arab Idol similarly began with either an
instrumental piece, known as a dulab, and/or an instrumental taqsim introducing a vocalist’s
unmetered mawwal. Contestants performed mawawil in varying lengths, ranging from a fewsecond taste of a mawwal to a full mawwal-only performance (See Table 3.1 of Shahin’s
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performance).53 The combined instrumental and vocal introduction of performances on Arab Idol
was sometimes also referred to as the matla‘. The performance usually ended with an upbeat
rhythmic popular song. The backing band’s make-up and instrumentation—a string section of
violins and cellos, nay (end-blown flute), accordion, keyboard-synthesizer player with various
tonal and timbral options, bass, electric guitar, and rhythm section—accommodated the
performance of older songs and more modern pop numbers. Typical components of Arab music
that accompany contestants’ solos include melodic instrumental droning for a mawwal and
heterophonic tarjama, or an instrumental “translation” or doubling of the vocalists’ lines or
ornaments (Gordon 2014, 107).

Table 3.5: Performance format of an Arab Idol selection by Hussam al-Shuwaykhi (Season 4,
Episode 9): https://youtu.be/5IMUvCKg9IY
Dulab

48:43-48:53

Nay taqsim

48:54-49:20

Mawwal

49:24-51:10 (with some “perfunctory”
audience clapping for a qafla at 50:17)
51:10-52:05 (“Aminti Billah”)

Song with backing ensemble

A common aspect of Arab performance is the reaction of audiences to the closing of an
instrumental or vocal solo with clapping or exclamations. Excitement increases around an
instrumental taqsim (solo improvisation) getting the audience warmed up for the singer and vice
versa. Audiences exclaim vocal expressions, such as Allah, ya ‘ayni, or ya salam. Such reactions
by audiences come not after a single note but are typically reactions to full phrases, or to qaflat
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Other rare examples where contestants did not follow this format is when singers performed Umm Kulthum long
song numbers, often starting from the second verse of the song (for example, contestant Dalia Sa‘id in Season 4).
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(Danielson 1997, 139).54 Such audience reactions readily appeared on Arab Idol. However, the
structure of a performance itself came across as institutionalized and perfunctory, including the
way the applause was inserted at certain routine moments, regardless of the caliber of the
singer’s performance or the audience’s interest. Audience applause and exclamations at the end
of a solo have become a mere automated addition to the performance format. Indeed, audience
response is oftentimes contrived altogether on such television shows. While sitting in on the
taping of an episode of The Voice in 2015 at the MBC studios in Beirut, I observed how audience
reactions were encouraged and engineered by the production team, which is largely the same for
Arab Idol. Similar to how American television stations would put up “applause” and “laughter”
signs for audiences of old sitcoms, production personnel stood at the sidelines and began the
clapping to encourage audience members to do the same at the end of instrumental solos or
certain closing vocal phrases when it was not being done spontaneously by the studio audience.
While the clapping at the end of a solo is often done on cue on Arab Idol, it was also
occasionally genuinely inspired, with some contestants’ closing phrases (qaflat) getting judges or
audience onto their feet. This was the case with Amir Dandan, whose last notes of his mawwal
caused Wael Kfoury to stand and clap emphatically.55

A beautiful voice
Having an aesthetically pleasing voice is also an important factor, both in musical and in
other contexts, whether it involves the filtering down of candidates for a music competition or
choosing a Qur’anic reciter for a competitive position, such as a slot on broadcast radio. Voice
and vocal qualities are primary aspects of concerns for Qur’anic recitation and performing
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Such reactions are also common in the setting of a Qur’anic mujawwad recitation.
Season 4, Episode 15.
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abilities, and there is a preference for a strong, clear, and flexible voice (Nelson 1985, 122). The
maintenance of a strong, good voice across low and high registers is important as well (Nelson
1985, 123). Even if the recitation was delivered correctly, reciters who audition for public
broadcasts have been rejected for not having the artistry or a beautiful voice (Nelson 2013).
Tahsin al-sawt, or “to beautify or best present the voice,” and having a “beautiful voice” (al-sawt
al-hasan) are preferred qualities for Qur’anic recitation. Both tahsin and hasan share the
linguistic roots of h-s-n. Also derived from the same trilateral Arabic root is the praise
“Ahsanta,” meaning “well done.” This is a phrase that the Abbasid era caliph Harun al-Rashid
bestowed upon the court performer Ibn al-Mawsili (Sawa 1989a, 159). “Ahsanta”56 was a
response that judges on Arab Idol exclaimed frequently after a favorable performance by a
contestant; it is also a commonly used equivalent of “Bravo!” as a response to favorable
performance in many Arab music contexts today. While it doesn’t necessarily relate to the voice,
in the context of Arab Idol, it was used when the overall quality of the contestant’s voice was
aesthetically appealing. Other terms that mean the voice was beautiful include the descriptors
hilu (literally, “sweet”) and awwi (colloquial version of qawwi, literally “strong”).

al-Sawt al-tabi‘i (natural voice) and timbre
The importance of a voice’s overall timbre lining up with one’s natural voice is often
approached on Arab Idol. Timbre is produced by various parts of the body, with the possibility of
altering the timbre with techniques and positions of the lips, mouth, and throat (Farraj &
Shumays 2019, 81). A particular timbre is created from the chest when vocalizing. Racy (2003)
notes that the basics of a pleasing voice usually comprise timbral profiles that correlate with the
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Or “Ahsanti” when directed towards a female contestant.
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“natural” vocal register for either women or men: “a full, somewhat throat-controlled chest
voice, in contrast to the ‘head, or falsetta voice’ (sawt musta’ar, literally, “borrowed or artificial
voice”) which in tarab singing is deemed aesthetically objectionable” (87).57 In terms of
tessitura, it was rare for a male contestant to perform a song associated with a female singer and
vice versa on Arab Idol. Songs that have been performed frequently by both men and women
were performed by either male or female contestants.58 This is related to the importance of a
voice remaining aesthetically pleasing across registers and one’s range. My vocal teacher Rami
al-Jundi would often tell me to use my sawt tabi‘i (natural voice), which comes from the chest.
In order for this concept to make more of an impact on me, he would make me put my hand on
my chest to make sure that this was where I was feeling the resonance coming from when I sang.
Earlier, al-Jundi made me do the same action while speaking basic sentences in Arabic, telling
me to smack my chest to see where I was creating sound, then advising me to sing from where I
spoke Arabic.
While a judge may have reacted positively to the ihsas or sawt tabi‘i a contestant
presented in one performance, the judge might have had the opposite reaction when the
contestant exhibited stage fright or discomfort. Many times, judges brought attention specifically
to the stress (tawatur) around performances, or how it was obvious that a singer exhibited signs
of “fear” (khawf) and that this stage fright was dictating that contestant’s performance. One main
way the tawatur or khawf manifested itself was not just in the contestants’ mistakes or their
performing out of tune, but in a change in their vocal timbre or vocal quality. For example,
contestant Muhammad ‘Uthman described his fear in a preamble recorded after a performance
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Also in the medieval Islamic court culture context, the term al-tafkhim meant the “singing with an ample sound by
way of the chest” (Sawa 1989, 101).
58
Examples include qudud halabiyya and the song “Biktub Ismak Ya Baladi”.
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when he was very out of tune and uncomfortable. The judges were surprised at how poor his
performance was in comparison to previous ones, and indeed his vocal quality had changed. He
also explained how he was not comfortable (murtah) that day.59 Discussions of breath and timbre
came into play on Arab Idol in the context of the heat of the competition. In the medieval
context, whereas competitions in general were seen as a way to enhance or bring performance to
the next level, fright was seen as having an adverse effect on performance, resulting in a
performer being out of tune and performing with a weak and shaky voice (Sawa 1989, 199). A
lack of experience (khibra) was often commented upon in situations on Arab Idol where
performances are not strong. For instance, one contestant in her first audition in Morocco was
told that although she did not have experience, she did have a good voice.60 Conversely, Season
Four winner Ya‘qub Shahin was praised for his experience (khibra) as a performer.
Learning how the quality of voice is affected by tensions in the body came up in my
voice lessons as well. Having an awareness of the body was key during these preliminary lessons
and was a novel concept for me as an instrumentalist who was not a singer. In particular,
awareness that I needed to relax every part of my body from my neck, to my throat, to my
shoulders, to my mouth, to my entire body was novel because I hadn’t thought to associate all
those body parts with singing, and thereby to see how this was also related to fear. The phrase
my teacher used several times with me, Ma itkhafi (Don’t be scared), was often used as
encouragement by judges to contestants who had a shaky performance. In my lessons, my
teacher would stress the importance of using my stomach to take a breath. Also, not only did I
need to relax my mouth to sing better, but I also had to open my mouth more to convey the
words more clearly. He told me to maintain my mouth in a shape of biting into an apple to
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Season Four, Episode Six: https://youtu.be/xbxnZEgKb3U @2:40.
Season Four, Episode One.
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pronounce words better and to get the sound out more effectively. My teacher pointed out that
my voice had changed for the better from before I did all of this (Sawtik taghayarit min qabl).
Sometimes references to one’s natural voice caused judges to associate it with contestants
best representing their nation. Nancy Ajram stated that the Jordanian contestant Muhannad
Husayn’s singing had represented his country with his country’s voice (“sawt biladik”).61 Ahlam
concurred saying the “tarab” in his voice was not of Umm Kulthum but a different one
representing his Jordanian background. “Khaym” (meaning” character” or “nature”, e.g., khaym
lubnani or khaym yamani) was also used frequently. Several times, the Yemeni finalist ‘Ammar
Mohammad was praised for his voice being “like Yemeni honey” (“sawtak mitl ‘asal yamani”),
referencing a commodity with which Yemen is famously associated.62
Other times, timbre related to one’s possession of an authentic approach to Arab music.
Muhammad Bin Salih sang the song by Egyptian Sayyid Makkawi (“Haliwayn Min Yawmna
Wallah”), and was praised by Nancy Ajram, who told him: You’re different, carrying a classical
[Arab] artistry (“inta mukhtalif...fann klasiki”).63 Her commentary here connected the
contestant’s performance to a generic Arabness in Arab music that the judges and hosts are often
trying to highlight, discussed further in Chapter Four.64 Even though it was acknowledged,
sometimes the replication of timbral color was not enough to get a contestant through to the next
round.
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Season 4, Episode 17.
Season 4, Episodes 17 and 18.
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Season Four, Episode 17.
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Here, “klasiki” does not mean European classical, but refers to an older sound, evoking “al-turath al-klasiki”
(Arab classical heritage; see Shannon 2006, 78).
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Timbre as vocal idiom of iconic singers
This section examines yet another way that Arab Idol identified timbre: to connect
contestants to the voices of famous singers. Having a voice that lined up with expectations of
famous performers and their renditions of iconic songs was an important discourse on the Arab
Idol stage; in particular, it was the replication of timbre that indicated a successful performance.
The idioms of iconic singers were often related to the overall timbre of their voices. Like certain
vocal repertoire, timbral idioms have formed a codified component of Arab music: they are
recognizable, reproducible, and receptive to canonization. I argue that through an
acknowledgment of timbral idioms associated with singers, Arab Idol reified a pan-Arab canon.
Many times, timbral idiom was also loosely associated with the iconic singer’s national or
regional background, particularly if the contestant hailed from that background as well. I also
suggest that a singer’s timbral idiom represents not just vocal technique but the articulation of
language, encapsulating the vital intertwining of voice and language—always, but particularly in
Arab culture. The successful replication of certain vocal timbres was both an aesthetic standard
and an occasion for praise on Arab Idol. Direct associations between the nationality of the
famous song and the contestant were acknowledged, discussed, and praised on Arab Idol. It was
more common than not for a contestant to perform a song associated with their homeland, or
with a singer from their country or region. Thus, in the rhetoric of the judges and personnel on
the program, contestants’ performances became indexical of the famous singer who sang them,
or even of a “national” sound. The concept of “covers” with little novel interpretation might be
seen as tacky in the American context, but a loyal performance of an Arab song was seen as
achieving a high standard. In fact, judges and hosts on Arab Idol frequently connected a
contestant’s performance with the famous singer associated with the song and the nation from
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where they hail. Such indications also show how pop music styles have become attached to
certain singers. Not only that, but a good performance was seen as a testament to a song or the
original singer.
The early twentieth-century singer Munira al-Mahdiyya was known for her husky voice
and its bahhah, (hoarseness, Racy 2003, 87). So-called “Golden Age” Arab singers, particularly
from Egypt, employed a certain vocal aesthetic using the chest voice, with some nasal resonance.
Egyptian singers such as Layla Murad or Umm Kulthum were known for using this chest voice,
as well as a nasal technique.65 Additionally, Umm Kulthum’s vocal idiom was associated with
“meticulously controlled vocal power” that was strong across her range and maintained timbral
color (Danielson 1997, 92). She also had a sound that was “min al-mashayikh,” or one that
indicated that she was reared among shaykhs who sang religious song (Danielson 1997, 25). The
Egyptian singer ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz “developed a singing style largely dependent on chest
resonance, relatively long, sustained phrases and love lyrics” (Danielson 1996, 305). On Arab
Idol, the above timbral colors are associated with an “Egyptian” voice. After a performance by
Egyptian contestant Isra’ Gamal, judge Hassan El-Shafi‘, who was also Egyptian, equated the
timbre of her voice with an Egyptianness on two separate occasions: once telling her that her
voice was undoubtedly Egyptian (sawtik masri bidun shak),66 and another time commenting on
her authentic Egyptian voice (sawt masri asil).67
Lebanon’s most iconic singer Fairouz has as much of a distinctive vocal quality as she
does recognizable songs. Born Nuhad Hadad, the singer changed her name to Fairouz, meaning
“turquoise,” at the suggestion of a radio station supervisor, who thought her voice was like a
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Example of nasal technique: “Layh Tilwa’ayni” (Composer: Muhammad al-Qasabji), performed by Umm
Kulthum: https://youtu.be/d3ykilrZXFU
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Season 4, Episode 13. LINK
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Season Four, Episode 15.
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precious stone (Asmar & Hood 2001, 353). Habib (2005) argues that through her particular
timbre, specifically “through tone and articulation,” Fairouz makes her voice an important trope
of Lebanese music with minimal ornamentation in comparison to dominant voices such as Nur
al-Huda or Su‘ad Muhammad.68 The timbre of her voice is smooth and clear, and uses more of a
head resonance, or a blend of a head and chest resonance. Habib writes:
One of Fairouz’s signature techniques is to use soft and relatively pure head voice, which
singers of Eastern Arab art song often avoid in favor of using their chest voice as much as
possible in their upper range. Sometimes Fairouz makes the switch to head register
relatively pronounced for affect. Usually she continuously blends head and chest registers
depending on the passage and where it sits in her voice so that the melodies unfold with a
seamless connection of notes in a smoothly delivered vocal tone. In addition, she often
sings with a round and open throated sound that contrasts with the nasal aesthetic that is
well known in Arab art song (287).
In Season Four, Palestinian contestant Nadin Khatib sang a range of songs by Egyptian and
Levantine singers, adjusting her timbre for each of those performances.69 In the case of a
performance where she sang the Fairouz song, “Adaysh Kan Fi Nas” (How many people there
were), she emulated more of this sweeter head resonance.70 More often than not, such mimicry of
famous singers is celebrated by judges, as is, in other cases, their ability to take the song in a
unique direction as an independent performer.
As early as a preliminary round performance, judges were explicitly comparing the
eventual Season Three Arab Idol winner Syrian Hazim Sharif to Syria’s most eminent singer
Sabah Fakhri, a sure marker of pride.71 In his performances, Sharif often sang songs and
improvisations popularized and performed by Sabah Fakhri. Lebanese icon Wadi‘ al-Safi is
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This is evident in “Lama ‘al-Bab” (Composer: Philemon Wehbe): https://youtu.be/XBANrdBXLOo
An example of Khatib singing “Ana Albi Lik Mayal” by Faiza Ahmad: https://youtu.be/OaAhsfPkg8Q.
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Nadine Khatib sings Fairouz’s “Qadaysh Kan Fi Nas”: https://youtu.be/SfifMeDWMHU.
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Season 3, episode 6: https://youtu.be/e8RCfNdUndI. Hazim Sharif’s performance: 33:30; Nancy Ajram’s
comments: 33:50.
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known for his jabali (mountain) style singing associated with Lebanese and Levantine
improvised styles. In one of Season Three’s audition episodes,72 a Lebanese contestant sang the
song by Wadi‘ al-Safi, “Allah Ma‘ak” (God be with you). Wael Kfoury told the contestant, who
replicated this jabali singing, ‘Andak shi libnani, bas…(“you have something Lebanese [in your
voice/singing], but...”) the replication of the jabali sound was not enough to make up for his
subpar singing, nor to get him through to the next round. Palestinian contestant Amir Dandan
was praised for his mountain voice (sawt al-jabal), again representing the bilad al-sham and
closely associated with Wadi‘ al-Safi , when he sang a song famously rendered by him,“‘Andak
Bahriyya.”73 I suggest that rather than undercut the show’s promotion of a pan-Arab sensibility,
allusions to specific nations or national icons celebrated the Arab world’s diversity as central to
Arabness, a theme I explore further in Chapter Four.

Jil bikammil jil: The new generation completes the old generation
Comparisons between Arab Idol contestants and legendary Arab singers were not just
made by judges and emcees on stage in televised episodes but were also a consistent theme in the
show’s social media promotional campaigns. One explicit campaign was titled Jil Bikammil Jil, a
series of posts on Instagram and other social media platforms, featuring that title—translated as
“The new generation completes the old generation”—as a hashtag. In a photo post on Arab Idol’s
Instagram platform in anticipation of a new live episode of Season Four in January 2017, three
contestants were juxtaposed with three famous singers. Egyptian contestant Isra’ Gamal was
pictured alongside Egyptian diva Umm Kulthum, Palestinian contestant Nadin Khatib was
juxtaposed with Fairouz, and Lebanese contestant Walid Bishara was positioned across from
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Season 3, Episode 4 (no link available).
Season 4, Episode 17.
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Wadi‘ al-Safi. In a related background video to that post, also on Arab Idol’s official Instagram
page, the three contestants discussed their personal affinities to the three stars.74 Each of the
contestants explained that while growing up they each wanted to be like the respective singer
whose songs they had chosen to perform in the upcoming episode. The video also showed the
three contestants singing their favorite songs by the icons imitating both their stage mannerisms
and vocal effects. For instance, Isra’ Gamal held a white scarf in one hand while practicing the
verse of an Umm Kulthum song. Walid Bishara sang a verse of a Wadi‘ al-Safi song, saying that
he wanted to acquire his lawn, or timbral color after he first heard his music, considering al-Safi
to be a model not just for Lebanon but for the Arab world.

Fig. 3.6: Screenshot of Arab Idol Instagram post in the Jil Bikammil Jil series.
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Jil Bikammil Jil: https://www.instagram.com/p/BPfYZ3tjIoE/
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In the weeks that followed during Season Four, several other series of posts were made as
a part of the Jil Bikammil Jil campaign. In another similar photo post, contestants Muhammad
Bin Salih, Dalia Sa‘id, and ‘Ammar Muhammad were compared to stars Milhem Barakat,
Warda, and Abu Bakr Salim, respectively, with a similar accompanying video.75 Here too, the
contestants discussed their favorite attributes about the legendary singers and their favorite
songs, each completing their bit by saying the phrase, Jil bikammil jil. This active connection
between contestants and specific iconic Arab voices represents yet another imagining on the
show of what constitutes a characteristically Arab singer. While many of the contestants hailed
from the same countries as the singers they revere in this series, this was certainly not always the
case; nor were references explicitly made to the national backgrounds of the iconic singers,
which I argue helped associate the campaign with a more generic Arabness. Similarly in the case
of American Idol, Meizel (2011) describes how with the preference for soul music from the
1960s and 1970s, the show created a “genealogical line” between revered older generation guests
and current contestants when they would collaborate on stage. (59). The #Jil_bikkamil_jil
campaign indicated a direct intention of rearticulating singers who are part of an Arab canon. I
suggest that the program’s producer’s saw this campaign as a way to appeal to the popularity of
these past generations of singers, particularly with older listeners; the campaign also signals the
ever-looming dominance of these singers’ stature in Arab music.
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Jil Bikammil Jil 2: https://www.instagram.com/p/BQV6HYxDzdc/
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Fig. 3.7: Screenshot of a second Instagram post in the Jil Bikammil Jil series.

The vocal idioms of famous singers as the benchmarks for contemporary performance are
apparent in other Arab music contexts as well. The National Arab Orchestra (NAO), an
American ensemble with which I play violin, performs many songs that have been reified as
canonical in Arab music. Its concerts of recognizable Arab music are featured on its popular
YouTube account. One of the NAO’s YouTube videos features Syrian-American singer Lubana
al-Quntar during a Detroit performance, singing her rendition of a song famously recorded by
Egyptian singer Su‘ad Muhammad, “Wahashtini.”76 Commenters have checked in with praise in
Arabic, English, and other languages, sometimes making their location known as well, from
Egypt and Syria to the U.S., Brazil, Germany, and South Korea. While some commentators
praised al-Quntar for her singing and performance, many, in both English and Arabic, argued
that, while it was a good performance, unfortunately she did not have the right voice for the
song. One commenter found her voice to be “too strong” for the song (tabi‘at sawt-ha al-qawwi
lam tatawafiq ma‘ hadhihi al-ughniya). Su‘ad Muhammad’s voice and rendition of the song are
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“Wahashtini” (Composer: Khalid al-Amir), Performed by Lubana al-Quntar and the National Arab Orchestra:
https://youtu.be/h0VdD9q7CO0
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much lighter and of a different quality than al-Quntar’s.77 There was so much of a cognitive
dissonance between al-Quntar’s voice and Su‘ad Muhammad’s for some that it merited critique.
A song is often strongly identified with the singer who made it famous, and this comes out
clearly in these comments. Similar to Arab Idol’s Jil Bikammil Jil campaign, this example of
singers being expected to reproduce the whole vocal approach of songs highlights the looming
prominence of Golden Age artists as the benchmarks for Arab song.
On the other hand, al-Quntar’s voice aligned with that of the singer Asmahan (born Amal
al-Atrash) and her songs, which required a different vocal idiom and techniques. Asmahan was
known for her “practiced clarity, vocal agility, and unusual strength” (Zuhur 2000, 174) and her
“dark middle tones, phrasing, and the resonance and timing of her ornamentations” (Zuhur 2000,
185). The American-based Syrian singer is related to the al-Atrash siblings,78 and Asmahan’s
famed songs are mainstays of her repertory. She trained professionally as an opera singer as well
as in Arab music. When the National Arab Orchestra traveled to Saudi Arabia for a pair of
performances at the Ithra Center in Dhahran in 2019, the theme of the performances was the
music of two iconic singers of the Arab world, Asmahan and Umm Kulthum. Lubana al-Quntar
was the featured performer for Asmahan’s repertoire, which included songs such as “Layali alUns” and “Ya Habibi Ta‘ala”. The YouTube videos of al-Quntar’s performances of Asmahan’s
songs were praised in comments not just for her skill and talent but for her Asmahan-like vocal
quality.79
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“Wahashtini” (Composer: Khalid al-Amir), performed by Su‘ad Muhammad: https://youtu.be/2-8VKQB9kno
The other famous family member was composer, singer, and ‘ud player Farid al-Atrash.
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“Ya Habibi Ta‘ala” performed by Lubana al-Quntar (2019): https://youtu.be/qLt0JnTN_R4
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Recognizable repertoire, iconic Arab singers, and an Arab vocal canon
The above examples of vocal aesthetics and performance conventions have come, I
argue, to create a canonical Arab voice, with variations that are often taken to be national, over
the last several decades. However, it is not just the voice, as indicated earlier in the chapter, but
the repertoire itself that signals Arabness to the audience. Furthermore, as judge Hassan alShafi‘i said on Arab Idol, having a good voice (sawt hilu) is not enough; song choice (ikhtariat
al-aghani) is just as important.80 Racy (2003) has noted how certain popular tunes can be
deemed “signal pieces” for how they bring out an instant reaction, often in the context of a
wasla, or suite (65).81 Khuri (2018) similarly argues that certain musical stimuli elicit similar
musical reactions across the Arab world (16). Fakhri popularized certain mawawil, qasa’id, and
al-qudud al-halabiyya—literally “equivalencies,” but a form of contrafactum compositions
associated with the city of Aleppo—that various contestants would frequently sing on the
program, such as “Qaduk al-Mayas.”82 Also, representing one’s country and its essence via a
song is a strength in the contest.
The repertoire of the Arab canon has come to be defined by the dominance of Egyptian
artists and composers of the so-called Golden Age, with the prominence of some Lebanese and
Syrian performers: the performers ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz, Umm Kulthum. Sabah Fakhri, Fairouz,
Sabah, Su‘ad Muhammad, Wad‘i al-Safi, and music composed by Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab,
Sayyid Darwish, Muhammad al-Mougi, Farid al-Atrash, Riad al-Sunbati, Zakariyya Ahmad,
Baligh Hamdi, and Bakri al-Kurdi. These are singers whose wide catalogue of performances has
understandably contributed greatly to a canon of Arab music disseminated through mass media.
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Season 3, Episode 10.
Examples included al-qudud al-halabiyya, such as “Qaduk al-Mayas”: https://youtu.be/wUbNihmAvQQ
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See above link.
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This is also because their recordings are readily available to serve as benchmarks in various
forms including streaming platforms. Indeed, even for Qur’anic recitation, recordings have taken
precedent over teachers for those who want to learn the artistry of recitation (Nelson 2013). The
music of the Egyptian singer and composer Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab (1902-1991) is the
foremost example of mass-mediated music that has come to represent the core canon of Arab
music, which is sometimes conflated with the term “Arabic classical music” in performance
parlance. Some of ‘Abd al-Wahab’s music in later decades has become canonized as a part of the
popular raqs sharqi, or belly dancing, music genre.
The repertory of Fairouz is considered synonymous with her country (Habib 2005; Stone
2002). Habib notes that in the early 2000s at the erstwhile Virgin Megastore in Beirut, Fairouz
had her own music category in the collections of CDs (Habib 2005, 123). Her national
importance to Lebanon was coupled with her significance to the Arab region. On a broader
regional level, she is also known for her songs dedicated to Jerusalem and Palestine (see Chapter
Five); she also released an album dedicated to Arabs around the region called Safirat al-‘Arab
(The Arabs’ ambassador; Habib 2005, 222-3). Umm Kulthum similarly produced musical
numbers in support of the Palestinian cause, which contributed to her self-crafting as a not just
Egyptian, but Arab, legend (Lohman 2010). Being the most famous singer of both Egypt and the
Arab world, her voice and repertoire have given her a footing in Egyptian and Arab cultural
literacy unlike any other personality. For this reason, she is considered synonymous not only
with her native Egypt, but also with the Arab world in general; everyone listens to Umm
Kulthum. The National Arab Orchestra’s sold-out concerts in Saudi Arabia with Mai Farrouk
featuring touchstones of Umm Kulthum’s oeuvre were performed to packed audiences of Saudis
and expatriates from across the Arab world. During the choruses of classics by Umm Kulthum,
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such as “Inta ‘Umri,” audience members sang along word for word, filling up the entire hall,
surround-sound style. 83
YouTube’s streaming platform has also contributed greatly to the recirculation of a panArab song canon. In a six-minute YouTube video called “Evolution of Arabic Music,” which
went viral in 2016, the Saudi musician, producer, and social media personality ‘Alaa’ Wardi
performs an a cappella medley of Arab songs, many of which have appeared on Arab Idol (see
Table 3.8).84 While Wardi’s main goal is to show how the song style of popular Arab music has
changed since the early twentieth century, what is more striking is that the songs attributed to
earlier eras are all songs that Arab audiences around the world might find familiar today.

Table 3.8: Selected songs from ‘Alaa’ Wardi’s “Evolution of Arabic Music” overlapping with
popular Arab Idol repertoire
Song Title
“Zuruni”
“‘Ala Balad al-Mahbub”
“Imta Hat’arif Imta”
“Ana Albi Dalili”
“Ahwak”
“Li-Ams Ana Illi Abki”
“Albi wa Muftah”
“Ana Kul ma A’ul al-Tuba”
“Magadir”
“‘Atini al-Nay wa Ghani”
“Sa‘at”

Composer/Performer
Sayyid Darwish
Umm Kulthum
Asmahan
Layla Murad
‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab
Farid al-Atrash
‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz
Talal Madah
Fairouz
Sabah

In addition to many of the songs from the Wardi mashup being performed on Arab Idol,
many of these songs are ones that I’ve played in other Arab ensembles or musical settings,
whether in Lebanon or in the U.S. The National Arab Orchestra has a sizeable YouTube
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“Inta ‘Umri” performed by Mai Farrouk (2019): https://youtu.be/e7wl1tm35bM
“Evolution of Arabic Music”/Tatawur al-musiqa al-‘arabiya (‘Alaa’ Wardi, 2016): https://youtu.be/cPvyl6MYxlg
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presence, with over 356K subscribers as of September 2022, and high-quality videos of its live
concerts garnering millions of views from all around the world. Its top YouTube hits are all from
this recognizable pan-Arab canon, including Egyptian singer Mai Farrouk’s performances with
the ensemble of the Umm Kulthum hit songs “Alf Layla wa Layla” and “Inta ‘Umri.” For
instance, Farrouk’s performance of “Alf Layla wa Layla” alone has over 30 million views.85 The
orchestra’s repertoire consists of that largely recognizable, primarily Egyptian and Levantine
Arab repertoire, with YouTube canonizing this music in its promotion of it as “Arab music.”
Similarly, the viral videos of Arab Idol or Voice performances allow for familiar tunes to remain
in circulation. Music is also preserved via innovative online Arab music archives and websites
that digitize and spread older Arab music (France 2019). There is also a pedagogical component
to the breadth of Arab music resources available online. Websites such as MaqamWorld.com
reference this canon, thereby reifying it, or re-instantiating it. In the United States, the annual
Arabic Music Retreat, co-founded by A.J. Racy and Palestinian musician Simon Shaheen,
teaches much of this repertoire while legitimating it, as do ensembles at many colleges and
universities in the U.S. that go on to perform this same repertoire.
The base familiarity with overplayed popular songs has been a springboard for jest on
Arab Idol. One Season Three audition episode presented an edited compilation of the most badly
sung excerpts of the ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz song, “Ahwak,” when various contestants in
Alexandria chose to audition with it.86 The following table shows a list of famous Arab songs,
largely from the Golden Age era, that appeared on Seasons Three and Four of Arab Idol.
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“Alf Layla wa Layla” (Composer: Baligh Hamdi), performed by Mai Farrouk and the National Arab Orchestra,
with 30.1 million views on YouTube as of 6 September 2022: https://youtu.be/Q_HoGYhk4x8
86
Season 3, Episode 3.
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Table 3.9: Examples of “canonical” repertoire selections in Arab Idol’s Seasons Three and Four
SONG

ORIGINAL PERFORMER

“Ifrah Ya Albi”

Umm Kulthum

Hayarti Albi Ma‘ak”

Umm Kulthum

“Hubbi Eh”

Umm Kulthum

“Layali al-Uns fi Vienna”

Asmahan

“Alulu”

‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz

“Ahwak”

‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz

“Habib ‘Ala Dunya”

Sabah Fakhri

“Qulil Maliha”

Sabah Fakhri

“Ghanili Shway”

Umm Kulthum

“al-Ward al-Gamil”

Umm Kulthum

“‘Ala Rimshi”

Wadi‘ al-Safi

“‘Andak Bahriyya”

Wadi‘ al-Safi

“Sa’luni al-Nas”

Fairouz

“Ana Albi Dalili”

Asmahan

“Ana Albi Lik Mayal”

Faiza Ahmad

“Wahashtini”

Su‘ad Muhammad

“Haliwayn Min Yawmna
Walla”

Sayyid Makkawi

The Arab canon as a continuous and living tradition on Arab Idol
Finally, this chapter argues that Arab Idol’s repertoire fits into a canon that is both
continuous and flexible. As discussed in the Introduction, “Arab music” is difficult to define, yet
has long been the object of institutionalization. The 1932 Arab Congress was known for its
attempt to standardize Arab music by synthesizing various local traditions in the framework of
largely Orientalist conceptions of Arab music (Racy 1993).87 Castelo-Branco (1980) notes how
87

One major point of contention at the Cairo Congress was the great disparity of musics from the region, from
Morocco and Algeria to Syria and Iraq.
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the term Arab Music (al-musiqa al-‘arabiyya) in Egypt following the Cairo Congress came to
connote urban secular Egyptian music. Various ensembles in Egypt, such as the Firqat al-Musiqa
al-Arabiyya, also codified the idea of al-musiqa al-arabiyya.
One reason that certain Arab repertoire might have become, and has remained, associated
across a pan-Arab context is that specific vocal—and instrumental—compositions defy
categorization, ranging from genres of Sufi music to Latin rhythms (Racy 2003, 6). In the early
twentieth century, Sayyid Darwish (1892-1923), one of the Arab world’s most prominent
composers, wrote in traditional “classical” forms such as the muwashshah and the dawr, yet
composed a large number of works for musical theater. Also, during the early twentieth century,
the variety performance (hafla munawwa‘a) exemplified how a single evening’s entertainment
could be similarly versatile in its offering of songs. The variety performance illustrated how
different types of music and performance art within a single performance, such as folk (sha‘abi)
and tarab musical numbers, were not irreconcilable in early twentieth-century Egypt (Racy 1981,
15). The sophisticated quality of music compositions in (mainly Egyptian) film and mass media
contexts from the middle of the twentieth century is one reason why these are revered in both
commercial and art-music contexts today, along with inducing nostalgia. They are also
performed in commercially popular contexts, such as on Arab Idol. Al-Faruqi (1980) argues that
mass-mediated Arab music of the twentieth century embodied “that which exemplifies nonchange” (77). Similarly, Sawa has commented on how performance conventions and musical
aspects are so similar between medieval and twentieth century practices that they cannot be
ignored. I argue that such aspects play into what Arab Idol sees as distinctly and indisputably
Arab, and represent a continuous tradition of Arab song.
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While stylistic unity has led to the blurring of distinctions between standard categories in
Arab music (Racy 2003; al-Faruqi 1980), the fact that the same repertoire is performed in
varying contexts further disassociates certain repertoire from a particular setting. Identical
musical repertoire, perhaps with different texts, might be performed in a Sufi religious ceremony
or informal gathering to a formal concert hall, broadcast regularly on radio or television and at
the same time played at elite parties (or on televised vocal talent competitions). Often, the
importance placed on improvisational style, coupled with the involved engagement of the
performer and audience, takes precedence over the performance context. The light songs alqudud al-halabiyya replace lyrics of what were originally religious melodies, such as those used
in dhikr circles. Fairouz and Rahbani songs also used old folk melodies (and even Mozart
compositions88) as the basis for popular songs, and composed new material in old folk styles
(Habib 2005, 317).
Farraj and Shumays (2019) see Arabic music as “a hybrid amalgamation that has come to
be accepted as one ‘ethnic’ tradition” (2). Indeed, great overlap exists between the repertoire they
see as constituting Arab music and the core repertoire appearing on Arab Idol. However, this
canon rarely includes North African popular music, with the exception of songs that have been
single hits in the last couple of decades, such as “Abdul Qader” (1993) by Algerian rai artist
Khaled,89 Rachid Taha’s “Ya Rayeh” (1997), 90 or Saber El Rebai’s “Sidi Mansour” (2000).91
Gulf and Saudi Arabian music also do not figure into the Farraj and Shumays’ conception of

88
Fairouz 's “Ya Ana Ya Ana” draws from Mozart's “Symphony No. 40 (First Movement)”:
https://youtu.be/AjIdXqNeaDk.
89
“Abdul Qader” (1993) by Khaled: https://youtu.be/ZI9t4zSbwws
90
“Ya Rayah” (1997) by Rachid Taha: https://youtu.be/vBu2OXGWBFI
91
“Sidi Mansour (2000) by Saber El Rebai: https://youtu.be/M1dcmKIIVGw
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Arab music, although in the case of Arab Idol, this has been changing. Recent Arab Idol seasons
have featured more popular music from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

Table 3.10: Examples of songs with European elements (from Farraj & Shumays 2019, 68-9),
some of which appear on Arab Idol
Song Title
“Alf Layla wa Layla”
“Ahwak”
“Qari’at al-Finjan”
“Layali al-Uns fi Vienna”
“Fi Yawm wa Layla”

Composer/Performer
Baligh Hamdi/Umm Kulthum
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab/ ‘Abd alHalim Hafiz
Muhammad al-Mougi/ ‘Abd al-Halim
Hafiz
Farid al-Atrash/Asmahan
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab/Warda

Arab songs from the so-called “Golden Age” (c. 1925-1975) have often quoted Western
music excerpts or styles (see Table 3.10). References to Western sounding styles might be
considered a time-tested Arab aesthetic in Arab vocal music, and these songs have come to be a
part of what I see as an Arab music canon. The use of “western” (gharbi) and “Arab” (‘arabi) or
“Eastern/Oriental” (sharqi) vocal and compositional styles, are often juxtaposed as different
styles and sounds, yet used together in a single Arab composition. For instance, there are
unmistakable quotes from German and Russian composers such as Beethoven, Tchaikovsky, and
Rimsky-Korsakov in compositions of composers such as ‘Abd al-Wahab (Racy 1982, 397).92
These include harmonic orchestrations, orchestral interludes, operatic monologues (munulug). In
this repertoire and period, drastic shifts within a musical work represented a microcosm of
Cairo’s constantly changing musical and political history (Racy 1982, 399). Such works included
those performed by Warda, ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz and Umm Kulthum, and composed by Baligh
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For instance, the end of ‘Abd al-Wahab’s instrumental piece “’Aziza” ends with an allusion to the opening of
Beethoven’s fifth symphony: https://youtu.be/DwXurHF47j8 @3:59.
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Hamdi, Muhammad al-Mougi, and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab (Farraj & Shumays 2019, 68).
Egyptian composers were constantly including Western instruments without coming under fire
for “Westernizing” Arab music’s character (Danielson 1997, 135).
Arab Idol contributes to this canon by including more contemporary popular songs within
this canon, and holding some of the contemporary pop singers to a similar standard as older
“canonic” voices of the Golden Age. Examples include songs by Muhammad ‘Abdu, Asala, and
Shirin Abdel Wahab. Other songs include those by Milhem Barakat (“Ala Babi Wa’if
‘Amarayn” and “Ta‘a Ninsa”); Zekra (“Yawm Layk wa Yawm Aalayk”); judge Ahlam (“Kalima
Za’l” and “Baghithak”); Saber El Rebai (“Attahada al-‘Alim”), and Kadim Al Sahir (“Ana wa
Layla”). While contestants often competed with Golden Age songs to showcase their abilities,
these musical numbers are not deemed particularly marketable for top Arab popular singers
today—including Arab Idol winners—who perform in the more contemporary and vernacular
styles of the songs mentioned above.

Conclusions
Through the examples of vocal aesthetics, performance conventions, repertoire, and
iconic singers presented in this chapter, I have tried to show how a commonly mediated body of
Arab vocal music in the region has come to represent a canonical repertoire that is not just
received but expanded on Arab Idol. I have argued that the show aims to not only present a
continuous tradition of Arab song, but that it also actively contributes to its canonization, both by
including new songs and by reifying Golden Age music as the standard for contestants via
rhetoric and social media campaigns.
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Chapter Four: Competing Constructions of Arabness on Arab Idol
After several months of live-episode performances, SMS-text voting, and social media
buzz, Season Four of Arab Idol has arrived at its much-anticipated season finale in 2017, with
millions of viewers tuned in across the Middle East and around the world. The three remaining
contestants sing their final competing numbers for the televised talent program in the first portion
of the episode, broadcast live from the Lebanese MBC studios. Audiences across the Arab world
have their last chance to submit their votes to the phone numbers corresponding to their
country’s cell phone carriers, running on tickertape at the bottom of the screen. Now, in the time
before the season’s Idol is crowned, and as the votes are processed, there are a few more musical
numbers to go.
The final performance of this final episode brings back to the limelight many eliminated
contestants of Season Four one last time to sing together with the three finalists, who are featured
as soloists. The song, “Mal‘una al-Hurub” (Cursed Are the Wars), is written especially for this
episode.1 “Why is war the alternative of love, and why is death looming over us?” the chorus
asks. “You who left come back to the embrace of those waiting for you/ to a dream that has yet
to come true.” During a climactic moment of the song, during which all the contestants sing in
unison, the camera pans to one of the four seated judges, Nancy Ajram, who is seen bursting into
tears. This song, strategically programmed right before the most anticipated moment of the
season, is aimed to resonate with its pan-Arab audience, for whom the sentiments of grief for
families separated because of political conflict and war, losing loved ones, and a yearning to be
reunited are relevant across the Arab world. The specifics go unspoken, but the emotional impact

1

Video clip with English subtitles provided by YouTube account holder: https://youtu.be/uy-n2IaA1lM
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is delivered; this is how the show intends to unite its audience in the final minutes of its final
episode, before the “Arab Idol” is declared.
***
This chapter explores how Arab Idol imagined a shared and palatable Arabness in ways
that supplement the promotion of an Arab musical canon, as illustrated in Chapter Three. I
examine the musical expressions of what I argue are primary cornerstones of Arabness on Arab
Idol, such as the shared Arabic language, shared regional identities, and shared experiences of
current events. Secondly, the chapter also examines how the show tried to celebrate the diversity,
rather than homogeneity, of the Arab world. The highlighting of sub-regional diversity, national
diversity, and less frequently, ethnic and linguistic diversity are varying ways that Arab Idol
articulated a diverse Arabness. Religion is not explicitly discussed on the show, nor is gender,
though there usually tends to be slightly more male than female contestants in a given year,
something worth noting since so many of the singers of the Golden Age were women. I
demonstrate how the program went out of its way to make overt demonstrations of Arabness by
identifying regional identities that notably overlap with regions that have historical cohesions—
in particular the Levant, or Bilad al-Sham—and with regional music categories that are
delineated in the music industry—particularly the Gulf, or Khalij—implying the commercial
importance of this angle. In earlier seasons of Arab Idol, and particularly in the previous Idols
iteration, Superstar, contestants of different nations were pitted against each other in (not
always) friendly competitive settings, with national rivalries effectively undermining sentiments
of pan-Arab unity.2 However, the show evolved to frame instances of national pride as indexical
of a diverse Arabness; it also began to stress celebrations of its various regions over nations in

2

See Chapter Two.
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later seasons instead. This is all while contestants generally ended up being from a limited
number of countries, mainly from Egypt and the Levant, albeit with increasing representation
from the Gulf.
By investigating Arab Idol’s emphasis on its produced markers of Arabness, this chapter
additionally addresses the show’s aim to promote contestants, music, and dialogue that speak to a
pan-Arab audience (al-jumhur al-‘arabi). I argue that Arab Idol also evolved to stress more panArab shared connections, particularly via non-specificity, to remain commercially viable. Yet
what is also apparent are the tensions between the feel-good diversity that it highlights in the
name of Arabness and more pressing issues that Arab Idol did not address by name, such as
specific wars and other sociopolitical issues; nor did it acknowledge Afro or Indian Arabness.
Therefore, this chapter also explores the unplanned moments that contradict the palatable
Arabness and that contribute to such tensions.

al-Jumhur al-‘arabi: Varying levels of resonance with a pan-Arab audience
Arab media scholar Marwan Kraidy (2015) argues that to be a celebrity in the Arab
world is to be pan-Arab: “A typical Arab star records songs in Cairo, shoots music videos in
Izmir, acts in a serialized television drama in Damascus, launches an eponymous perfume in
Dubai, performs in the Arab Dancing with the Stars in Beirut, and appears on talk shows and in
concerts beamed via satellite to viewers from Iraq to Morocco” (164). Similarly, the target
audience of Idols in the Arab world has always been a pan-Arab one. Throughout the runs of
both Superstar and Arab Idol, presenters and other personnel frequently utilized references to the
Arab nation such as al-watan al-‘arabi or min al-muhit ila al-khalij, a common regional phrase
to represent the Arab world, as seen in earlier chapters. With the advancement of satellite media
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to cover an Arab footprint, this meant that the shows on these channels were angling their
offerings towards a regional Arab audience.3
During Superstar’s several-season run on Future Television, the global Idols franchise
produced a one-off, two-episode production called World Idol in 2003-2004, another context that
interpellated a pan-Arab audience. This two-night production featured the winning contestants of
the then eleven existing global versions of Idols, including Superstar, competing against each
other: Superstar’s first-season winner, Jordanian vocalist Diana Karazon, participated in World
Idol. What is particularly of note is that she was referred to in English as the “pan-Arab”
contestant throughout its broadcasts (Meizel 2011). The judge representing the Arab world on
World Idol, Lebanese musician Elias Rahbani, was also referred to as “pan-Arab.” Karazon was
also the only singer who did not perform a number in English, performing instead an Arabic
song from her new album. This album was incidentally the direct result of her record-deal win in
Superstar. Fittingly, upon its release, the album was called Superstar al-‘Arab, an indication of
both the show she won and who the fans were meant to be: Arabs (al-‘arab). She herself was an
ideal pan-Arab candidate, as she was of Palestinian origin, born in Kuwait, yet officially
represented Jordan, her long-term country of residence.
Even more so after Arab Idol’s premiere in 2011 on MBC1, the more recent Idols Arabworld offshoot continued to make it clear that its audience was an “Arab” audience. Increasingly
in its most recent seasons, production efforts seemed to accentuate the pan-Arab aspect in order
to move away from sub-national identifications that dominated in earlier seasons and the intraregional politics of Superstar.4 Jumhur was a term used frequently on the show, particularly by
the emcees, Ahmad Fahmy and Annabella Hilal Sa‘d. While its main meaning here is

3
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See Chapter One.
See Chapter Two.

152

“audience,” it also has connotations of “public” or “crowd.” It was variably used to refer either to
the audience members in the studio or to the live viewers watching on television around the
region. Often, jumhur was explicitly linked to an Arab audience (al-jumhur al-‘arabi). In other
cases, the word jumhur was not further determined; however, on-stage discourse around its usage
suggested that it referred specifically to an Arab audience, or the Arab world, at large. For
instance, during one climactic moment of a mid-season episode, after the judges had provided
their feedback on all the contestants’ performances that could potentially advance further in the
competition, the time had come for the contestant who received the fewest audience votes to be
eliminated. Fahmy, the host, reminded viewers that despite the importance of the comments from
the lajna (panel of judges), it was the qarar al-jumhur (decision of the audience) that ultimately
mattered.5 The climactic moment was not just about who would be the weakest link but about the
community that was responsible for the contestant’s elimination. While jumhur here simply
referred to the voting audience, the various references to al-‘alam al-‘arabi throughout the
program strongly reinforced how the audience that would be given the reins for making this
decision was an “Arab” one.
At the same time, jumhur on Arab Idol had various levels of resonance. These different
levels of jumhur correlated with different valences that the contestants must simultaneously
speak to. As Meizel (2010) has noted:
Linked to the notion of unity, a difficult balance among intertwined levels of political
identity—ethnic, national, regional—has proven to be an outstanding theme throughout
many Idols and Idols-inspired talent competitions. Contestants become cultural
representatives of identity-based communities, and, as part of the Hollywood-style dream
for which they are reaching, often bear a substantial burden of responsibility as they sing
(295).

5

Season Three, Episode 12 ~0:58:03: https://youtu.be/LTuZtKQVGpI
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While Arab Idol promoted the notion of Arab ethnolinguistic unity—for example, a
contestant’s participation in a show automatically implied his or her Arab belonging—the
construction of Arab identity was complicated by the many subjectivities that the contestants
brought to the stage. Contestants faced the paradox of being both automatically “Arab” and
peripheral on different levels, due to various markers of difference, including those that are
regional, linguistic, ethnic, religious, musical, or related to place of residence. Additionally, a
contestant’s country of residence and the country they represented on stage were not always
identical.6 Finally, the holding of auditions not only across the Arab world but in European cities
further complicated the location of identity. The contestant background story was also an
important factor in the shaping of contestants’ images for their audiences and taken into
consideration on the production end before they progressed to further stages. Some of the
subjectivities that the contestants performed were those imposed upon them by default of their
national background and through deliberate narrative construction on the program, whether by
highlighting their Arabness, national identity, or appealing personal background stories. In
Seasons Three and Four of Arab Idol, there was less emphasis on the cities, countries, or regions
from where contestants originated, replaced with an emphasis on personal trials, tribulations, and
acquired life lessons instead. Yet when these references were made, they were usually connected
to a larger generic Arabness.

Jumhur and subregional identities and Arabness on Arab Idol: The Levant
A second level at which Arab Idol connected its contestants to Arabness was that of
discrete subregional constructs. These included the Gulf (Khalij), which comprises Bahrain,

6

Indeed, Season Four finalist Amir Dandan is a resident of New Jersey, USA.
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Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Oman; and the Levant, which
includes Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Iraq was inadvertently included in both of these
regional constructs, though Iraqis did not make much of an appearance on the show; Egypt
usually stood apart from a regional construct. As a subregion, North Africa—which has had
many of its own talent shows that are more popular for contestants from that region—was not
highlighted as much in Seasons Three and Four, though several contestants represented
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia in the live rounds of the competition.7
Palestinian Ya‘qub Shahin was an example of a singer who voiced a discrete sub-regional
identity within the Arab world: the Levant. Shahin sang to a larger Levantine identity, singing
popular Lebanese and Syrian music in various competing numbers. After Arab Idol, he has
continued to easily assimilate into the Lebanese music television circuit, performing on Lebanese
MTV and even performing specifically Lebanese nationalist songs, despite being Palestinian.8
Furthermore, in a study on Palestinian practices, Wood et al. have found that the connection
between urban centers in the Levant was not as historically divided by borders (2020, 71). Also
at play is the historical precedent of greater Syria, or Bilad al-Sham, from the Ottoman era that
ties the region together, as is the importance of the relative proximities of Palestinian cities to
Lebanon and Syria. Palestinian wedding songs show the importance of this shared Levantine
regional history; the repertoire often includes songs by Lebanese stars such as Wadi‘ al-Safi. In
Nazareth, a city in present-day Israel, one popular genre of songs is named after the city called
“nasrawiyat,” although they are in fact Syrian songs (Wood et al. 2020, 83). Singers from the
Galilee (also in present-day Israel) see their region as its own regional cultural sphere, but also

7

Libya is a glaring exception, with the country not even having a phone number listed in the tickertape for
audience’s voting purposes.
8
Ya‘qub Shahin appeared on the MTV program Haik minghanni, singing “Sayajna Lubnan” by Wadi‘ al-Safi (no
link available).
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feel intimately connected with Lebanon and Syria. At the same time, other Israeli/Palestinian
regions are seen as less culturally shared (Wood et al. 2020, 78). Lebanese, Palestinian, and
Syrian songs often “overlay” connotations of one region on top of another, which is a reason
why people can relate so much to songs from other countries or localities; a song describing
topography in Lebanon may be very reminiscent of the Galilee (Wood et al., 85; Stone 2008a,
162). Similarly, themes in songs by the Lebanese Rahbani brothers, such as nostalgia, a leftbehind village, and the ideas of returning to it one day, are applicable across borders (Stone
2008a, 162).
Along with Egyptian music, Levantine music also encompasses the most dominant
regional representation of Arab music around the region and the globe.9 One of Shahin’s final
songs was the nationalist song popularized by the Lebanese singer Sabah, “Ta‘la wa Tit‘amar Ya
Dar” (Rise and come together, my country). This song, whose lyrics include, “Rise and come
together, my country/protected by your towers/the army will stand around at all sides at your
defense,” can apply to both a generic nationalism and to specific countries. It has been
popularized by other singers from the Levant, and in later lyrics the word for “our country”
(baladna) can easily be replaced by the name of a country, such as Syria. Another example of
Levantine representation is Muhammad ‘Assaf’s rendition of the Lebanese Rahbani Brothers’
song, “Qataluni ‘Uyun al-Sud” (Dark eyes killed me) in Season Two. He began the performance
with a mawwal that referenced Palestine, which elicited a big cheer from the audience.10 His
joyful rendition of this popular song, with a simple catchy melody in the maqam bayati11 and the

9

It is also arguably often seen as synonymous with Arab music in the U.S, via the influence of teachers and
performers who are primarily Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian.
10
See Chapter Five on Palestinian representation on Arab Idol.
11
Maqam bayati (Maqam World online resource): https://www.maqamworld.com/en/maqam/bayati.php
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light rhythmic cycle maqsum12, typical of the subregion at large, was meant to get as many
people onto their feet as possible. These two songs exemplify contestants who invoked Palestine
while resonating with a greater Levantine, and an even greater Arab, audience at the same time.
While patriotic references to countries were not particularly emphasized on Arab Idol,
certain generic patriotic songs without such references were common on the show. The Sabah
song above is one example of this. Another example is “Biktub Ismak Ya Baladi,” (My country,
I write your name), written by Lebanese singer and composer Elie Choueiri in 1973. This song
was first performed by Joseph Azar, and appeared at least twice during Arab Idol. Interestingly,
it was performed by Syrian contestants in both instances, by finalist Farah Yusif in Season Two
and by winner Hazim Sharif as his victory song in Season Three. Like “Ta‘la,” “Biktub Ismak”
promotes a generic sense of patriotism. In this case, the song rendered sentiments that could
speak to al-watan al-‘arabi or al-jumhur al-‘arabi, and at the same time to whatever country the
audience wanted it to represent, be it Palestine or Syria, or the Levant in general. Again, these
songs’ renditions left them open to varying or contesting interpretations of Arabness. The
neutrality regarding specific countries was what is most significant in these songs’ performances
and reception by the judges. This left space for more subregional identification, which I argue is
sometimes seen as interchangeable with Arabness.

Representing the Khalij on Arab Idol
Arab Idol was known for its Egyptian and Levantine centricity, both with its musical
repertoire and with contestant representation on the show. It was therefore significant when in
the auditions stage of Season Three, Emirati judge Ahlam told two Saudi contestants, Majid and

12

Maqsum rhythmic cycle (Maqam World): https://www.maqamworld.com/en/iqaa/maqsum.php
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‘Abd al-Aziz, during their auditions that the show was always looking for “Khaliji” voices.13
This suggested that Arab Idol wanted to diversify using this particular regional bent. The two
contestants were both successful in their auditions and moved onto the next group round. In the
first live episode of Season Four, Badr al-Hassan from Bahrain seemed to have been the first
representative of his country to make it this far into the competition. After his performance, he
vocalized greetings to Bahrain, albeit following it up with a nod to al-watan al-‘arabi, a common
sequence of events on the show to de-emphasize a country’s acknowledgement. Al-Hassan also
proudly wore a Bahraini headdress. Saudi contestant Bandar Mugri was hailed by judge Wael
Kfoury for representing his region (Inta mumathil muhittak). However, it is also unclear how
specific or widely reaching the muhit (region) was in this case, as it could represent Saudi
Arabia, the larger region, or the Arab world. In another example, a contestant from the United
Arab Emirates wore a traditional headdress, and upon moving onto the next round was depicted
telling the cameras that he hoped the next Idol was Khaliji, and that it would be him.14 Most
prominently, Yemeni contestant ‘Ammar Muhammad, who will be discussed further below,
became a finalist on the show.
The increase in Khaliji contestants has also meant more Khaliji repertoire on the show.
On one of the final episodes of Season Four, which happened to fall on Kuwaiti National Day
(al-yawm al-watani al-kuwayti), the live broadcast began with a major production in honor of the
day. Beginning with several measures of percussion playing the sawt rhythm of the genre with
the same name, associated with Kuwait and the Khalij more generally, the production launched a
medley of Kuwaiti national songs with a host of performers. It ended with balloons in the colors
of the Kuwaiti flag being released on stage as the four judges and the three finalists joined the
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Season 3, Episode 6: https://youtu.be/e8RCfNdUndI
Season 3, Episode 6.
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performers on stage. At this point before the show went on to its regular programming,
projections of various flags of Gulf countries appeared behind the performers, accompanied by a
social media hashtag, Khalijuna wahid. At the same time, the performers launched into a short
melodic number featuring those words, meaning “Our Khalij is one.”15 This whole performance
was a rare example of a country being highlighted this way, and it seemed to have been in the
spirit of highlighting Gulf countries, and indeed the Gulf in general, as apparent with the final
social media campaign highlighting the subregion as a whole. This campaign was done
presumably to interest more Gulf audience members, who make up a good percentage of MBC’s
viewers, and also because the Gulf is where MBC’s production is increasingly taking place.
Incidentally, Yemen’s flag was not included, and indeed it is not technically a member of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC); at the same time, Yemeni ‘Ammar Muhammad appeared on
stage in traditional attire and was later lauded for bringing Khaliji music to the Arab Idol stage.16
Indeed, on the same day as the Khalijuna Wahid campaign, Muhammad performed a song by
Yemeni singer Muhammad Sa‘d ‘Abdallah, “Yawm al-Ahad” (Sunday), also popular across the
Gulf, for the occasion, indicating his and Yemen’s subsummation under the Khalij.17
Representing the Khalij subregion on Arab Idol, Yemeni finalist ‘Ammar Muhammad
often sang popular pan-Gulf music that was less familiar on the Arab Idol stage. He sang
numbers that doubled as pan-Gulf music and Yemeni music. One of the songs that Muhammad
prepared was “Sirr Hubbi” (Secret of my love), which was originally performed by the famous
Yemeni singer Abu Bakr Salim. The lyrics, penned by the Yemeni poet Hussain al-Mahdar,
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Kuwaiti National Day performance: https://youtu.be/BDzbRgvigto
Other commercial attempts to show pan-Khaliji identity in recent years include the 2021 theme song of the Gulf
Cup, which includes Iraq and Yemen (in addition to the usually associated countries of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman): https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nSF9yw86Ld4,
17
Original song by Muhammad Sa‘d ‘Abdullah: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=C05DguV0XZM
16
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reference the Yemeni port city of Mukalla in Hadhramout, and also largely dwell on the poetics
of love. His performance of this song generated some of the greatest enthusiasm seen on the
show.18 After he finished singing, it was difficult for the emcee to get the crowd to stop cheering,
as the judges prepared their comments. Ahlam, the Emirati judge who had frequently voiced her
support for Khaliji music and contestants, told Muhammad he should be proud that he was
evoking the great singer Abu Bakr Salim, and gave a “shout-out” to Yemen. Wael Kfoury,
referred to Muhammad as ibn al-yaman (a son of Yemen), which garnered a big reaction from
the crowd. Hasan al-Shafi‘i mentioned that in addition to his performance it was his pride in his
identity (fakhr bi-huwaytak) that stood out. Finally, Nancy Ajram echoed a sentiment that came
up in previous episodes, telling him that above all, he was an ambassador for his country (safir
li-baladak Yaman).19 However, “Sirr Hubbi” did not necessarily evoke Yemen for most viewers
of the show: it is a popular song across the Gulf, as Abu Bakr Salim recorded and performed
largely in Saudi Arabia. The song is also well known beyond the Arabian Peninsula, particularly
after it was re-popularized by Lebanese singer Ragheb Alama in recent years. Significantly,
Alama, a former judge on Arab Idol, performed the song as a guest artist on an earlier season of
Arab Idol, its recirculation suggesting its previous commercial success for the show’s pan-Arab
audience. As with the group performance of “Mal‘una al-Hurub” during the season finale,
Muhammad referenced Yemen in non-specific ways that spoke to the region at large.20
As his song of choice for the season finale, Muhammad performed the song “Hubbiliha”
by Emirati pop star Hussain al-Jasmi. He poignantly presented a Khaliji song for the first time at
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https://youtu.be/LKBD5KIdN-Q
See Chapter Three for other similar references made about Yemen and ‘Ammar Muhammad.
20
While referred to as ‘Ammar Muhammad during the filming of Arab Idol, the singer is now professionally known
as ‘Ammar al-‘Azaki.
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the show’s finale, a clear emotional moment for him.21 In fact, in the middle of his performance
he broke down into tears, having trouble getting through the final verses. With these songs, he
was celebrated for bringing Gulf music at large to the final stages of the competition. However,
at no point in the show was there any indication of where in Yemen Muhammad is from. His
supporting fans were livestreamed from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, rather than a city in Yemen, yet
there was no specific explanation of the war that continues to be bankrolled by the show’s major
financial backer, Saudi Arabia, nor if this was now his current city (and country) of residence. I
argue that these production decisions cast him in more of a pan-Gulf light than a Yemeni one,
particularly in a pan-Gulf light that could be recognized across the Arab world. It was also
seemingly a way of keeping current politics and conflict out of the show. Muhammad’s depiction
contrasts greatly with that of Ya‘qub Shahin, along with other Palestinians in the show, whose
performances included various Palestinian-specific numbers in addition to Levantine or other
greater Arab world ones. Unlike Muhammad, while Shahin articulated both pan-Arab and panLevantine identities on Arab Idol, he certainly was given more of a chance to represent Palestine
as well, a platform not openly afforded to Muhammad as a representative of Yemen. In fact,
Shahin’s participation showed how Palestine received a disproportionately high level of
visibility, a topic that will occupy the entire fifth chapter for further examination.

Jumhur and the shifting relevance of national identities on Arab Idol
While jumhur usually referred to the audience at large, presumably al-jumhur al-‘arabi, it
was also used to refer to a specific country’s residents (e.g., al-jumhur al-lubnani) on Arab Idol.
Such references reveal a third level of resonance to which Arab Idol simultaneously strove to
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While he was singing music that represented Yemen, in the pop realm this is associated with the Khaliji popular
music industry style.
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appeal: the national level. References to the audiences of a particular nation were also apparent
in moments such as when Ahlam told Saudi contestant Bandar Mugri to think about how he is
addressing and making a Saudi audience (al-jumhur al-sa‘udi) proud.22 A performance by
Moroccan contestant Kawthar Berrani prompted Nancy Ajram’s comment that despite her voice
being a bit off in her performance of the song “Wahashtini,” it was not in the least a disservice to
the Moroccan people (ahl al-maghrib).23
The stress on the nationality of contestants shifted in meaning and importance over the
course of Arab Idol’s four seasons; furthermore, it changed significantly from the previous
iteration of Superstar on the overtly political Future Television network, owned by former
Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri.24 In Superstar, contestants and audiences were actively
encouraged to be nationalistically competitive, with the flags of each country being displayed in
the opening credits of the show (Phillips 2012, 111). In Seasons One and Two of Arab Idol,
visual reminders of the contestants’ nations were omnipresent, with the names of contestants
displayed on screen alongside their countries’ names and national flags. At the same time, these
first two seasons featured contestants performing pan-Arab repertoire rather than tunes
representing their respective countries. After the unexpected fervor around Muhammad ‘Assaf’s
win at the end of Season Two, during which the audience flooded the stage with Palestinian
flags, the display of flags was briefly reconsidered in the following season. For example, in
Season Three, no flags were permitted in the studio, nor were they displayed on screen next to
the contestant’s name. This proved to be particularly important when the winner was Hazim
Sharif from Syria. At this point in Syria’s civil war in 2014, there existed two different Syrian
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References to the national were also apparent in judges’ discourse surrounding vocal idiom, style, and timbre, as
seen in Chapter Three.
23
Season Four, Episode 13.
24
See Chapter Two.
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flags; a display of one would have indicated the contestant’s affinity with or against the Syrian
regime. By Season Four, Arab Idol went further with eliminating markers of nationality,
removing the display of country names on screen next to the contestant’s name altogether.
At the same time, there was little room for doubt around which Arab nation a contestant
was representing in the more recent seasons, with the emcee always introducing a contestant
along with his or her country (“‘Ammar Muhammad from Yemen!” or “Ya‘qub Shahin from
Palestine!”). In the most recent season, national origin was made apparent in other means by
which the contestants represented their countries. Conspicuous national markers were evident in
dress, repertoire choice, and commentary by judges. Ya‘qub Shahin, the eventual Palestinian
winner of Season Four, performed a few numbers wearing a kuffiya, the checkered scarf that has
become a symbol of Palestinian nationalism and of the resistance movement against Israeli
occupation.25 ‘Ammar Muhammad, the Yemeni finalist in that season, occasionally sang while
wearing traditional Yemeni dress adorned with a jambia or dagger. Furthermore, as discussed in
Chapter Three, musical references to a country due to its association with a famous singer were
still common and seen as a matter of national pride. What was different in the latter Arab Idol
seasons was that national repertoire became a diversity ploy that was indexical of an Arabness at
large, as seen later in this chapter.
The limited ambiguity around what country a contestant represented undoubtedly
affected audience voting, encouraging fellow citizens to vote for them and leading to campaigns
by national phone companies promoting contestants from their country.26 The format obviously
favored larger nations, which explains why Egypt and Syria were always in the running.
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See Swedenburg 1990 for more on the kuffiya as Palestinian national signifier.
There is no rule, as in the Eurovision Song Contest, that one cannot vote for someone from their own country. In
fact, the situation is the opposite and has been more about national representation, particularly in earlier Arab Idol
(and Superstar) seasons. However, there seems to have been less of an emphasis on this in recent seasons.
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However, other identities have factored into the reasons for people voting for someone outside of
their country. For example, Ya‘qub Shahin, a Syriac Christian, garnered popularity as well as
votes from the Assyrian community in northern Iraq.27 Furthermore, audiences watching from
the diaspora were able to vote by submitting texts to an international number (See Chapter Two,
Table 2.3).
Jumhur was not linked to other collective imaginaries relevant to the region, such as
religious, specifically Muslim, ones. While other reality shows and television in general are
either influenced by Islamic values—another underpinning of pan-Arab ideology from the 1930s
as articulated by Michel ‘Aflaq and Salah al-Din Bitar—or reference Islam directly, Islamic or
other religious references never appeared on Arab Idol or went completely unacknowledged.
This might have to do with Lebanon’s role in popular cultural production and in Arab Idol, as the
(albeit decreasing) prominence of Christianity and religious-diverse stars in Lebanon might
regard religion as a moot point. Indeed, if anything, similar pan-Arab reality franchises in the
region such as Star Academy were hotly debated for their “un-Islamic” values (Kraidy 2010; see
also Chapter Two). Differences separate pan-Islamism (umma) and pan-Arabism, but despite
them, Islam is often a crucial element of Arabism (Abdul-Rahim 2005, 42). Another common
marker of a unifying Arab heritage—al-Andalus—was similarly not invoked on the show,
although it has been viewed in terms of looking for a shared history in the Arab world and, in
Syria, it is also linked to Ba‘athist ideas of secularism and pan-Arabism (Shannon 2015, 55).
Rather, as discussed in other contexts earlier in this dissertation, one of Arab Idol’s major
rallying points of Arabness to connect to al-jumhur al-‘arabi was the Arabic language.
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al-Jumhur al-lugha al-‘arabiyya: Arabic and linguistic hierarchies on Arab Idol
The Arabic language was a shared marker of Arabness on Arab Idol through which
contestants and producers spoke to al-jumhur al-‘arabi. While Arab Idol did not explicitly link
jumhur with speakers of the language, most songs on the show were indeed sung in Arabic,
although in varying dialects and literary Arabic, al-fusha. Songs were never sung in English or
French, and rare examples of songs performed in a different language on the live episodes were
in Kurdish. Audiences around the region were able to sing along with the lyrics, which was a
significant factor for a show that catered to so many countries; it is also a product of the ubiquity
of recognizable pan-Arab repertoire as discussed in Chapter Three. Furthermore, one of Future
Television’s demands for Arab Idol’s predecessor was that anyone with an Arab background
could participate in Superstar so long as they could speak Arabic fluently, and were familiar with
“Arab culture, values, and traditions” (Ghattas 2012, 123).
The importance of Arabic to the show was apparent in the way the judges gave intense
attention to the Arabic first and/or last names of the contestants. In one audition episode, the
judges immediately commented upon the last name, najm, of the contestant ‘Ali Najm, which
means “star” in Arabic: they remarked that hopefully he would be a star (inshallah ha-takun
najm) of the show. This pun showed how there was an implicit understanding that their viewers
would appreciate the word play because of their shared Arabic language, in addition to
expressing their hope that he would move forward and be successful in that round.28 In another
pre-recorded stage during which the contestants performed in teams, one of these groups featured
two female contestants with the first name Sahar. Judge Ahlam commented on the sihir
(“magic”) in their names and shared performance, going out of the way to point out a
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connotation of the linguistic roots of their shared name.29 In another example, the judges told a
contestant named Tawfiq, “bil-tawfiq” before he began his audition: a phrase that translates to
“good luck.”30 These examples demonstrate the importance of the Arabic language as a primary
marker of Arabness on the show.
A diversity of Arabic dialects and varieties of media Arabic on Arab Idol complicated the
notion of a pan-Arab imaginary, particularly in the realm of linguistic identity. A uniform Arab
linguistic ideology has pervaded media, such as state television and later satellite media, in the
form of linguistic unification and erasure of other dialects of Arabic (Schulthies 2015). Becky
Schulthies (2015) analyzes linguistic hierarchies and the evolution of corporate media’s
linguistic preferences in Arabic-language talent competition programming. For example, while a
speaker is considered “more Arab” the more her speech is reminiscent of classical Arabic in
intellectual and news media contexts, Arabic used on entertainment media outlets is of an
Egyptian-Lebanese urban dialect variant, one to which contestants familiar with other linguistic
registers must accommodate. These linguistic aspects of pan-Arab talent programming present
variations of what a linguistic Arabness constitutes. Schulthies attributes these linguistic
hierarchies to “social processes of capitalist-driven consumer marketing that draw forth contexts
and commodity aesthetics for expanding familiarity with transregional Arabic registers and
global languages” (Schulthies 2015, 63). In the process of fostering a regional pan-Arabic
character in programming, entertainment media tends to normalize the sub-regional Mashriqi
varieties of Arabic rather than the Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) that is used in news media,
and certainly above other regional varieties, such as those from North Africa or the Gulf.
Schulthies highlights tensions between the discourse of unity and diversity of participants and
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audiences of these shows, seeing these linguistic hierarchies as “cracks in…[the] Arab unity
façade” (Schulthies 2015, 65). Linguists and linguistic anthropologists have identified the
phenomenon of language and code-switching as salient complicators of Arabness on pan-Arab
talent shows (Attwa 2019; Schulthies 2015; see Introduction). This trend was evident in the
necessity of participants to learn or acquire Modern Standard or Mashriqi Arabic fluency. If a
contestant did not speak in one of these standards, the dialogue was accompanied by MSA
subtitles.
A similar instance of language hierarchy was apparent in the subtitling of North African
contestants’ speech on Arab Idol. In Season Four’s first episode, the show held auditions in
Morocco, where contestants spoke in Moroccan dialects and often also spoke in French, for
which subtitles were provided. Also, in the episode featuring auditions in Berlin, Germany in
Season Three, the dialogues of several contestants of Moroccan origin living in Germany were
presented with subtitles. In contrast, subtitles were rarely used for other Arabic speakers during
this season, even if the contestant was using a more rural dialect of Arabic, thereby othering only
the North African contestants in this way.31 Even though auditions took place in Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia, there was a low turnout of North African contestants on the show at large
as well.32 Most contestants still hailed from Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria, with a growing
number of contestants from the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula in the latter two seasons. While
Arab Idol featured North African stars as guest artists who sang their own songs, it was less
likely that the songs chosen for contestants were from this region.33 al-‘Arabiyya al-bayda, or
“White Arabic,” is a commonly used media register of Arabic employed on Lebanese satellite
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One exception to this rule was the subtitling of the dialogue of a Bahraini contestant in Season Three, Episode 4.
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, North Africa also has many of its own talent shows that cater to the region.
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Superstar as well as Arab Idol’s first season featured more North African contestants, up through the final stages.
However, this was not the case for the seasons that I primarily examine here: Seasons Two, Three, and Four.
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television. Bayda invokes the adjustment of native dialect speakers to something closer to alfusha. However, bayda is not always the most recognizable concept for those outside of
Lebanese broadcasting and advertising industries (Schulthies 2015, 61). On television, Lebanese
speakers are rarely required to perform such codeswitching; primarily North Africans must do
this.
One evening while I was in Beirut in February 2020, I watched an episode of the sports
program called Sada al-Mala‘ib (Echo of Stadiums), on the same network as Arab Idol, a show
that MBC’s website notes is one of their highest rated daily sports programs. Sports show it may
be, but the guest that night was the Algerian singer Souad Massi. The other guest was, from what
I gathered, a Real Madrid soccer superfan and an amateur singer. Massi performed some original
numbers, and then the program host took live questions. After some time, the host asked her if
she had a song that could be understood from the Muhit to the Khalij—in other words, something
not in the dialects in which she regularly sings. “Oh, fusha?” she asked. “Bayda,” he responded.
She seemed unsure of its exact meaning, mentioning that she sings in masriyya (Egyptian
dialect) and fusha, ultimately choosing a song with fusha lyrics. This is an example of the
dominance on Lebanese television for bayda, and perhaps the limited relevance of this
terminology outside Lebanese television, which includes Arab Idol.
Linguistic Arabness also becomes complicated at the edges of the Arabic-speaking zone.
Arabness is seen as a notion of class or caste in Arab countries along the Indian Ocean due to the
presence of non-Arabs (Limbert 2014). With the notion of the Arabian Peninsula as a source of
true Arabness, the context also becomes a racialized one rather than linguistic, with less concern
over who speaks Arabic (ibid. 590). When one is recognized as Arabic-speaking but not Arab,
questions of caste and lineage rise to the fore. This is also the case in Sudan, where linguistic
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Arabization policies have created an Arab cultural and racial supremacy, resulting in the othering
of non-Arab identities (Sharkey 2008).34
Since 2012, however, Arab Idol and The Voice have featured a wider range of contestants
who are not necessarily comfortable with Mashriqi Arabic (Schulthies 2015). A diversity of
dialects was also celebrated on the Arab Idol stage. On Arab Idol, contestants auditioning from
across the region were shown speaking with the judges or about themselves in their respective
dialects. While speaking in various dialects might have been a source of ridicule in earlier
seasons, this was normalized in Arab Idol’s latest seasons. Furthermore, songs were performed in
various dialects. Attwa (2019) regards the celebration of national dialects and linguistic
differences on The Voice (Ahla Sawt) as a way of showing Arabness (13).Yet in Arab Idol’s
second season, the predominance of Mashriqi Arabic was still apparent in the speech of the
majority of judges and hosts, and visible even in the three final contestants, who were from
Palestine, Egypt, and Syria. Their musical selections were largely in Mashriqi dialects as well,
seemingly because those were the dialects they already spoke and understood.

Around the Arab world: The auditions stage and national diversity
In addition to the expansion of featured dialects, Arab Idol moved to identify national
origins as indexical of the diverse Arabness it promoted in its later seasons. A celebration of
contestants’ national diversity took place in the early episodes of Arab Idol, which would feature
snapshots of the auditions held across the Arab world and its diaspora, and would be pre-

34
Another related blanket term or concept worth mentioning in passing is Arabization (ta‘rib),which is used to refer
to the spread of Arabic in the sense of a linguistic Arabization over time (Hammond 2017a), and also to political
practices of prioritizing Arabic as the primary language and cultural system, such as in Sudan (Sharkey 2008).
However, it is not directly relevant to my work. See also Lavin 2017 for a discussion of issues of hierarchies of Arab
identity and music in Sudan.
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recorded months before they aired on primetime television. On these episodes featuring a larger
pool of contestants, the audience witnessed much more national and linguistic diversity than in
the eventual live episodes, where the number of participants was whittled down considerably.
Indeed, one express purpose of these early episodes was to take the audience on a tour (jawla)
around the Arab world to show how extensive and diverse the region is. In Season Three, the
emcee Ahmad Fahmy stressed the diversity of the Arab world as he narrated the visits to various
cities, accompanied by visual imagery to celebrate and mark this great regional span. In this
season, the auditions took place in twelve countries, including Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates
(Dubai), Algeria, Iraq (Erbil), Egypt (Cairo and Alexandria), Morocco (Casablanca), Bahrain,
Palestine (Ramallah), as well as in two European cities, Berlin and Paris. Auditions in Season
Four also took place in Turkey for the first time in order to feature the millions of Syrian
refugees living there.

Figure 4.1 Screenshot from a Season Three episode during Arab Idol’s jawla (tour) through the
Arab world.
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During the Egyptian auditions, Fahmy made ample reference to Egypt’s ancient history,
with the pyramids figuring as a backdrop to the seated judges in the studio. When the auditions
came to Algeria, he referred to the country (balad) as the balad al-rai, stereotypically coding a
popular Algerian genre of music as synonymous with the country. Subsequent clips of the
history of rai music were displayed in the introduction to the country. From the auditions in these
twelve countries, 80 contestants were chosen by the panel of judges from a pool of thousands
that was understandably more diverse. In the second stage of the competition contestants who
had been chosen to travel to Beirut performed as fourteen teams of either all-male or all-female
contestants (See Table 4.2). The contestants were primarily from Egypt and Lebanon, with fewer
representatives of Morocco, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates,
Tunisia, Algeria, Libya, and Palestine. By the time more contestants were eliminated by the
judges in these pre-recorded elimination stages, the semi-finalist pool had already been reduced
to contestants primarily from the Levant and Egypt: this occurred before viewers had a chance to
vote on live episodes. This shows a production, rather than voter, bias, as the pool from which
voters could began to vote was already limited. Contestants’ national diversity was celebrated on
the show, albeit in minimal ways so as not to have national competition figure heavily into the
contest, and in a way to index Arabness.

Linguistic and ethnic diversity as Arabness
Arab Idol also attempted to celebrate linguistic and ethnic diversity with the rare
showcasing of other languages or of non-native speakers singing in Arabic. Kurdish contestant
Parwas Husain made headlines when she performed on a live episode of Season Two singing the
Iraqi Arabic song “Fawg al-Nakhil,” but in Kurdish. She was introduced on screen as a
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representative of “Iraqi Kurdistan.” Notably, the Emirati judge Ahlam noted she should have
been introduced as Iraqi, a comment for which she received both praise and criticism online, and
she reviewed the Kurdish performance negatively. In a Season Three audition in Erbil, Iraq,
people were interviewed saying that they loved Parwas, singing songs that the Kurdish contestant
performed during Season Two for the cameras. Another contestant singing in Kurdish, ‘Ammar
al-Kufi, made it much further in Season Three. During his audition, the judges attempted to say a
phrase or two in Kurdish to express their affirmative votes for the contestant that moved him
onto the next round. He would go on to rank fifth by the end of the season. In one of his
voiceovers during the aforementioned jawla of the Arab world, the emcee noted that the show
included languages from the Arab world other than Arabic, such as Kurdish, Assyrian, and
Turkish. However, other than these two Kurdish contestants, contestants speaking or singing in
other languages did not make it past the first audition round.35 The importance of communicating
and performing in Arabic has remained de rigueur on the show.
Despite the region’s sizable non-Arab communities, Arab Idol rarely featured their
members on the show, and certainly not past the initial auditions, with Arabness failing to
include Indian or Afro-Arabness, for instance. Migrant workers from South Asian, East Asian,
and African countries have held their own non-commercial iteration of an Idols-like competition
in one of Dubai’s worker accommodations, called Champ of the Camp. Its contestants sang
songs in a variety of languages, largely taken from Bollywood films, and participated in music
trivia segments. The show was the subject of a documentary by the Lebanese filmmaker
Mahmoud Kabbour, who lives in the United Arab Emirates.36 One rare example of South Asian
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Furthermore, while there have been several notable Kurdish contestants on Arab Idol, Fremantle Media licensed
one season of Kurd Idol to Kurd Sat, which featured Kurdish contestants from Arab majority nations and others.
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contestants being featured on Arab Idol was during the auditions phase in Bahrain (Season
Three). In the episode, a pair of Indian sisters, Karishma and Prateeka Hemanathan, performed
their rendition of a popular song in Arabic while accompanying themselves on ‘ud and tabla.
They sang the Fairouz tune, “Sa’aluni al-Nas.” After their performance, the judge Hassan alShafi‘i told the sisters in English that the judges were proud of them but did not think they would
make it through to the next stage; they did not.
Also, during the third season’s auditions in Dubai, a Japanese woman who likely had
“Western” vocal training, Nao Koyasu, auditioned singing another Fairouz song with a simple
melody, “‘Atini al-Nay.”37 She progressed to the group round in Beirut, in which she, along with
four other female contestants, performed “Sa’aluni al-Nas” together—all dressed in Fairouz
movie character costumes. While Koyasu was successful in her audition, she did not make it past
the group round, failing to make it to a stage where viewers’ votes came into play. She was
thanked by the judges in English “for appreciating our culture, singing better than other Arabs.”38
In this instance and in the case of the Indian sisters, it seemed the auditions were included in the
edited episodes for added entertainment value and to emphasize the diversity that the show
claimed to feature. In neither case were the contestants featured because of their promise to
advance further in the competition. These instances of non-native speakers of Arabic performing
in Arabic might also have taken a page from the playbook of the MBC show Arabs Got Talent
and the example of the American vocalist Jennifer Grout, who was a contestant in 2013; a clip of
her singing in Arabic while playing the ‘ud made international headlines and went viral in the
region and across the world.39 Arab Idol’s non-Arab contestants didn’t make nearly as much of a
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YouTube clip of this audition: https://youtu.be/yT5aiNz2_tU
Season Three, Episode 5.
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Clip of Jenni Grout’s first performance on Arabs Got Talent: https://youtu.be/wY-E3w-nIB4
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splash, yet such instances have clearly provided good promotional material for the shows when
their clips went viral on social media. Although the diversity presented in the audition stage
diminished as each season progressed, I argue that this emphasis on diversity, whether by
featuring other languages or non-native speakers attempting to sing in Arabic, is crucial to how
Arab Idol framed Arabness on the show.

Table 4.2: Stages of the Arab Idol competition
Location

Elimination criteria

Examples

Stage One:
Auditions

Filmed in various
cities; contestants
perform for panel of
judges

Judges determine
which contestants
move forward

Stage Two: Group
Stages

Filmed in Beirut MBC
studios; groups of
contestants perform
for panel of judges
Beirut MBC studios
for a live audience

Judges determine
which contestants
move forward

Karishma and
Prateeka
Hemanathan
(Bahrain) did not
pass this stage
Nao Koyasu
(United Arab
Emirates) did not
pass this stage
Parwas Hussain
(Iraqi Kurdistan)
made it to this
stage

Stage Three: Live
Episodes

Voters determine
elimination of 1-2
contestants per
episode; Contestants
with lowest number of
votes are eliminated

War, shared struggles, and Arabs as one people
In these final sections, I return to examples where Arab Idol explicitly resorted to
connecting al-jumhur al-‘arabi with al-watan al-‘arabi at large above all else, although not
always successfully. In its latter two seasons, Arab Idol made limited if any references to the
various geopolitical conflicts or events that have either occurred in real time or in recent
memory. Generically nationalist songs included a group rendition of the song “Mawtini” (My
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nation), performed by the twenty-five contestants who made it to the live rounds in Season Four,
with the purpose of conveying an underlying shared pan-Arabness rather than a reference to
specific countries or their tribulations.40 One of the rare references to a current event was when
the first live episode of Season Four coincided with Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s retakeover of Aleppo in December 2016. It was clear that it was impossible to ignore the headlines
during this primetime broadcast. Without getting into much detail, the judges each proclaimed
that they were thinking of the people of Syria. Yet this was no deeper than luminaries at a 2022
entertainment awards show saying, “Prayers for Ukraine.” This non-specificity is significant, as
political valences were baked into Superstar, particularly when it came to Lebanese or Syrian
politics. That such limited references were made to politics unfolding in real time shows how
much the overt association of Idols with politics has changed. A couple months later in the
season, in February 2017, the finale song was “Mal‘una al-Hurub” (Cursed are the wars), an
emotional song discussed at the top of the chapter that was meant to be relatable to all viewers
tuning in. With “Cursed are the wars,” the show aimed to comment on an aspect that is seen as
“shared” throughout the Arab world—war and displacement—without commenting on specific
scenarios. Indeed, that would have been an awkward position for the show to take, as Saudi
Arabia, the country financing Arab Idol and its songwriters, MBC, and a large part of the
entertainment industry, is directly responsible for many regional catastrophes, most recently its
war in Yemen. It made the appearance of a Yemeni contestant among the top three finalists all
the more striking. Decisions to avoid the discussion of specific regional conflicts were likely
linked to the politics of the financial backing of the show, in addition to the related commercial
motivations.41

40
41

Season Four: “Mawtini”: https://youtu.be/OetXNmiNt_A
See also Chapter Two.
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As discussed in Chapter Two, one early motivator for the Saudi financial backers to
propagate generic Arab unity was likely the need to dissuade references to the politics of the
2011 Arab uprisings. Saudi Arabia is an influential political actor in the region, and in the
context of the Arab uprisings, Saudi foreign policy was motivated largely by the need to
maintain regional monarchies in order to secure its own regime, as well as its competitive
dynamic with Iran (Ennis & Momani 2013, 1128). In this sense, containment of uprisings was
generally the Saudi modus operandi in the context of the period when Arab Idol first began its
run. Saudi Arabia’s pull in the region is also manifested through its founding positions and
alliances in organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Arab League, not
to mention its economic influence as a member of OPEC (Ennis & Momani 2013, 1133). Saudi
Arabia has also been a “mediator” of regional politics since the early 1970s, supporting likeminded state policies and challenging forces aligned with Iran, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon,
Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain (Ennis & Momani 2013, 1133). Saudi Arabia’s domestic security and
resources interests are not only reflected in their political actions, but Saudi influence can easily
extend to culture and the media. The precedent set by Saudi Arabia above helps explain how, as
investors of MBC and thereby Arab Idol, it was in their interests not to allow specific references
related to the uprisings to appear on the show. Furthermore, the popularity of Arab Idol’s newly
minted stars was also exploited by other regimes in order to counter uprisings in their respective
countries. The runner-up of Arab Idol’s first season, Moroccan contestant Dounia Batma,
became a spokesperson for King Mohammed VI soon after gaining fame on the talent show,
speaking on state television and appearing on posters and state media after an endorsement by
Morocco’s largest telecom provider, Maroc Telecom (Errazzouki and Kareem 2013).
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Throughout Arab Idol’s seasons and iterations, one constant was the open invitation to
statesmen or other political dignitaries to attend the live show. This figured most prominently in
the finale episodes of different seasons. With two Palestinians among the final three in Season
Four, Palestinian political representation was inevitable. Palestinian president Mahmud ‘Abbas
met with the three finalists, Palestinians Ya‘qub Shahin and Amir Dandan, and Yemeni ‘Ammar
Muhammad, in the week leading up to the season finale. The three final contestants also met
with the Yemeni ambassador to Lebanon, ‘Abdullah al-Duais. Edited clips of both meetings
were aired during the live finale. Al-Duais was also in the audience during this live finale, along
with Palestinian dignitaries.
The inclusion of these politicians might have been used to complicate the shared unity
that typically defines the Arabness on Arab Idol by implying a rivalry of interests in having their
own countries’ “candidates” win. However, I suggest that the lack of political input and the
diplomatic discourse accompanying their appearances coalesced in yet another example of the
show presenting a semblance of shared Arabness. In the edited video clip mentioned above,
Amir Dandan, one of the three finalists, was seated with his two fellow contestants and the
Yemeni ambassador al-Duais. At one point in their conversation, he responded to comments by
the ambassador, saying, “We are one people, one country, and we are all brothers” (Ihna sha‘b
wahad, wa balad wahad, wa ihna kulna ikhwan ma‘ ba‘d). The “we” could be referring to the
four of them in the room, but it seemed to implicate all Arabs, including viewers. The statesmen
in these clips, therefore, were portrayed as representatives of a united Arab world, rather than
brought in to foment competition between countries. In an earlier live episode but in a similar
diplomatic context following one of his live performances, ‘Ammar Muhammad was referred to
by the judges as the Yemeni cultural ambassador, safir al-thaqafa al-yamani, a term possibly
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highlighting the diplomatic yet solely cultural association of the nations mentioned on the
show.42

Unexpected politics on the Arab Idol stage
Inevitably, politics reached the Arab Idol stage, albeit not at the production’s behest. In
the Season Two finale, a rush of people came onto the main stage with national flags and other
paraphernalia when Palestinian Muhammad ‘Assaf won. The pandemonium included the display
of a very large Kurdish flag by a woman, featuring prominently in front of the cameras during
this live broadcast. While Arab Idol’s inclusion of a Kurdish performance by Parwas Hussain
earlier in the season seemed to capitalize on the presentation of a Kurdish contestant to
demonstrate the diversity of the Arab world, this impromptu demonstration of pride in Kurdish
ethnicity and nationality seemed to catch the producers off guard. Indeed, Hussain had received
negative comments by judge Ahlam surrounding the show’s depiction of her as being from
“Kurdistan.” Ahlam had remarked, “I'm against when Parwas is written saying she is from
Kurdistan, because Kurdistan is part of Iraq and from today, I want your [pointing at Parwas]
name to be Parwas from Iraq and not from Kurdistan” (al-Kuttab 2013). In contrast to her
commentary, which can be seen as channeling the motivations of larger powers at play, I argue
that the Kurdish flag display in the final moments of the Arab Idol finale revealed how
contestants and audience members were able to express unexpected sentiments that contradicted
the show’s pan-Arab ideological underpinning.
At separate points in the same season, a couple of examples of unexpected politicaloriented dynamics took centerstage during the performances of two Syrian contestants. Syrian

42

Season Four, Episode 18.
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contestant Farah Yusif gave an emotional performance in which she sang a mawwal followed by
a song, collectively denoted on screen and social media as al-qudud al-halabiyya, songs from
Aleppo.43 There were various live shots of both the judges and the audience reacting
emotionally, particularly to her improvised lyrics of “Darab Halab” referencing Aleppo (Halab)
and Damascus (al-Sham): Darab Halab wa darab al-Sham (The path to Aleppo/Damascus). At
another moment, the cameras captured Yusif’s mother crying as her daughter sang the lyric, wa
lak haj tibki wa tanuhi… lak bukra rah niji (Stop crying and wailing... tomorrow we will return).
After becoming quite moved by her heartfelt performance, the judges were visibly and audibly
reluctant to espouse rhetoric with empty references to the entire Arab world to fit the framework
of the show’s incentives. For instance, judge Nancy Ajram emotionally addressed Yusif,
exclaiming, Allah ‘ala Halab, allah ‘ala al-sham, wa Allah yahmi….kil Suriya (God protect
Aleppo, Damascus, and all of Syria). However, it did not take long for the other Lebanese judge,
Ragheb Alama, to interject saying, “And [God protect] all of the Arab world,” after which Ajram
adjusted and repeated her statement to include Alama’s words. Ajram then went on to make an
unrelated and generic comment about how beautiful Yusif looked and sounded, as if to cover up
for contributing to the emotional scenario that the show usually tries to avoid. Yet the audience’s
reaction had been stronger after Ajram’s earnest commentary in reference to Syria. When Alama
interjected about the Arab world and Ajram restated her blessing, their comments were barely
audible under the cheering for Ajram’s initial comment, genuinely felt by the crowd.
Syrian contestant Abdul Karim Hamdan also had a viral moment in Season Two when he
performed a mawwal he had composed for the occasion, about the bloodshed in his hometown of
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Clip of Farah Yusif singing “Habib ‘Ala Dunya”—“Darab Halab”—“Ya Mayila ‘Al-Ghusun” https://youtu.be/EsuHOGwTXs
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Aleppo, “Halab, ya Nab‘ min al-Alam” (Aleppo, wellspring of pain).44 The YouTube clip of this
performance immediately went viral in April 2013, receiving more than 2.3 million hits in less
than three days, making it one of the platform’s most-watched videos of the week as Syrian
viewers around the world identified with his agony.45 Following his performance, the judges and
audiences were similarly if not more moved than with Farah Yusif’s performance, with Ragheb
Alama calling Hamdan an “ambassador of peace and love” and an ambassador for his country.46
Again, judges used diplomatic and generic terms so as not to highlight the specifics of the
situation too closely. This is yet another example of specific political contexts being
acknowledged, yet clearly going against the grain of the neutral “shared” stance that the show
assumed in its most recent seasons.

Conclusions
Arab Idol went out of its way to make the case to its viewers that Arabness goes hand in
hand with the program’s essence and in order to speak to al-jumhur al-‘arabi. I have also
suggested that political implications accompanied the issues the show chose to address, due to
the Saudi ownership of the show and MBC networks. Arab Idol also prioritized the promotion of
certain subregional representations, particularly those of the Levant and the Gulf, therefore
aiming for limited references to specific countries and thereby their politics. It mainly tried to
avoid national controversies by portraying national diversity as indexical of a larger Arabness. I
have argued that references to other countries would have been seen as leading audience
sentiment in unpredictable ways in the context of salient political scenarios playing out in real
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https://youtu.be/TYQo5Kmu4wQ
https://english.alarabiya.net/life-style/entertainment/2013/04/17/Arab-Idol-contestant-dedicates-his-voice-toSyria-ranks-sixth-on-YouTube
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Al-Arabiyya article.
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time. As the next chapter will examine, Palestine was the exception to this rule, and that despite
its charged political history, performing Palestinian music was in fact seen as a neutral rallying
point in Arab Idol’s imagination of Arabness.
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Chapter Five: Palestine as a Cornerstone of Arabness on Arab Idol
In the homestretch of the Season Four finale of Arab Idol comes the moment that
everyone has been waiting for. Both viewers at home and the studio audience in Beirut have just
witnessed almost two hours of varied acts, ranging from narrated video montages about the
remaining finalists, rousing guest artist performances, emotional group performances featuring
previously eliminated contestants,1 and final performances by the remaining top three. During
this time, audiences across the Arab world have submitted their votes for their choice of “Arab
Idol” by texting their phone providers. The votes are all in, and the moment has finally come, the
lahzat al-fawz, for the announcement of the winner. Music associated with the franchise’s tensest
moments begins to play as the three finalists, Ya‘qub Shahin, ‘Ammar Muhammad, and Amir
Dandan, take the stage together.2 The three young men clasp hands as they stand side by side,
their faces scrunched in anticipation. The in-studio audience is restless as well. Onscreen,
contingents of fans for each contestant are shown live in their respective locations, also
anticipating the results as they watch the live studio footage themselves. Two of these locations
are Palestinian cities: Majd al-Krum, Dandan’s hometown in the Galilee region in the presentday state of Israel; and Bethlehem, in the West Bank, home to Shahin. The emcee Ahmad Fahmy
acknowledges the audiences of these cities by name, as well as the fanbase of Muhammad, the
Yemeni finalist. He goes on to acknowledge all viewers in their homes across the Arab world
(kul al-buyut fi al-‘alam al-‘arabi), garnering some fidgety yet enthusiastic cheers from the
audience. Fahmy plays up the audience, asking them who they think might be the season’s Idol.
Will it be Ya‘qub, Amir, or ‘Ammar?

1
2

One song was “Mal‘una al-Hurub” discussed in Chapter 4.
Clip of this final moment of Season 4’s finale: https://youtu.be/sG0rBbPsveE
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Finally, as the audience enthusiasm dies down, he announces, “…and the winner [alfa’iz]…”—and here the background music cuts out, with near silence from the audience, aside
from the stray exclamation of support— “…of Arab Idol Season Four”—some time passes again
as the audience energy steps up once again— “…is … YA‘QUB SHAHIN FROM
PALESTINE!” Fahmy’s announcement in Arabic, which has a ring and rhyme to it—Ya‘qub
Shahin min Filastin—is drowned out by the studio’s eruption into cheers. Upon hearing the
announcement, Shahin cups his face in his hands, both in relief and with great emotion. Sparklers
go off and confetti begins streaming; supporters flood onto the stage to congratulate Shahin. The
livestream of Shahin’s fans in Bethlehem is displayed both in the studio and on the television
screen as they are shown bursting into celebration, alongside footage of the festivities in the
Beirut studio (See Fig. 5.1). Someone gives Shahin a Palestinian flag to display, and Dandan,
who is also Palestinian, receives a flag to flaunt as well. It takes another several minutes for the
live studio musicians to finally get a chance to play again amidst the mayhem. They warm up the
stage with a vamp that hints at the beginning of a dabke, or folk line dance, musical number.
Shahin prepares to sing his final victory number, flanked by Palestinian flags and compatriots.
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Figure 5.1: Screen capture of the “winning moment” (lahzat al-fawz) of Season Four. A smaller
screen depicts a live contingent of fans outdoors in Bethlehem (Arabic text: mubashiratan min
Bayt Laham [live from Bethlehem]).3
This celebratory scene echoes the win of Palestinian singer Muhammad ‘Assaf in Arab
Idol’s Season Two, outlined at the beginning of this dissertation, when his win took on a
semblance of political victory. Scenes of audiences in Palestine anticipating and celebrating the
results alongside ecstatic pandemonium in the MBC studios had similarly been broadcast for
viewers that year. The media reported extensively on the widespread celebrations that followed
around the globe.4
In the previous chapter, I examined how contestants voiced Arabness in the context of
language and subregional identification. In this chapter, I examine how Arab Idol recognized one

3
4

Screen capture from YouTube video: https://youtu.be/sG0rBbPsveE

https://www.aljazeera.net/news/cultureandart/2017/2/26/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%81%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B7
%D9%8A%D9%86%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D8%B9%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%87%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%85%D8%AD%D8%A8%D9%88%D8%A8%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8;
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/26/palestinians-in-raptures-as-yaqoub-shaheen-wins-arab-idol-tvcontest
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specific nation or national imaginary as a source of Arabness: Palestine. Particularly in Seasons
Three and Four, I argue that the notion of solidarity with and pride in Palestine was not only a
primary cornerstone of Arabness on Arab Idol but goes hand in hand with some of the show’s
most successful and memorable moments. I argue that Arab Idol found a noncontroversial place
to focus positive shared sentiment in the topic of Palestine. I also argue that its emphasis on
Palestine provides an exception to the rule developed in the previous chapter: namely, that Arab
Idol tended to shy away from nation-specificity in its efforts to speak to a pan-Arab audience. As
seen with contestants from Yemen and Syria, Arab Idol avoided tangible politics by glossing
over the wars and tragedies unfolding in their countries despite their urgency in real time. In
contrast, I show how Palestine was promoted on Arab Idol as the ard al-‘uruba (the land of
Arabness). Despite its capitalization on solidarity with Palestine in the face of Israeli occupation,
Arab Idol’s focus on Palestine was often vague from a political standpoint, with no mention of
Israel ever coming up on the show, for instance. Palestine’s significance on the show does not
necessarily represent concrete policies that Arab countries themselves carry out, although it does
represent the rhetorical stance of many Arab or Muslim countries: support for Palestinian
autonomy, and solidarity with the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination. Such a
stance has its precedent in pan-Arab (and pan-Islamic) policies throughout the twentieth century,
with Palestine being front and center of the pan-Arab movement in the middle of the twentieth
century.
Palestinian self-determination has been deeply ingrained in twentieth and twenty-first
century Arab popular discourse. This chapter begins with an overview of how this has been
reflected in Arab song throughout the twentieth century until the present. This leads to an
examination of Palestine as it appeared on the Idols franchise’s Arab iterations. I argue that Arab
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Idol banked on the political connotations of Palestine and its musical precedents to speak to all
Arabs, al-jumhur al-‘arabi. I also argue that the rise of Muhammad ‘Assaf in 2013 was a pivotal
moment that caused Arab Idol to focus more on Palestine, and even to pave the way for the win
of Ya‘qub Shahin two seasons later. The phenomenon of Muhammad ‘Assaf was a success story
that baked Palestine into the show in its subsequent seasons more so than it had ever been
included before. Finally, I analyze examples, particularly from Seasons Three and Four, in which
Palestine was celebrated without any hesitation, unlike any other country mentioned on the
show. I analyze the performances of Palestinian contestants who voiced Arabness through the
specific evocation of Palestine and performed music that exemplified this specific articulation of
Arabness. That Arab Idol encouraged explicit pride in Palestinian contestants and politics while
Yemeni or Syrian contestants were not spotlighted for their national backgrounds or
sociopolitical struggles represents what the network considered to be a safe, palatable, and
widespread “identity” to exploit, and what was not. Along with Chapter Four, this chapter argues
that the show’s aim was to promote contestants that spoke to a pan-Arab audience, showing yet
another way that Arabness was imagined by its producers: in this case, through the issue of
Palestine.

Palestine in Arab popular music
Palestine has been central to Arab discourse following the expulsion of Palestinians from
Israeli cities and the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, marking what was known for
Arabs as the Nakba, meaning “catastrophe” (Boulos 2013, 54). The Palestinian cause has
remained of broad significance to the larger Arab world. It has even resonated on a regional level
beyond the Arab-majority states, as Turkey and Iran have tried to re-frame the Palestine question
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as a human rights or larger Middle Eastern or Islamic concern (Monier 2014, 429). Similarly in
the larger Islamic context, Pakistan does not allow Israeli passport holders within its borders. Yet
the importance of Palestine has been most obviously linked with the pan-Arab movement in the
1950s and 1960s, particularly with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Arab socialism and anticolonial
movement.5
Reflected in cultural production, there has been a long history of pro-Palestinian song in
the trajectory of twentieth-century Arab popular music. During this period, some of the most
famous pan-Arab singers of the region performed songs in support of Palestine, or were vocal in
their support. Many of these songs were released in direct response to political contexts. In the
years following the 1948 Nakba, regional stars such as the Lebanese singer Najah Salam, Syrian
singer, composer, and ‘ud player Farid al-Atrash, and Egyptian singer and composer Muhammad
‘Abd al-Wahab responded through song (Massad 2005, 177).6 With Nasser’s rise to power and
popularity, songs about Palestine fit into a larger genre of nationalist pan-Arab thematic
material.7 Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and Egypt’s socialist anticolonialist approach, under which Nasser claimed that Arab countries’ forces would help retake
Palestinian territories from Israel, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Wahab became the leading composer of
pan-Arab nationalist music that addressed this claim. He performed his own songs, and his
compositions were also performed by various leading singers from across the region (McDonald
2013, 72). Interestingly, this roster of singers rarely included singers from Palestine. In fact, a
striking aspect is that while many of these pan-Arab songs were about Palestine, the canons of
Arab nationalist song and Arab popular music have not included famous Palestinian singers.

5

See also: Introduction.
‘Abd al-Wahab’s song ‘‘Filastin’’ (1949) is one example: https://youtu.be/ZIuqEuJmaxI
7
This Nasserist pan-Arab repertoire included watani (national) songs (Abdelmoez 2020).
6
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‘Abd al-Wahab’s song “Sawt al-Jamahir” (Voice of the masses, 1963) was one of several songs
about Arab unity and was one that was particularly explicit in linking the Nakba and the
liberation of Palestine to pan-Arab consciousness (Massad 2005, 180).8 In this song and others
that came out at the height of pan-Arab sentiment, Nasser was seen as the leader of the march to
Palestine, a posture he maintained until the humiliating defeat of Egypt and its allies by Israel in
1967 (Massad 2005, 181). Palestine’s liberation was touted as a collective Arab responsibility
(McDonald 2013, 72). Another of ‘Abd al-Wahab’s songs “Al-Watan al-Akbar” (the greatest
[Arab] nation) was released on television in 1960 and featured prominent Egyptian singers ‘Abd
al-Halim Hafiz, Fayda Kamil, Shadia, Najat al-Saghira, and Warda, and the Lebanese singer
Sabah.9 “Al-Watan al-Akbar” was commissioned by the Egyptian government in celebration of
the laying of the first stone of the Aswan Dam in Egypt (Abdelmoez 2020, 303).10 This highly
staged video, featured music in a military musical style typical of the era’s and composer’s
nationalist songs, and included a double choir of men and women. It also included a larger cast
of people wearing the attire of various countries of the Arab world, holding flags of those
countries as the solo star performers vaguely referenced these countries in the context of a larger
Arab nation. In the final verse of this eleven-minute song, with lyrics penned by the poet Ahmad
Shafiq Kamal, ‘Abd al-Halim Hafiz sang about Palestine. In the lyric hankammilak huriyyatak
(We will fulfill your freedom), the “we” refers to the Arab nation/al-watan al-‘arabi, again
hinting at the collective responsibility of the Arab nation to Palestine to which Nasser would
allude. McDonald (2013) writes, “By sheer media presence and repetition, ‘Abd al-Wahab’s
nationalist songs were to have a substantial social impact across the region” (76). Palestinian

8

‘Abd al-Wahab’s “Sawt al-Jamahir” (1963): https://youtu.be/qO88wln8nYE
‘Abd al-Wahab’s: “Al-Watan al-Akbar” (1960): https://youtu.be/4m_15G4-ics
10
See also McDonald (2013)’s treatment of this song (73).
9
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alignment with Egyptian values was seen as a pathway to repatriation, and therefore Palestinians
were in support of Nasser’s movement.
Following the humiliating defeat (Naksa) of Nasser and the Arab armies in the Six Day
War in 1967, several songs still circulated on radio in support of Palestine. One by Umm
Kulthum, “Asbaha ‘Indi al-Aan Bunduqiyya” (I now have a rifle, 1969), is a musical setting of a
poem by the Syrian poet Nizar Qabbani and was dedicated to the Palestinian cause (Massad
2005, 185).11 With music also composed by ‘Abd al-Wahab, the song is bombastic in a European
march style, as are many of the patriotic and Palestine-centered songs of this era. The final line
of the poem paints a very militaristic picture: Ila Filastin tariq wahad/yamurr min fawhat albunduqiyya (There is only one path to Palestine/by going through the muzzle of the rifle). Umm
Kulthum sings this while backed by a male choir and percussive cymbals in a full-force
orchestral climax that echoes the military theme. In the same year, Egyptian satirical singer
Shaykh Imam released “Ya Falastiniya,” with lyrics by Ahmad Fu‘ad Nagm, featuring themes of
sympathy and solidarity with Palestine (Massad 2005, 187). Shaykh Imam’s songs were a
welcome voice in the devastation of the defeat and Shaykh Imam was seen as a foundational
figure for the Palestinian resistance movement (McDonald 2013).
A common theme in these pan-Arab nationalist tunes following the defeat of 1967 were
lamentations for the loss for Palestine as much as a celebration of Palestine (Massad 2005, 177).
Jerusalem in particular was often a symbol for loss, both of life and place, as well as of the idea
of a unified Arab world (Stone 2008a, 155). These themes were particularly evident in songs by
the Lebanese Rahbani brothers for Fairouz (Stone 2008a, 155). The years following 1967 saw an
outpouring of creativity in the arts in Lebanon, particularly in theater (Stone 2008b). The
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“Asbaha ‘Indi al-Aan Bunduqiyya” performed by Umm Kulthum: https://youtu.be/3VZXnjZQa-4
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Rahbanis, also famous for their musical theater, produced a work called Jibal al-Suwwan
(Mountains of flint), about life under Israeli occupation, starring Fairouz (Massad 2005, 185).
Fairouz’s songs for Palestine were arguably listened to the most (Massad 2005, 185). One of her
most famous songs about Jerusalem was “Zahrat al-Mida’in” (Flower of the cities)12, with lyrics
and music by the Rahbani brothers.13 The timing of Fairouz’s first performance of it—a mere
two months after the Nakba—and its subsequent inclusion in the prelude of the Lebanese film
Safar Barlak (Exile) contributed to it becoming one of the most popular songs of the time (Stone
2008a, 158). Stone suggests that this song first introduced Fairouz to Arab listeners outside of
Lebanon in a significant way, as the film was screened extensively in other countries, and the
song was played constantly on the radio (Stone 2008a, 158). It featured references to the
multifaith importance of Jerusalem, musically enhanced with a march-like accompaniment.
Fairouz also released an album for Palestine in this era that included the song “Zahrat alMida’in,” Jerusalem in My Heart/al-Quds fi al-Bal (1972; Habib 2005, 220).14 What is also
significant here is that Fairouz likely became a pan-Arab icon in large part due to her songs
about Palestine.
Also following this defeat, factions of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, such as
Fatah and groups associated with Palestinian armed resistance movements, moved their bases to
Lebanon. This new increased Palestinian presence in Lebanon was a primary impetus for the
beginnings of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990). Support for the Palestinian cause came from
leftist and pan-Arabist Muslim groups, while Lebanese forces and significant factions in the
country such as the Christian Phalange party sided against them. With the move of the PLO to
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https://youtu.be/XryCNk6q4KM.
Bahgat, Hossam. 2000. “Songs of the Intifada.” Cairo Times.
http://www.cairotimes.com/content/archiv04/resmusic.html. Vol. 4, 38. Nov. 30-Dec. 6, 2000.
14
Literally, “Jerusalem on my mind”.
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190

Lebanon, coupled with the number of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon, both then and in
the aftermath of the Lebanese Civil War, Palestinian cultural production was not seen in a
positive light in Lebanon. Violent acts against Palestinian refugees, such as the infamous
massacres of the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps in 1982, marked turning points in Lebanese—
and Arab—history. That Arab Idol, whose studios are in Lebanon, featured such explicit support
for Palestine and Palestinian music in the 2010s without controversy is remarkable given this
dark history. The performance of Palestinian resistance songs onstage in Beirut, kuffiya and all,
was a stark change from the possibility of public performance of Palestinianness on stages in the
preceding decades. Granted, these wins were more in the symbolic realm, as politically the
assimilation of Palestinian refugees decades later into societies such as Lebanon is fraught with
issues.
Another major moment in Palestinian and Arab consciousness is what is known as the
First Intifada (1987-1993), or Palestinian uprising. Spontaneous uprisings began in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip and continued until agreements were made between the Palestinian
Liberation Organization and the Israeli government, also known as the Oslo Accords (Pappé
2011; Naser-Najjab 2020). The First Intifada is remembered by residents of Gaza and the West
Bank as the first collective mobilization against the Israeli occupation (Naser-Najjab 2020).
During this period, Palestinian resistance became more associated with popular civil
disobedience rather than with the freedom fighters of the previous decade (Karkabi 2018, 176).
One of the most popular Arab songs in support of Palestinians during the First Intifada came
from Lebanese popular singer Julia Boutros (Massad 2005, 193). She released the song “Wayn
al-Milayin” (Where are the millions/masses? 1987) whose lyrics begin, Wayn al-milayin/Wayn al
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sh‘ab al-‘arabi (Where are the [Arab] masses? Where are the Arab people?).15 In 1998, in the
years following the Oslo Accords and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, a song featuring the top popular
singers of the day, “al-Hulm al-‘Arabi” (The Arab dream), was aired on satellite television,
becoming a hit associated loosely with pan-Arab unity, and featuring footage from the First
Intifada and the United-States led Gulf War against Iraq’s Saddam Hussein after his invasion of
neighboring Kuwait. At the same time, the song was heavily parodied due to the great disconnect
between its tone and the reality of Arab politics (Colla 2005, 339). It was funded in part by Saudi
prince Walid bin Talal and featured a sizeable number of singers from the Gulf. It featured
singers from all Arab countries except for Iraq, as per a veto by Kuwaiti participants in the
context of Saddam Hussein’s annexation of the country (Massad 2005, 195).
In 2000, the Second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, began after the
unwelcome visit of Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem,
which also followed the collapse of negotiations over Palestinian sovereignty at Camp David.
While the First Intifada had been overwhelmingly non-violent, the Second Intifada, which lasted
for five years, was undoubtedly violent on the part of both the Israeli army and Palestinian
militants, rather than being an uprising at the hands of everyday people (Naser-Najjab 2020).
After the Second Intifada began, “al-Hulm al-‘Arabi” was recirculated with new video footage
associated with the uprising, edited to include depictions of martyrs killed during the uprising
(Colla 2005, 338).16 In the years following the Second Intifada, the airing of nationalist songs
from the 1950s and 1960s on Arab satellite channels became more common, representing a
renewed Arab solidarity with the Palestinian cause (Colla 2005, 339). Colla (2005) describes the
rhetoric of Egyptian popular solidarity as one defined by sentimentality and redemption, arguing
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Live performance of Julia Boutros’ “Wayn al-Milayin”: https://youtu.be/LeJHO9pRhKk.
“al-Hulm al-‘Arabi”: https://youtu.be/V9ByJLMRGsk
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that Egyptian solidarity in pop music is presented as natural and as based in a shared identity
(340; 355). In his dissertation on Fairouz, Habib (2005, 225) writes:
In terms of the sweeping impact of the Palestinian issue on Egypt specifically, Hossam
Bahgat has pointed out that immediately following the start of the second intifada, there
was a rush of Egyptian musicians into the studios to record songs in support of the
Palestinian struggle for independence. Citing this material as forming an intifada genre,
and after assessing the pros and cons of the recent material, he discusses the role that
Fairouz has played in this combined musical genre and political cause, and he points to
the continued impact it is having on Egyptian culture.
The Lebanese singer and composer Marcel Khalife has also been associated with the Palestinian
cause, often singing poems by Palestinian poet and one of Palestine’s most famous figures,
Mahmud Darwish, such as with the song “Rita” (1976).17 All these different moments are
examples of non-Palestinian Arab singers singing in support of Palestinians’ struggle. Whether
or not these stints, particularly the numbers featuring groups of superstars, were as superficial as
the empty gestures of musical solidarity on Arab Idol, described further below, they were
undoubtedly a precedent for the show’s use of Palestine as a safe commercial crutch.

Palestinian popular music
Palestinian popular music by Palestinian popular artists over the decades should not be
painted with a pan-Arab brush. A rich tradition of Palestinian protest song reflects each political
moment highlighted above. These include bands such as Sabreen, active from the 1980s to the
early 2000s, and DAM, a hip-hop band particularly active in the 2000s.18 Their music has been
more concerned with on-the-ground Palestinian struggles and issues rather than a vague
solidarity with the larger Arab world, a frivolous endeavor in comparison. Popular music has
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“Rita”: https://youtu.be/Bpm4BOzwIec
For an in-depth monograph on Palestinian popular music, see McDonald 2013.
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also been addressed more directly to an Israeli and “Arab-Israeli” audience, or specifically in
regard to the Israeli occupation (Belkind 2021a; 2021b). In the context of Palestinian resistance,
McDonald (2013) argues that protest music is not one genre, but music in a variety of genres
attached to national and resistance projects. Massad (2005) goes as far as to argue that songs for
Palestine generate popular sentiments, and do not just reflect them.
After the First Intifada (1987-1993), as part of its state-building authority the Palestinian
National Authority, established in 1994, instituted songs, serials, and other state-sponsored
mediated forms (Stein & Swedenburg 2005, 12). Kanaaneh (2018) argues that there has been a
process of “heritagizing Palestinian music.” That is, Palestinian music has become a frozen
heritage, one that is seen as needing care from those in whose care Palestine remains, including
the state (376). The institutionalization of Palestinian music has also become a business with
commercial goals (Kanaaneh 2018; Brehony 2018). While Kanaaneh writes about this in the
context of the Palestinian state, these commercial goals have extended to the pan-Arab level as
well. This commercialization and institutionalization of Palestinian music sets up the next
section of the chapter regarding the commercial capitalization on Palestine and Palestinian
contestants by Arab Idol.
Hammond (2017a) argues that Arabism travels more by means of popular culture than
through politics. He suggests that popular culture is crucial to the perpetuation of a pan-Arab
identity, which is reinvigorated by new satellite media, where issues such as the Palestinian
cause can remain in circulation and new transnational identities can also develop. While
previously, Palestinian television viewers were beholden to Israeli television, the advent of
satellite television allowed for inhabitants of the Palestinian Occupied Territories to become part
of al-jumhur al-‘arabi, further incorporating Palestine into cultural and political visibility in the
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region (Hammond 2017a). Arabization set the standard for repertoire and performance aspects
on satellite television (Kanaaneh 2013). Yet, as seen in Chapter Four, musical ties particularly
within the Levant have been strong for centuries.

Palestine as an expression of Arabness on Arab Idol
This chapter has so far shown how the trajectory of Palestinian music constitutes a likely
precedent for Palestinian representation on Arab Idol. The show’s emphasis on Palestine has
connoted a representation of Arabness that was not disputable in the eyes of Arab Idol’s
producers. As an exception to the emphasis on regional over subnational identity, Palestine is the
one country that Arab Idol explicitly highlighted in order to advocate its exceptional importance
to the Arab world, rather than conflate it as a component of its diversity. Pride in Palestine and
the Palestinian musical performances on the show are equated with Arabness, with Palestine
referred to as the ard al-‘uruba (land of Arabness) by presenters on the show. No other
contestant’s country was taken by name as much as Palestine was during Season Four, whose
final showdown featured two Palestinian contestants. Furthermore, no music was as overtly
associated with the patriotism of a specific nation as was Palestine’s. Performances of patriotic
Palestinian repertoire by Palestinian contestants featured prominently in the widely watched final
rounds of several seasons of Arab Idol and went viral online. Also of note, two of the four
winners—and two of the four runners-up—were Palestinian (see Table 5.2). The participation
and success of these Palestinian contestants have in turn garnered international media attention.
This was the case with one of the two finalists in Superstar’s second season, the Palestinian
‘Ammar Hassan. Superstar coincided with the Second Intifada in Palestine (2000-05).
Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat supposedly made a phone call to Hassan in support, while the
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organization Hamas condemned the frenzy for the show as shallow compared to the need for
actual freedom fighters (Kraidy 2010). Hassan made international and American news at a time
when Palestine was already making headlines.19 Popular support for Hassan also showed
Palestine in a positive light to the world, with the Palestinian Ministry of Culture’s advertising of
the public viewing of the finale as a way to lift people in the struggle for freedom and
independence (Meizel 2007, 161). Palestine and the Palestinian struggle against Israeli
occupation together formed a point of (superficially) uncontroversial pan-Arab unity on Arab
Idol (and Superstar), deemed irrefutable by production personnel, judges, contestants, and many
fans alike, despite their many other contrasting national loyalties, and the lack of state or regional
policies to support this.

Table 5.2: Palestinian finalists in Superstar and Arab Idol
Season

Contestant

Superstar 1 (2004)

‘Ammar Hassan (runner up)

Arab Idol 2 (2013)

Muhammad ‘Assaf (winner)

Arab Idol 3 (2014)

Haitham Khalaila (runner-up)

Arab Idol 4 (2017)

Ya‘qub Shahin (winner)
Amir Dandan (runner up)

Arab Idol even went out of its way to allow for “honorary passports” to be given to
Palestinian contestants who are residents of Israel to allow for their participation in the highly
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Erlanger, Steven. 2004. “Palestinian carries a tune and the hope of his people.” The New York
Times, August 22, 2004. https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/22/world/palestinian-carries-a-tune-and-the-hope-ofhis-people.html; [no author]. 2004. “An Arab Idol is crowned.” The New York Times, August 30, 2004.
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/30/world/an-arab-idol-is-crowned.html.
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anticipated live broadcast stages of the show. Lebanon does not allow Israeli citizens past its
borders, or vice versa, which would have created an automatic barrier for Palestinians who are
Israeli citizens to compete on the show. However, two contestants in this position were selected
to advance in the show’s auditions for the first time during Season Three. Residing in the region
of the Galilee, Haitham Khalaila and Manal Musa traveled to Lebanon after receiving special
permission and documentation from the Palestinian Authority to compete in the show.20
Similarly, Amir Dandan, who like Khalaila was from the Galilee village of Majd al-Krum, was
granted an honorary passport to be able to attend the various stages of the competition in the
Lebanese studios.21 This was a significant allowance, as it is extremely difficult for Palestinians
with Israeli citizenship to receive permission to take part in cultural productions in this center of
popular culture in the Arab world. I suggest that this sizeable effort indicated the influence of
‘Assaf’s win in the previous season on Arab Idol’s urgency in facilitating its Palestinian
contestants and their primetime appearances. These behind-the-scenes complications were not
otherwise highlighted in front of the camera, as the only on-screen indication of these
contestants’ origins was glossed references simply to “Palestine.” On the other hand, Arab Idol
did not accommodate for Arab voters who reside within Israel; because no Israeli phone numbers
were provided to which voters could text their vote, dedicated voters would have driven every
week to the West Bank in order to cast their votes through a Palestinian cellphone provider.22
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https://www.haaretz.com/next-arab-idol-may-be-israeli-1.5316741
https://www.cpr.org/2017/02/27/seven-fun-facts-about-arab-idol/ .
Incidentally, Dandan is currently a resident of New Jersey, USA.
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https://www.haaretz.com/next-arab-idol-may-be-israeli-1.5316741
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The Muhammad ‘Assaf phenomenon
Probably what Arab Idol has become most famous for over the years is its Season Two
Palestinian winner from the Gaza Strip, Muhammad ‘Assaf. Conversely, ‘Assaf is undoubtedly
the contestant to have gained the most fame out of his appearance on the show, having become a
major Arab celebrity today. I argue that his unexpected fame and popularity was a gamechanger
for Arab Idol, making Palestine an even more viable rallying point on Arab Idol, with ‘Assaf as a
symbol of its importance to al-jumhur al-‘arabi in the seasons to come. On the other side of the
coin, the overwhelming reaction of the Arab audience to ‘Assaf’s win undoubtedly contributed to
Arab Idol seeing Palestine as a way to keep its viewers engaged. In 2013, ‘Assaf’s improbable
rise to the finalist stage as a contestant hailing from Gaza had gripped audiences across the
region and around the world.
Throughout the season, ‘Assaf wowed audiences with his voice, charismatic persona,
humility, and endearing backstory. His performances largely comprised hits by various Arab pop
singers, from Egyptian Karim Mahmud to Lebanese Wadi‘ al-Safi to the Saudi Muhammad
‘Abdu. His mawawil, vocal ornamentation, and vocal control impressed both the judges and
audiences on any given broadcast leading up to the finals. He was given the nickname al-sarukh
(“the rocket”) by Lebanese judge Ragheb Alama, seemingly an allusion to how he rocketed to
fame. He had also received a public endorsement from Palestinian Authority leader Mahmud
‘Abbas. His rags-to-riches story has circulated in various other contexts, becoming as
commonplace information for fans as the content of his viral videoclips.
One context for his backstory was the show Al-Dunya ‘Alamatni (The world taught me),
which also aired on the MBC network. During my short-lived stay in Beirut, I caught the end of
Al-Dunya ‘Alamatni on February 27, 2020. It just so happened to feature ‘Assaf reflecting on his

198

2013 participation and win on Arab Idol.23 He was speaking to a studio audience that looked like
it was based in either the United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia: he talked about how Arab Idol
changed his life, and how he went from a life of playing weddings to one of mega stardom,
mentioning that even a film had been made about him.24 He recalled the audition process, and
how when after his first attempt to audition he was unable to enter the premises, his mother had
told him not to go back and not to get his hopes up. He returned anyway, recalling how someone
he knew from back home was there, he said, and how this person gave him his own competition
number, telling ‘Assaf he would have more of a chance of success than he. This story echoes one
of the most oft-repeated anecdotes surrounding Mohammad ‘Assaf’s origins. Indeed, his origin
story was important to his fame, and to people’s perceptions of his rise and their admiration of
him. ‘Assaf had arrived at his audition in Egypt after two days of complications at the Egyptian
border. Reaching the audition space late—the building was already closed off to further
applicants—'Assaf had been too tardy to be able to qualify for an audition number. Impressed by
his voice, a fellow contestant, the Palestinian singer Ramadan Abu Nahel, had indeed handed
him his own audition number (Brehony 2018, 21). This scene was also recreated in the 2015 film
by Hany Abu-Assad, The Idol, based on ‘Assaf’s life and rise to stardom on Arab Idol. An
emotional story such as ‘Assaf’s has made for ideal reality television material. This series of
events has been regurgitated and passed around so much, a story that has become one of the most
basic legends around ‘Assaf, that it was interesting for me to hear it from ‘Assaf’s own mouth.
Whether this might have been a part of his story he was advised to emphasize, or if he simply felt
compelled to tell it repeatedly, he ultimately inspired his audience in this talk by advising them
to go after the impossible, among other things. This story, which along with the virtue of his
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At this point in 2020, this was perhaps a rerun of an older episode.
Hany Abu-Assad’s The Idol (2015).
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voice cemented ‘Assaf’s fame, also contributed to his significance to Arab Idol and MBC, which
took credit for introducing the Arab world to Palestine’s most recognizable cultural icon today.
As mentioned earlier, all the previous repertoire that ‘Assaf competed with up until the
season finale was not Palestinian; ‘Assaf mostly performed Lebanese and Egyptian numbers.
This changed with his final competition performance, a song that has made the viral rounds. He
performed “‘Ali al-Kufiyya,” a song associated with the Palestinian Fatah party and its call to
resistance of the occupation in an earlier era.25 New lyrics were penned by Mohammad Al-Najjar
especially for Arab Idol (Brehony 2018, 21).26 ‘Assaf began with a mawwal in the maqam
bayati, referencing Palestine as precious homeland, with a rare Islamic reference as well
mentioning the nur al-nabi (light of the Prophet [Muhammad]). His vocal prowess matched the
power of the words, resulting in strong reactions from the audience, and a viral spread of the clip
online in the days, months, and years to come. He then launched into the song, which featured
long instrumental interludes between verses, the dabke rhythm, and a synthesizer imitating the
mijwiz, a folk double-pipe wind instrument associated with dabke.27 During one of these
instrumental sections, ‘Assaf began to perform the footwork of dabke alone on stage, holding his
microphone up in the air to one side as if he were holding up a kuffiya, the way a leader of a line
of dancing people might have done. In the studio, audience members began to form spontaneous
mini-trains of dabke lines as well. One audience member couldn’t help but barge onstage to hold
‘Assaf’s available hand, so that ‘Assaf would not be dancing dabke alone. They danced a cycle

25

Fatah is a political party to which Palestinian Authority president Mahmud ‘Abbas belongs. A faction of the larger
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Yasir Arafat was one of its founders.
26
The song is of either Palestinian or Iraqi heritage depending on who you ask (Brehony 2018, 21).
27
For more on the mijwiz in the Arab Levant, see Racy 1994.

200

or two of the dabke rhythm together before the man was removed swiftly by security from the
stage. ‘Assaf launched into the next verse without missing a beat, a big smile on his face.28
During the season finale, split screens prominently depicted live audiences in three
Palestinian locations while ‘Assaf performed: Gaza, Ramallah, and Nazareth, significantly in the
three demarcated regions of Gaza, West Bank, and within the state of Israel, respectively. When
‘Assaf was announced as the winner of Season Two, his victory was celebrated in those cities as
well as in Beirut and beyond, with audiences glued to their screens at home and in public spaces
as the results were announced.29 One Twitter blogger wrote, “Mohammed Assaf didn't free
Palestine…but he brought joy to people who didn't smile for the past 66 years of occupation.”30
Similarly, during a New York screening of his film The Idol (2015), the Palestinian film director
Hany Abu-Assad expressed that he felt prouder of Palestine in the moment that ‘Assaf won than
he ever had previously. Indeed, his film captured that feeling of hope and joy. As film scholar
Dina Georgis (2020) writes, the film allowed ‘Assaf to “[become] a transitional cultural object
through which the potential space for Palestinians to imagine an otherwise was rendered
possible” (4).
The song that ‘Assaf performed after his victory, “Ya Dunya ‘Alay Ishhadi” (World,
witness me) was written and prepared especially for his potential victory moment.31 The patriotic
pan-Arab lyrics of this song seemed to be modeled on the tradition of bombastic songs of the
1960s. I argue that the excitement of the crowd was unrelated to these pan-Arab sentiments.
Despite the subject of the lyrics being about the unification of the Arab people and renewal
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Clip of ‘Assaf’s Season 2 performance of “ ‘Ali al-Kufiyya”: https://youtu.be/wEUBdZOEDRU
https://electronicintifada.net/content/mohammed-assaf-champion-people-or-powerful/12643
30
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23017923
31
“Ya Dunya ‘Alay Ishhadi” https://youtu.be/fh6Vhrr5nS8
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through unity—with lines such as Ya shu‘ub al-dad lazim bil-waja‘ tatawahadi (O Arabs,32 you
need to unite)—it was his vocal talent, charisma, Palestinianness, and story of a Gazan who
succeeded against all odds that gave Palestinians and Arabs something to celebrate. The audience
and fan reactions to the Season Two finale weekend, between his performance of “‘Ali alKufiyya” and his monumental win, were numerous and emotional. Due to his win, overt
Palestinian references and an emphasis on celebration of Palestine become more evident and
accepted as a commercial preference in the next seasons of Arab Idol.

‘Assaf as a turning point for Palestine’s significance on Arab Idol
Muhammad ‘Assaf’s momentous win was by no means forgotten in subsequent Arab Idol
seasons; in fact, it was seemingly referenced as frequently as possible. ‘Assaf made guest
appearances in various capacities on both subsequent seasons of Arab Idol, a special honor that
had not been bestowed upon previous winners to this extent. Riding the wave of this new
marketable symbolism of Palestine with ‘Assaf’s sensational win, Arab Idol took its auditions to
Palestine for the first time during the following season. Taking the audience across the region
and the world for the audition stage over the course of several episodes, Palestine was the highly
anticipated arrival in Season Three’s final auditions episode.33 In the previous episode, emcee
Ahmad Fahmy had teased the upcoming first visit to Palestine, telling the audience to stay tuned
for a visit to the ard al-‘uruba (land of Arabness) next time.34 ‘Assaf appeared in this episode,
with Fahmy introducing him as the most appropriate guest to introduce this very first visit of
Arab Idol to Palestine. He called ‘Assaf the ibn il-balad or “son of the country [of Palestine].”
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“Shu‘ub al-dad” is literally “people of the Arabic letter dad ض.”
Season Three, Episode 4.
34
Season Three, Episode 3.
33
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Before ‘Assaf took the stage as the featured guest in a live episode later that season,
emcee Annabella Hilal Sa‘d prepared the audience with a preamble, stating how last season on
Arab Idol, a star had rocked the Arab world, a clear reference to ‘Assaf, as such extreme stardom
had not accompanied any other Arab Idol winner or finalists previously. “Tonight, he is with
us!” (Al-layl hua ma‘na!). Before Hilal had even said his name, the crowd was loudly cheering
for him. The studio band began to play an introduction, and there was quite a bit of visual media
theatrics before ‘Assaf’s grand entrance. The crowd was already chanting his name—a repeating
pattern of his last name chanted twice in succession—before he even arrived on stage, going wild
when he did finally step into the light.35 Once he began to sing, the studio audience was on its
feet throughout his performance. He performed two of his original singles: “Aiwa Haghanni”
(Yes, I will sing) and “Shu Bitkhabarna” (What are you telling us). He featured his Palestinian
band for his performances rather than Arab Idol’s house band. Finally, ‘Assaf performed “‘Ali
al-Kufiyya,” reprising his touchstone Season Two performance within a medley featuring the
other participating contestants of the season as a backing chorus. Just as the audience had done in
his previous performance of this song, the contestants began to form dabke lines onstage, behind
him, around him, and at times with ‘Assaf as well as they sang along with him. After the
performance, Sa‘d thanked ‘Assaf not just for his performance but for his dabke, which I argue is
indexical of his Palestinianness, and discuss further below.
‘Assaf’s win made him a fixture not just of Arab Idol but also of the MBC Group
corporation at large. Like other winners of the show, ‘Assaf won a record deal with Platinum
Records, a subsidiary label of MBC with whom he entered a contract to produce content.
Because of MBC’s continued production of ‘Assaf’s stardom, the subsequent two seasons of
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Season Three, Episode 12: https://youtu.be/LTuZtKQVGpI
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Arab Idol included various self-promotional references to ‘Assaf. He performed his own singles
that were produced under the auspices of Platinum Records as a guest artist. Furthermore, later
contestants also sang his numbers recorded with that label. His appearance on al-Dunya
‘Alamatni also reflected how he was beholden to the MBC network. As he had done on that
program, ‘Assaf expressed how thankful he was for Arab Idol when he appeared as a Season
Three guest. Nancy Ajram responded by welcoming him back to his MBC home and family. His
relationship with MBC has paid off, as ‘Assaf has become one of the Arab world’s, and certainly
Palestine’s, most visible celebrities. If Instagram followers are any kind of rubric, his following
of 5.6 million far exceeds that of two superstar judges on the show, such as Wael Kfoury (1 mil)
and Hassan al-Shafi‘i ((3.1 mil), as well as that of celebrity emcee Ahmad Fahmy (4.8 mil).36

Dabke, the kufiyya, and Palestinian music on Arab Idol
Dabke featured prominently on Arab Idol. It is a common dance and music form not just
in Palestinian communities, but in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, as well as in similar forms across
the region and continent.37 After the 1948 Nakba, pan-Arabism was a source of hope for an
eventual return for Palestinians exiled from what is now the state of Israel (Rowe 2011, 371).
This affected the production of Palestinian dance forms such as dabke, which became associated
with a more Arab identity (Rowe 2011, 371). The Baalbek Festival in Lebanon became
associated with the production of dance and theater productions in this vein, with dabke taking
on a more stylized form through the 1960s (Rowe 2011, 372; Stone 2008). Following the 1967
Naksa, a Palestinian national ideology sponsored by the Palestine Liberation Organization began
to take precedence over pan-Arabism, and in the way dabke was promoted in Palestine (Rowe
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Numbers of followers as of summer 2022.
See Silverstein 2012 on dabke in Syria; See also Munk 2021.
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2011, 375). Dabke began to become a more ubiquitous practice crossing class and generational
divides in this new era. As Rowe (2011) writes, “This presentation of dabkeh as a symbol of
political identity had been fostered by the Palestine National Front, which declared a
commitment to protect local ‘culture and history from Zionist manipulation and distortion’ and
to revive folk heritage as an embodiment of the peoples’ attachment to their land” (375).38 Dabke
is associated with a “canon of rhythmic folk song” (McDonald 2013, 62). A typical rhythm
associated with Palestinian dabke such as in “‘Ala Dala‘una,” is the wahid wa nus39 (McDonald
2013, 63)—literally one and a half—because of the asymmetric feel.40 After the First Intifada,
dabke, popular folklore, and peasant symbolism associated with wearing the kuffiya (checkered
scarf) became popular, signaling a “rooted” identity in the land (Swedenburg 1990; Karkabi
2018; McDonald 2013b). On Arab Idol, it is clear that these various eras of dabke superficially
affect how it was portrayed on the show, with different performances appealing to various
valences of Levantineness, Arabness, and Palestinianness.
After ‘Assaf’s win, dabke became a more obvious marker of Palestinianness on Arab Idol
when it was performed while the contestants or backing singers and dancers donned the
Palestine-associated checkered scarf, the kufiyya. Along with ‘Assaf in the example above, other
Palestinian contestants in Season Three and Four performed with dabke accompaniment, and the
raising of Palestinian flags became a common occurrence. The appearance of Palestinian
nationalist dabke songs on a Lebanese stage is a contrast from Lebanon’s historical relationship
with Palestinians and Palestinian performance.

38

Rowe cites International Documents on Palestine, 1973 (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1976) p. 460.
Wahid (wahda) wa nuss rhythm: https://www.maqamworld.com/en/iqaa/wahda_w_nuss.php
40
Ya‘qub Shahin performs “‘Ala Dala‘una,” a song in the wahid wa nuss rhythm, during Season 4 while wearing a
kuffiya draped around his neck: https://youtu.be/5IMUvCKg9IY @ 24:55.
39
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Table 5.3: Select Palestinian songs on Arab Idol
Season

Song

Contestant

Season Two (finale)

“‘Ali al-Kufiyya”

Muhammad ‘Assaf

Season Three

“‘Ali al-Kufiyya”

Muhammad ‘Assaf (as guest
performing artist)

Season Four (mid-season live

“Ana Dammi Falastini”

episode)

(single by Muhammad

Ya‘qub Shahin

‘Assaf)
Season Four (mid-season live

“Falastin Ya Ummi Ya Ruhi”

Amir Dandan

Season Four (live episode)

“ ‘Ala Dala‘una”

Ya‘qub Shahin

Season Four ughniyat al-fawz

“Ana Dammi Falastini”

Ya‘qub Shahin (with Amir

episode)

(victory song)

Dandan and Muhammad
‘Assaf)

In one of the final live episodes of Season Four, Palestinian contestant and eventual
winner Ya‘qub Shahin performed the song “Ana Dammi Falastini,” a single recorded by
‘Assaf.41 In the performance, Palestinian tropes and imagery summoned a historic connection
between Palestine and the Arab world as kuffiya-adorned performers danced in dabke formation.
Once again, audience members made spontaneous lines of dancers throughout the studio. Dabke
became a somewhat performative trope on Arab Idol, an easy way for the show to demonstrate a

41

Clip of “Ana Dammi Falastini”: https://youtu.be/PLKAFceE-fU
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Palestinian-ness. On the same night, Muhammad ‘Assaf again appeared as a guest artist,
performing with what seems to be the same troupe dancing behind him as well.42

Figure 5.4: Screenshot from Shahin’s Season 4 performance of “Ana Dammi Falastini”

The brief history of “Ana Dammi Falastini” also reveals the continued commercial viability of
Palestine within the MBC network. As with his other singles and albums, ‘Assaf recorded this
song on MBC’s Platinum Records, the label to which Shahin is now beholden as well. Shahin
performed “Dammi Falastini” not just once as one of his final competitive performances: it was
also his victory song (ughniyat al-fawz) following his acceptance of the Idol title, and he did not
fail to get his audience up and dancing dabke each time. ‘Assaf was an invited guest in the
audience along with political dignitaries during the finale where both Amir Dandan and Shahin
were up for the title. The odds of a Palestinian winning and therefore for ‘Assaf being able to
celebrate with the winner were quite high. As expected, he joined the finalists on stage after
42

https://youtu.be/UDiSd608xtA

207

Shahin’s win was announced. The presence of ‘Assaf and Dandan alongside Shahin suggested
that this was an overall win for Palestine as each of the three Palestinians took a Palestinian flag
and positioned himself centerstage. Later in this performance of “Ana Dammi Falastini” ‘Assaf
and Dandan each took a verse of the song for themselves after Shahin had enjoyed his moment in
the spotlight, a welcome move as evidenced by the reactions of the crowd, who appreciated the
passing of the baton among the Palestinian stars. “Dammi Falastini” exemplifies how Palestinian
nationalism and resistance are commercially viable.

Figure 5.5: Season Four finale: (from left) Muhammad ‘Assaf, Ya‘qub Shahin, and Amir
Dandan.
Similar to ‘Assaf’s win four years earlier, Shahin’s was considered a national day in Palestine
and celebrated across Palestinian territories and communities around the globe. One person
celebrating noted, “There are faces of victory, political and musical. Today it is musical, but we
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hope one day we will have our political victory.”43 Just as ‘Assaf marked a turning point for the
influence of Palestinianness on Arab Idol, there is no doubt that ‘Assaf and Shahin are squarely
products of the commercial cultural production associated with MBC and the Saudi-owned
cultural production. As Brehony (2018) suggests, corporations are happy to sell the idea of
Palestine as a musical product and throw around the Palestinian flag for marketing purposes (2224). This raises the question of why the revolution and disaster in Syria, one of the pillars of PanArabism, did not garner as much attention. Instead, Syrian performances were subsumed under
pan-Arab catchphrases that ignored Syria’s historical importance as a center for pan-Arabism
and the urgency of its current events, as indicated in the previous chapter.

Conclusions
This chapter has further explored how articulating Arabness is an approach that Arab Idol
used to reach out to its far-flung audience. In this case, it did so by suggesting that Palestine
served as a unifying shared pillar of Arabness. While recent seasons de-emphasized national
identities, the one exception was Palestine. Palestine on Arab Idol was seen as a major node of
accordance for its audience, something uplifting, a story that was meant to show a success
against all odds. Particularly after Muhammad ‘Assaf’s significant rise under the public eye,
Arab Idol’s emphasis on Palestinian contestants and Palestinian music increased to form a point
of commercially viable yet uncontroversial pan-Arab unity on Arab Idol, deemed irrefutable by
production personnel, judges, contestants, and many fans alike in order to reach their target, aljumhur al-‘arabi. This is significant because no other country, particular Syria, which was the
primary bulwark of anti-imperialism in the region and a homeland to Arab nationalism, nor the

43

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/palestinians-take-to-the-streets-as-local-boy-makes-goodon-arab-idol-1.5442045
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current events and suffering due to the wars in Syria and Yemen, were given anywhere near the
same amount of attention. The emphases on Palestine also reiterate the precedents of Arab
history, media, and music since the twentieth century that have informed the contours of
Arabness—touched on throughout the dissertation—that Arab Idol chose to embrace.
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Conclusion
When I initially pursued this project, I had assumed Arab Idol would continue to run
throughout my research timeframe; however, the first season that I started paying attention to in
real time, in 2016-2017, turned out to be its last. Or, at least, the return of a future season of Arab
Idol looks unlikely. The Idols franchise on MBC has now begun a string of national offshoots
that may continue for the foreseeable future. What is different with these offshoots, such as Iraq
Idol (2021) and Saudi Idol (slated to air in late 2022), is the focus solely on Iraqi and Saudi
audiences, respectively. For instance, MBC only broadcast Iraq Idol on its local satellite channel
carried in Iraq. At the same time, viewers across the Arab region and across the world were able
to watch full episodes on YouTube in the days following their airing, including this author,
before they were removed for reasons of copyright infringement. While featuring new celebrity
personnel in front of the camera, production tenets behind the camera seemed similar to previous
seasons of Arab Idol, with a focus on singers having to show their ability to sing a range of
repertoire from across the Arab world, in addition to highlighting a broad variety of Iraqi music.
Other vocal talent franchises, such as The Voice and X-Factor, continue to be slated for future
seasons, and in the years since Arab Idol finished, have featured viral moments of contestants
singing Arab repertoire, both contemporary hits and older Golden Age hits.1 Otherwise, Arab
Idol as a regional phenomenon and a uniquely modern-day pan-Arab project, has come to an
end.
Of all Arab Idol winners or contestants, Muhammad ‘Assaf remains by far the most
prominent and famous, having forged a serious touring and recording career, and having

1

One example is The Voice Kids winner Muhammad Ibrahim singing Warda’s “Mustahil” in 2020:
https://youtu.be/Jfq7GlSE-Ro.
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maintained a large social media following at this time of writing. As mentioned in Chapter Five,
there was a fictional biopic based on his life and his ascent to fame on Arab Idol, which had
international screenings, one of which I attended in New York, and long-term availability in the
United States on the movie-streaming platform, Netflix. ‘Assaf’s rise to celebrity not only
brought this Palestinian cultural-realm victory to international headlines, but, as I argued,
positioned Palestine into becoming a cornerstone of Arab Idol’s imagined Arabness, and paving
the way for Palestinian contestants to gain a sometimes-exaggerated prominence on the show in
comparison to contestants from other countries.
While official Arab Idol accounts on YouTube and social media platforms have limited
episodes or contestants’ performance clips available for streaming, various fan accounts carry
some of the most viral and still prominent videos when one makes a cursory “Arab Idol”
keyword search.2 Some of the show’s most viral moments coincide with those that I’ve discussed
in this dissertation: Muhammad ‘Assaf’s performance of “‘Ali al-Kufiyya”; Kurdish contestant
‘Ammar al-Kufi singing in the Kurdish language; Yemeni ‘Ammar Muhammad breaking down
crying while performing about Yemen; Syrian contestant ‘Abd al-Karim Hamdan singing a
mawwal about Aleppo; and the group finale song “Mal‘una al-Hurub” (Cursed are the wars)
during which Nancy Ajram burst into tears. These are some of the most moving moments from
the show’s brief history, and are expected to remain the most watched clips: moments where the
music, lyrics, and visible emotions of either a contestant or judge combined to create a
memorable clip worth re-watching, “favoriting,” and sharing.
These clips highlight the immediate relatability of their content, which sometimes
overlapped with what I have suggested Arab Idol presented as its imagination of Arabness. They

2

These videos and accounts have dodged being removed from the platforms for years but are inevitably still subject
to being taken down.
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often aligned with Arab Idol’s decision to celebrate a diverse Arabness, as discussed in Chapter
Four. “Cursed Are the Wars” was meant, tragically, to tap into something that many Arabs could
relate to: war and its everyday consequences on daily life. In other instances, however, these
viral videos related to what I presented as the contradictions to the show’s general themes of
Arabness. Hamdan’s viral Aleppo mawwal was one that contested Arab Idol’s almost vindictive
stance to move way from any discussion of Syria during its many years’ conflict. Yet, the
crowd’s reaction in the moment and the clip’s continued appearance on top-Idols hits,
demonstrates how that performance was more memorable than some of the finalists’ winning
songs, topping those clips of the presumably Idol-worthy. While Arab Idol strove to move away
from specificity of countries and cities, the clips that remain popular today ultimately relate most
to specific national or city identities, specifically to those that have been linked to disaster and
devastation, rather than themes of general Arab identity. I have suggested that this disconnect
between the official show discourse and fan responses during and after the show’s tenure is
linked to why Arabness became the discourse of choice on Arab Idol: to offset the discord of
specific events of that decade through generalizations.
Also notable about YouTube’s top Arab Idol hits are the ones that I’ve argued fall under
a canon of pan-Arab song: songs that have persisted on various media for decades and now are
further codified on entertainment media platforms through their popularity on Arab Idol: as I
have argued, Arab Idol actively contributed to the pan-Arab vocal canon, and continues to do so
through its streaming hits on platforms such as YouTube. Similarly, some of its top songs
overlap with videos of the same numbers on other corners of YouTube, whether they are
YouTube videos featuring the audio of the original songs themselves, or are renditions
performed by contemporary ensembles, such as the National Arab Orchestra. While Chapter
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Three outlined the various aspects of vocal technique, aesthetics, repertoire, and performance
conventions that were objects of attention or discussion throughout the vocal talent contest, it
also must be stated that there was not much profound criticism of the voice and vocal technique,
with little serious “judgement” made on any of these aspects. They were often just mentioned in
passing and vocal techniques were not often deconstructed or even necessarily associated with a
contestant being particularly promising.
When I first approached this project, I was primarily interested by how the same Arab
music “hits” would keep appearing in various contexts, not just in my experiences as a student of
Arab music in the United States and later as a performer of this repertoire, but in highly
commercialized contexts, such as Arab Idol. This interest has of course brought me to explore
many other aspects of Arab Idol that helped explained this development of the canon and other
features that I came to see as the show’s imagined Arabness. With this project, I have begun to
pursue not only the overlap of music and media throughout the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries, but also other areas of inquiry that I find reverberate across the fields of media studies,
Arab studies, Arab music studies, and ethnomusicology at large.
There are many roads for further inquiry. I was not able to conduct the in-depth fieldwork
that I had imagined, so ethnographic avenues comprise a first obvious realm of interest.
Interviews with personnel involved in Arab Idol’s production, former contestants, or judges,
would certainly provide further insight into the making of the Arabness I’ve been largely
gleaning from watching online clips and previous episodes. Ethnographic pursuit of what went
on between broadcasts, such as how songs were chosen for individual singers and the types of
coaching they received, would certainly open up other avenues of inquiry. Interviews with past
viewers of Arab Idol or focus groups centering around the viewing of old episodes would further
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add to an understanding of how a framing of Arabness might translate on the ground. Another
related line of inquiry that might benefit from ethnographic research is discussions of how direct
engagement or voting aspects on the show relate to political issues today, something I began to
allude to in my second chapter. Furthermore, how might the widespread Arab diaspora
contribute to an understanding of pan-Arabness on the show and to understandings of a pan-Arab
musical canon?
Another arena ripe for inquiry is one that straddles music and media studies: the
enormous Arab musical mainstream and its continued dominance on Arab television, social
media, and streaming platforms, such as YouTube, Spotify, and Anghami. Even if Arab Idol
does not return as a pan-Arab phenomenon, there is much to focus on regarding Arab music
programs on Arab satellite television that feature contemporary Arab popular mainstream music.
Music programs, whether they are contests, performance programs, or talk shows, continue to
proliferate on Arab television, whether in sub-regional or national contexts, or on channels
broadcast throughout the region. Research on the songs that might have commercial connections
to various shows, who licenses them, and who is performing them might provide more
information about the overlap of music and media industries, which I discussed in Chapter One.
Indeed, as I have also discussed in this dissertation, televised talent shows have often portrayed
contestants singing songs that are already licensed by the recording companies under the same
corporate umbrella as the satellite channels, and are ones that have been recorded by the judges
on these shows, themselves a part of the industry. An examination of recording labels and other
corporate entities to get a sense of all the players involved in the formation of this mammoth
industry has not been thoroughly pursued, and hopefully this study might open some pathways in
this direction.
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In a similar vein, the transnational aspect of the Arab music industry is also a major line
of inquiry. As Awad (2022) argues, it is not so much Arab unity through Arab nationalism that is
relevant in the 2020s but an Arab regionalism, one based more in economic policies to involve
the coordination of countries across a region and a way to maintain identity and cohesiveness as
well (36), what can be seen to be an Arabness. The decline of the pan-Arab Idols might suggest
the demise of pan-Arabism, particularly when it comes to Saudi Arabia’s funding of the show
and satellite network and the state’s geopolitical and economic priorities, as well as the role of
Dubai (United Arab Emirates) in the show’s production, as discussed throughout the dissertation.
Saudi and Emirati influence on entertainment media must be investigated further, with recent
developments in the past few years—such as increased diplomatic and economic relations
between Saudi Arabia and Israel, and the 2020 Abraham Accords between the United Arab
Emirates, Israel, and the United States—possibly influencing how the networks prefer to express
an Arabness, and some of its cornerstones such as Palestine.
Finally, in addition to examining how various media forms such as Arab Idol have
contributed to codifying musical repertoire and mirroring a musical canon, an examination of
how the field of ethnomusicology does this itself is worth investigating. With this study, I hope
to have contributed to this and other fields, and to have shown how the voice on such a highly
commercial television program can serve as a lens for considering various valences and layers of
politics and culture.
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Appendix A: Arab Idol contestants discussed in this dissertation
NAME

COUNTRY

SEASON

Muhammad ‘Assaf
Farah Yusif
Parwas Hussain
‘Abd al-Karim Hamdan
Hazim Sharif
Haitham Khalaila
Majid Madani
‘Ali Najm
‘Ammar al-Kufi
Ya‘qub Shahin
Amir Dandan
‘Ammar Muhammad
Nadine Khatib
Isra‘ Gamal
Walid Bishara

Palestine
Syria
Iraqi Kurdistan
Syria
Syria
Palestine
Saudi Arabia
Iraq
Iraqi Kurdistan
Palestine
Palestine
Yemen
Palestine
Egypt
Lebanon

2
2
2
2
3 (winner)
3 (finalist)
3 (finalist)
3
3
4 (winner)
4 (finalist)
4 (finalist)
4
4
4

Muhannad Husayn
Muhammad bin Salih

Jordan
Tunisia

4
4

Dalia Sa‘id
Bandar Mugri

Egypt
Saudi Arabia

4
4

Hussam al-Shuwaykhi
Humam Ibrahim
Kawthar Berrani
Badr al-Hassan

Tunisia
Iraq
Morocco
Bahrain

4
4
4
4

Appendix B: Judges and emcees from Arab Idol Seasons Three & Four
NAME
Nancy Ajram
Wael Kfoury
Ahlam
Hasan al-Shafi‘i
Annabella Hilal S‘ad
Ahmad Fahmy

POSITION
Judge
Judge
Judge
Judge
Emcee
Emcee

COUNTRY
Lebanon
Lebanon
United Arab Emirates
Egypt
Lebanon
Egypt

SEASON
3&4
3&4
3&4
3&4
3
3&4
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